Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization

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Preface

Two years have passed since the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami occurred on March 11, 2011. The city of Sendai, the home of Tohoku University, appears to have returned to the bustle of life prior to the disaster. However, the catastrophe has left deep marks, and the painful loss can often be felt. Living in Sendai, we live close to many people who daily mourn the dead. Many people who continue to live their daily lives despite having lost their homes, and any clear sight of reconstruction, not knowing what the future will be, suffer from the rupture the disaster has caused. Our Tohoku University Global COE Program entitled “Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization” is committed to academic work on issues caused by and brought to light by the natural disaster.

Our Program established in 2008 at Tohoku University attempted to present solutions for the broad set of problems emerging in a world of advancing globalization. Furthermore, as its primary purpose, this GCOE program aimed to cultivate young researchers able to generate deep understanding and effective answers addressing the problems of globalization (for further details please visit the GCOE program’s website available at http://www.law.tohoku.ac.jp/gcoe). Since the second year of this project we have been also able to welcome the participating students of our Cross-National Doctoral Course (CNDC) allowing the GCOE program to unfold its full research capacity.

To aid in achieving its stated purposes and objectives this GCOE program launched a journal which published its academic research results in academic year 2008. Adopting the first letters from the GCOE’s program title “Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality”, this periodical was named “GEMC journal”. Since academic year 2009, we have published two GEMC journals, English and Japanese volumes every year. Numbers 6 and 7, published in March 2012, both featured articles on the disaster. In the final academic year 2012, we published a final edition Number 10 featured GCOE Concluding Seminar as well as the regular English and Japanese volumes.

As a general rule, the journal is divided into two sections. The first section includes invited articles requested by members of the journal’s editorial board and features papers based on presentations held at one of the GCOE’s seminars and workshops, as well as research articles from program members. In order to provide young researchers the opportunity for publishing their research work, the second section of this journal features submitted and reviewed articles. The journal accepted articles related to the GCOE’s program regardless of the author’s academic status and qualifications, and invited the authors of articles considered for publication to present their work at a workshop and to share the results of this research work. All submitted papers were subject to a review process conducted by the Referee Board established within the Editorial Board of this journal. Given the broad nature of themes the submitted papers cover, this Referee Board evaluated the articles by inviting additional opinions from anonymous experts from each article’s academic field. Based on these evaluations the Referee Board aimed to provide a firm and fair review process. We would like to express our deepest gratitude to all external experts who have been kind enough to provide their help in offering their opinions on the various articles.

Accompanying the advancement of globalization, the differences created by gender, nationalism, community and generation have caused severe and structurally entangled negative effects for society. This GCOE program was initiated to support the seeking of ways to overcome these negative effects and to construct a society sharing a plurality of cultural values. In 2008, the year of the GCOE program’s founding, the world was been dominated by the globalization issue of the financial crisis spreading from its epicenter in the United States of America. The Great East Japan Earthquake, which hit at a time of global economic crisis, made the difficult issues facing Japanese society far graver. Yet, while this crisis has created challenges of a complex and immediate nature, this GCOE program wished to create through academic ventures reliable and sound research, building the foundations for addressing these challenges. Publishing a total of 10 volumes of the GEMC journal by the final year 2012 was, therefore, one of our efforts in this endeavor. We are deeply grateful to all of the authors and those who cooperated in the production of our GEMC journal.

March, 2013
GEMC journal Editorial Board
Tohoku University Global COE
“Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization”
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THE GENDER GAP IN HAPPINESS AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITION
MIZUOCHI Masaaki
Let me start with a scenario. What would happen if the Prime Minister of Iceland, Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, met with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia? This would be a meeting between two heads of state in which the starkest of differences would be evident in terms of gender and sexuality, not to ignore also the differences in cultural, religious, political and ethnic backgrounds.

Regarded as one of the most powerful women in the world according to Forbes magazine, Sigurðardóttir became Iceland’s head of government on 1 February 2009 on the wake of the ‘great financial crisis’ that hit her country hard. She is the first female Prime Minister of Iceland, although there has been a female President in the past, and this is no coincidence perhaps as Iceland is usually at the very top of all of the international indices that evaluate the health of a nation’s gender equality. Apart from Finland, Iceland pretty much out-performs all countries in the world in terms of its performance in equalising the differences between male and female opportunity, education, political participation and health.

According to the World Economic Forum annual report, which measures equity in the areas of politics, education, employment and health, Iceland remains the country that has the greatest equality between men and women. Indeed, Nordic nations are at the top of the list of 134 countries, with Norway in second place and Finland third.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is usually found in the bottom 10 countries in terms of gender equality. One stark comparison would be the presence of women in parliament and government with Iceland having high representation in contrast to Saudi Arabia.

But, having said that, changes have been happening in Saudi Arabia. In September 2011, the King brought in the ability for women having the right to vote, ‘to run in future municipal elections and to be appointed to the all-male influential advisory Shura Council.’ Although a long way from the kind of emancipation of women that has now generally been accepted as normative in the international arena of the twenty first century, ‘These initiatives are considered to be major advancements for the rights of women in a conservative society such as the Saudi society’.1 And it is worthwhile to note that Saudi women do have the opportunity of education and many feel that while they may be physically and politically invisible, they are active in constructing, maintaining and sustaining Saudi society. Understanding gender issues across such different
cultural contexts is complex warranting careful analysis given that dominant ideas about gender equality are frequently framed through a Western lens.

Furthermore the stark difference in the meeting between the heads of Iceland and Saudi Arabia would be exacerbated entirely by a further difference that would be highly noteworthy. Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir is also a lesbian, and married her female partner in 2010 when same sex marriage was fully legalised in Iceland. By contrast, being a lesbian in Saudi Arabia is illegal. Homosexual men face the death penalty. This example underscores the interconnections between gender, sexuality and culture. It also highlights the complexity of gender equality across cultures, which can be seen at the very heart of cultural and social issues in a society.

As the Catalan philosopher and human rights theorist Raimundo Pannikar has argued so eloquently, ‘cultural translations are more delicate than heart transplants.’ Thus, to search for common ground or space in which to enter into dialogue and conversation, which is at the heart of a cosmopolitan and active convivial democratic commitment, requires an attempt to connect the specific to the universal experience. As Edward Said observed about this dilemma, ‘Universality means taking a risk in order to go beyond the easy certainties provided us by our background, language, nationality, which so often shield us from the reality of others.’

This meeting I suspect would therefore be a remarkable one (if it actually ever occurred) as it brings to the foreground crucial tensions around the ways in which gender and sexuality are negotiated, regulated and governed across a multiculture world. It underlines cultural diversity and difference and the kinds of challenges that exist in terms of different values, customs and ideas about intimacy and love, particularly if we then connect these things to citizenship and identity. As Jonathan Ong writes cogently about our present times, ‘Processes of globalization – the increasing awareness of a world “where there are no “others”” (Giddens, 1991: 27) – seem to necessitate a new kind of identity politics for a world marked by complex interdependencies and everyday encounters of difference.’

Responding to the paradoxical forces of globalization is a demanding but crucial endeavour. The changing landscape of culture and society across the world is so rapid and so complex that the need to clarify what is happening is imperative and urgent. We know that the effects of globalisation are uneven and deeply contradictory. Economic, social, cultural and political interdependence and mutuality are certainly key features of the twenty first century, but so are parochialism, atavism, fundamentalism, essentialism, poverty and exclusionary notions of belonging. We know that according to world indicators across a range of issues that endemic inequalities exist that cut across markers of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, disability, age and so on. Moreover, the postcolonial environment of the twenty first century is witness to the aftermath of centuries of Western colonisation affecting every part of the planet.

And as we face this complex global arena, it is apparent that it is characterised by a revolution in communication and knowledge as well as the centrality of violence in public life, a leftover of the militarisation of the twentieth century. Following several centuries of European Enlightenment thought dominating the way things are done and conceived; where the production of knowledge has been predicated on Western Enlightenment values and principles such as individualism, progress, science and rationality to the exclusion of other ways of knowing; the world is becoming re-imagined through the re-ascension of Non-Western ways of thinking.
This leads inexorably to new and reflexive ways of thinking about what it means to co-habit the planet, particularly how to get along with others who are radically different. Understanding how to get along in a world of cultural and social diversity is now ubiquitous to the human condition. Flowing out of this are questions about human identity and how it is constructed. The opportunities, challenges and inevitability of rubbing shoulders with difference are now so extant that we need to develop new languages and disciplines for not just coping with these things, but to negotiate and understand them fully. As Edward Said remarked about human culture: ‘Survival is about the connections between things.’

As a response to this global arena of complexity, my interest as a cultural studies and human rights scholar is on the effects of changing notions of citizenship. I am concerned with cultural citizenship, where broader questions of how citizens come to belong or not belong, are included or excluded, visible or invisible in society, occurs through markers of difference that form the citizen’s identity as a subject and as a person. I think it is important to open up the meaning of multiculture to include the full range of markers that define what being human means, to go further than racial or ethnic markers alone to understand culture as a multiplicity that also includes gender, sexuality, age, religion and so on.

Citizenship as a consequence has become an increasingly important conceptual framework for cultural and political theory and practice. Implicit in the question of who/what is a citizen is the role of the public sphere (where citizens are constructed through the media, education, law and, medicine for example) and I would argue that there is a powerful interconnection between civil society and the public sphere with implications for how intimacy is managed, regulated and negotiated. There is a sense that in any consideration of what citizenship means it is necessary to examine what is embedded in the relations between the state and citizen, and between citizens. What are the dynamics of the conditions necessary to enable mutuality in these relations, where co-habitation is not only peaceful, respectful, convivial and dialogic, but consonant with creativity and openness.

The formulation and construction of citizenship is a central concern according to cultural theorists because it brings up the ways in which people are subjected to determining social, cultural and political mechanisms. These technologies of subjection are bound up in the relations of state and civil society, the public sphere and notions of private/public. There is no unitary notion of citizenship as people respond to and are determined by technologies of subjection in a variety of ways.

For someone who is marginalised because of gender, sexuality, age, race, religion, disability, ethnicity and class (and everyone is marginalised by society at some point in their life – although not equally), the concept of citizenship becomes a core site of tension in contemporary society. This is where subjectivity and the state meet, where the contest and project of identity is played out. Hence, citizenship is a cultural, political and social site of embedded meaning and representation. The feminist scholar Ruth Lister has made an apt point in relation to her analysis of gender in culture and society when she argued that citizenship is always about exclusion since contests of identity are always about who can be represented and who has the power to represent. In a largely patriarchal and hetero-normatively dominated global framework, there are, as we know, profound exclusionary practices against women that have only begun to be questioned, debated and rejected over the last century.

As a cultural studies scholar responding to
globalisation, I am therefore keen to clarify what is at stake in the formation of citizens, and my concern is about the question of intimacy and citizenship, where the intersection of the state and the person becomes evident in terms of how gender and sexuality are managed, regulated and imagined. As we know, gender is a key organizing principle of society. Gender inequality between men and women is still the prevalent norm of power relations.

Following these considerations, in this paper I want to re-think the concept of cosmopolitanism as a means of illuminating how we might consider gender and sexuality as social issues that are indicative of inclusive, multicultural and democratic values. The idea of cosmopolitanism has gained an increasingly robust and important place in contemporary debates about how to respond to difference, and engage at the crossroads of distinctive epistemologies and ontologies. I want to argue that there is a very cogent connection between cosmopolitanism and questions of justice and equality in relation to gender and sexuality. Cosmopolitanism is in this sense a space for critique, creativity, border and boundary crossings, involving the possibilities of transformation through exchange and encounter with otherness.6

The paper is in four parts. First, I want to consider the concept of cosmopolitanism and in this regard I draw on some of the key thinkers who have contributed to the discourse as a way of understanding, interpreting and responding to the effects of globalisation. I want to suggest that we now live in an age that is characterised by a default to banal cosmopolitanism. That is, where more people now live in highly conurban and urban contexts than in rural areas, and that the effects of an international networked society has brought about a global village where encounters with difference are mundane, convivial and routine. The cosmopolitan possibilities of openness, generosity towards the other and mutuality have never been so present. But what I want to suggest is that what is required is an activated cosmopolitan ethic and commitment that goes beyond elite academic circles or highly urbanised demographics, to a meta and reflexive cosmopolitan understanding that is brought about through activating convivial multicultural democracy and citizenship. Second, I want to bring in the question of the relationship between gender and sexuality, to argue that these intertwining markers of human identity are mutually implicated. To do this, my focus will be on recent and current debates around the world in terms of same-sex marriage, or what is referred to in many places now as marriage equality. A new era of gender and sexuality rights has begun to take shape. I am interested to gauge whether there is a link between multicultural societies which value social and cultural diversity, and evidence of gender equality and respect for same-sex relationships.

Third, I want to discuss Australia as a particular case study of how a multicultural society has been developed and the consequential effects, if there are any, on questions of gender equality and marriage equality legitimised through legal, political and social forms. The case study is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis, but to simply highlight an example of a nation that is considered to be a compelling litmus test for globalisation. Finally, I want to bring the discussion to a conclusion by making some observations about the value of understanding the effects of globalisation through the idea of a cosmopolitan ethic. I want to make the argument that there are ineluctable connections between gender equality, sexuality and cosmopolitan perspectives and thought.
I. From Apartheid to Conviviality

My thinking on what I want to refer to as reflexive cosmopolitanism derives from a discussion I once had with Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Tutu talked about his philosophy which was based on the insight that one person’s diminishment is our collective diminishment. His view was that we become human beings through our relationship with others; we cannot become human alone. In this regard he referred to the African word ‘Ubuntu’ which means that human beings become human through others.

Human society, he argued, only comes about in this equation and it is something that happens in everyday life through connection and relationship. He also made an important point about South Africa where the policy of apartheid had well and truly entrenched the racialisation of human relations over several decades creating profound inequality. He said that the only way forward towards reconciliation had to be through an ethical commitment to activating human rights. I interpret this to mean implicitly activating a multicultural convivial democracy where people learn to live and respect difference through reflecting on the condition of being human.

This is my understanding of cosmopolitan conviviality. That it is about learning to negotiate difference with respect, to live with the tension between the universal and particular, to live with cultural diversity, which is at the heart of a cosmopolitan ethic.

Tutu is one of the most admired, courageous and controversial contemporary human rights and peace activists and cosmopolitan thinkers in the world, someone who has been radical, innovative and holistic in his approach to questions of justice, reconciliation, ending poverty, freedom, conflict resolution and challenging all forms of oppression.

His life and work are exemplary in the way that they illustrate how aspirations for human rights and peace are not merely empty rhetoric and ‘loose talk’, endless inscriptions on parchment or agitations in legislation. His thorough commitment and successful drive to ending the apartheid regime has been followed by an equal commitment and drive to end entrenched meta-racism in all societies.

But what remains also fascinating about Tutu, is that he has consistently demonstrated a unique capacity as a black South African Christian and theologian to connect his experience of apartheid as a racially inhumane demarcation of legitimacy and power with what he perceives as other forms of apartheid. Tutu has thus been as outspoken about what he has termed an ‘apartheid of homosexuality’ as he was about South Africa’s shameful apartheid policies based on race. His insight into the connection between apartheid based on race with an apartheid based on sexuality is profound. The capacity to link different forms of oppression, even if they are historically distinctive and contextually dependent, is to my mind a fundamental characteristic feature of the cosmopolitan, that is, someone who values the human project. Tutu embodies the very yearning of the cosmopolitan commitment through a deliberative and active attention to the various and complex questions of human diversity.
II. Cosmopolitanism, Gender and Sexuality

It goes without saying that there is a very extensive literature on cosmopolitanism, a concept that is widely regarded by a number of thinkers such as Paul Gilroy, Martha Nussbaum, Anthony Appiah, Ulrich Beck, Diana Neaga and others as a way of going further than multiculturalism and extending the idea of multiculture into a specific approach of living with difference, coming to terms with co-habitation and negotiating power relations in a world of multicultures. Indian thinker Ashis Nandy has also made the point that the idea is resilient as a way of approaching cultural diversity since it is an idea that is not just Western, but also derives from the non-West, from people such as Rabindranath Tagore, Mohandas K Gandhi and Aung San Syu Kyi for example, that it is an idea that is universal. My purpose in this paper is not to rehearse all the theoretical debates extant on cosmopolitanism as this is now a well and truly well trodden field. Suffice to say I think the concept has usefulness in understanding the general conditions that face humanity in an age where human rights language, values and principles, questions of equality and social justice are core concerns about co-existence.

Yet what is puzzling is that given the concept of cosmopolitanism is fundamentally about difference and the problem of diversity and identity, there has been little scholarly work done on the presence of gender and sexuality issues as features of cosmopolitanism. According to Stivens, this is ‘all the more remarkable,’ because ‘feminisms have engaged both theoretically and practically with many of the besetting difficulties within the cosmopolitanism debates – ‘universalism, ethnocentricity, neo-imperialism.’

Stivens argues that this may be the case due to ‘a long-term disdain in political thought for what is deemed the “private”, “domestic” or “intimate”, the main focus of women’s democratisation movements’. This argument can well be extrapolated to include the elision of sexuality as an intrinsic element in any discussion about multicultural conviviality and cosmopolitanism. Sexuality is where we are most human and vulnerable, where intimacy intersects with the public sphere. A failure to value sexual identity is a failure to value our humanity. As Amnesty International states, ‘sexual identity is a fundamental dimension of being human.’ As Tutu asks, ‘How can you be fully human unless we act sexually?’ It is therefore a crucial area to examine in relation to any question of multicultural conviviality. What I wish to do is look at the intersection between gender equality and gay and lesbian equality specifically.

It is well established that the social movements for women’s rights and gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people’s rights have been mutually dependent. While much of the literature on multicultural conviviality and cosmopolitanism has indeed focussed more on the intersections of race and culture, my argument is that gender and sexuality are fundamental features of the multiculture world. My position is that we need to think more about our global multiculture including the full range of human diversity, whether this is about race, gender, disability, religion and so on. As Diana Neaga states, ‘The core of cosmopolitanism is fundamentally with the principle of respecting diversity.’

As a theoretical lens into this discussion on cosmopolitanism, which I see as a way of understanding the qualities of active conviviality I refer to the work of Jonathan Corpus Ong. In distilling the various views on cosmopolitanism, he offers a theoretical framework that I think is
useful in examining and qualifying the degree of convivial health in a society. He argues that there are four ways of understanding cosmopolitan theory. First, there is Closed Cosmopolitanism. This he defines as, ‘the identity performance when individuals reject the ideal of openness and fall back on the comforts of the similar and the predictable, separating ‘self’ from ‘other’. While the basic idea of cosmopolitanism is premised on permissibility, closed cosmopolitanism is premised on impenetrability.’

This is where a culture or society retreats from engagement with globalisation or diversity, or where there is a negotiation from a hard form of nationalism or cultural or religious essentialism and point of view. This is a society that is traditional, tribal, regulating the possibility of openness entirely, actively excluding the ‘other’.

Ong writes of the second kind that, ‘Instrumental cosmopolitanism is an important category because it captures a rather selfish expression of the cosmopolitan “openness to others”. While it is not its absence, as with closed cosmopolitanism, instrumental cosmopolitanism makes use of one’s knowledge of the world to promote oneself. In other words, it uses otherness for the sake of the self and to further delineate self from other.’

This is akin to the kind of multiculturalism that is basically predicated on a marketplace of social and cultural identities. This is where the ‘other’ is consumed, deployed, commodified, managed and regulated through, as Michel Foucault would put it, an ensemble of institutions.

The third kind Ong refers to as Banal Cosmopolitanism. This is akin to the approach that Anthony Appiah argues for in much of his work. That is, through everyday convivial encounters and exchanges, through rubbing shoulders with others who are different in terms of age, class, sexuality, gender, race and religion, for example, there is the potential and possibility, perhaps even an inevitability that people learn to live with difference, not always in an easy manner, but through a range of ethical and relational attitudes. Unexpected results can come from this form of cosmopolitanism. In a sense, it could be argued that the time line between African slavery in the United States to the present day with a black American President is evidence of banal cosmopolitanism at work. Through processes of inter-marriage, emancipation, civil rights movements and explicit political inclusion, the United States could be viewed as an example of complex iterations of cosmopolitan efforts that have been messy and unpredictable, producing unexpected moments such as Barack Obama.

This is where hybridity or Homi Bhaba’s ‘third space’ is a form of ordinary, everyday, cosmopolitanism where marriage across cultures or nations produces new forms of familiarity and new ways of living with difference (not necessarily agreeable of course). Ong writes: ‘Repeated encounters with difference in the banality of daily life, the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah argues, have the potential to transform the way we deal with others over time. Using the example of the increasing presence of “openly gay” people in social life and in the media over the past 30 years, he relates that the mere presence of the Other makes it ‘harder to deny these people their respect and their concern’ (Appiah, 2006: 77).

The final conception of cosmopolitanism that Ong refers to is Transcendental Cosmopolitanism. This is where the critical distance between self and Other is resolved. In Transcendental Cosmopolitanism, the engagement with the Other is an acknowledgement, recognition and acceptance of that relationship. In fact, where the Other is seen as necessary. This frame of Ong’s is similar to the way human rights can also be conceptualised. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali writes, ‘Indeed, human rights, viewed at
the universal level, bring us face-to-face with the most challenging dialectical conflict ever: between ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’, between the ‘myself’ and ‘others.’ They teach us in a direct, straightforward manner that we are at the same time identical and different.'

These four ways of thinking about cosmopolitanism can be useful in how we consider the ways differences and diversity is negotiated.

III. Homophobia as an indicator of gender inequality

As I suggested above, sexuality is a core site for social, cultural and political exclusion. If we look at the situation of sexual orientation, which includes people who are identified as gay and lesbian, in terms of law, 76 countries still criminalise and persecute people on the basis of their sexual orientation. Of these, seven countries actually punish lesbian and gay people with death. As the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) report, ‘On a global scale, the nations doing something positive for gay rights are dwarfed by those behaving negatively. While 75 countries will imprison you if you are gay, only 53 have anti-discrimination laws that apply to sexuality. Only 26 countries recognise same-sex unions.'

In many parts of the world, admitting to being gay is very much a matter of life and death. In African countries such as Uganda and Zimbabwe, there have been recent attempts through parliament to legislate the death penalty for gay people. It is reported by ILGA that ‘More than 50 per cent of African states have taken action to criminalise homosexuality and religious homophobia is rife. The picture is not much brighter in Asia, where 23 countries have made being gay a crime. Latin America and the Caribbean are also home to many governments with a similar outlook. In Jamaica, sex with another man is described in the statute book as an “abominable crime”.’

Amidst this very problematic situation for people who are gay or lesbian, there has also been a dramatic change worldwide over the last decade and more in relation to the institutionalisation and acceptance of same sex marriage. Since 2001 when The Netherlands became the first state to fully legalise same sex marriage (or institutionalise marriage equality) there are now 11 countries including Denmark, South Africa, Argentina, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Canada that also provide full legal status to same-sex marriages. There are also a number of cities such as Mexico City and New York that recognise marriage equality.

Civil unions, which are an alternative form of recognising same sex relationships (but far less substantive symbolically than same sex marriage) also exist in a number of countries and jurisdictions. A number of other countries are in the process of instituting marriage equality such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand and France. In other words, there are significant changes to how sexual orientation, as a human right, and within the province of equal rights struggles, are being considered across the world, though in uneven ways. Although not within the scope of this paper, these changes are also taking place in countries where there are also strong religious/faith societies such as Spain and Portugal that are predominantly Catholic.

For the purposes of the present discussion, I want to refer to a recent and very interesting study by two scholars, Judit Takács and Ivett Szalma who have examined the relationship between homophobia and same sex partnerships across
Europe. This is the first time such a study has been undertaken to find out whether same sex marriage was connected to both gender equality and multicultural convivial democracies more broadly, and the effects on homophobia. Their concern was about the recognition of structural connections between groups who are marginalised and oppressed, in this case lesbian women and gay men, and questions of gender equality, democratic and inclusive policies.

As they write, ‘This recognition is reflected by the European Parliament’s resolution of 2006 on homophobia calling on the member states of the European Union to ensure that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people are protected from homophobic hate speech and violence and that same-sex partners enjoy the same respect, dignity and protection as the rest of society. The resolution defines homophobia as an “irrational fear of and aversion to homosexuality and to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people based on prejudice” (European Parliament, 2006), comparing it to racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and sexism, and strongly condemns any discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.’

What is compelling about their research is that it reconfirmed previous studies that exclusionary and negative attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women are frequently associated with traditional views and values about the roles of women in society. ‘In this context, social acceptance or rejection of gays and lesbians were seen to be rooted in a broader gender belief system focusing on the appropriate, and usually not at all overlapping, paths of women and men in society.’

They also were able to reconfirm much of the literature that shows clear links between homophobia and racism and how these attitudes are connected to views on immigrants, refugees and others. ‘In the examined 26 [European] societies more than 70 per cent of the not at all xenophobic and only 47 per cent of the very xenophobic respondents agreed that gay men and lesbians should be able to live their own life freely as gays and lesbians.’

But what was even more interesting and thought-provoking about their study, is the effect of the institutionalisation of same-sex marriage on homophobic attitudes. Their results showed that there is ‘a clear message for policy makers especially in those countries where equal treatment of lesbian and gay citizens has not yet been achieved in this field: there is no point to sit back and wait until society will slowly “mature” by itself, and homophobia would not prevail any longer – the maturation process can most probably be sped up by introducing and using legal institutions providing equal rights for all. Providing institutional frameworks for same-sex relationships... conveys a societal judgment that committed intimate relationships with people of the same sex are not inferior to heterosexual relationships and that the participants in a same-sex relationship are not less deserving of society’s recognition than are heterosexual couples. In our
Across the world the ramifications of the state’s recognition of intimate or sexual citizenship is having a profound impact on the ways we now conceive of questions of gender equality and active convivial democracies. In the United States, the recent adoption of full support for same-sex marriage by the Democrats signalled an enormous cultural shift in the American context. ‘This is a major turning point in the history of American civil rights’ said New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, an independent whose city is in one of six states that allow same-sex marriage. Neera Tanden from the Center for American Progress described the president’s expression of support as ‘another large step toward realizing this country’s promise of equality.’ In 2012 Barack Obama courageously articulated in his campaign for re-election that marriage equality was a matter of basic human rights. This is a radical departure, fundamentally questioning the hetero-normative, heterosexist and patriarchal dominance of entrenched regimes of gender and sexuality organising principles that have existed for centuries unchallenged until now. Obama’s views on marriage equality are also resonant with those of recently elected Socialist French President, Francois Hollande, and Conservative UK Prime Minister, David Cameron.

IV. Australia: A Brief Case Study

In this final section of the paper, I use Australia as a case study to briefly examine the intersection of race, gender, sexuality and struggles for marriage equality, to see whether Australia is an active multicultural convivial democracy. I am following Patience & Jacques observation that ‘The number of languages, religious and cultural traditions, forms of social pluralism, demographic complexity and gender relations that Australia’s multiculturalism encompasses makes it one of the most interesting experiments in globalization from below that the world has yet seen. In a sense Australia can be regarded as a test case in the construction of global citizenship.’

Today, one in four of Australia’s 22 million people were born overseas, 44 per cent were born overseas or have a parent who was and four million speak a language other than English. There are over 260 languages spoken and people identify with more than 270 ancestries. In a sense Australian society is characterised by its everyday experience of multiculture, although it is also evident that much of the public sphere is constituted by a white, Anglo-Saxon, Christian monoculture, the result of being a settler colonial society.

Australia’s public sphere over the past hundred and fourteen years has been driven by two contradictory imperatives. First, following the Second World War, Australia modelled and benchmarked its core institutions consonant with the establishment of international human rights treaties, declaration, values and language. The entrenchment of a rights consciousness in Australia demonstrated the hallmarks of a rational, modern and civilised society. Through much of the latter part of the twentieth century, Australia prided itself as a beacon of human rights law and practice. The other contradictory imperative that emerged, and which complemented the human rights framework, was the entrenchment of the notions that Australia was a tolerant, fair and just society. Indeed, through political rhetoric, national celebrations and the creation of modern
traditions, these notions became mythologised and rationalised as Australia formed the content of its consciousness.

These imperatives have characterised Australia’s development of its public sphere. With the demise of the White Australia Policy in the 1960s, which followed in a direct response to the waves of migration from non-Anglo European nations and increasingly from Asia, Australia became a nation in which there existed two dominant forms of belonging. The first was based on the maintenance of the mono-cultural traditions of the core institutions.

The second form of belonging that occurred cohered around the everyday experience of the multicultural, where the everyday exchange and interaction of cultural diversity was evident. Waves of migration from the outset of the formation of the Australian state have demonstrated this cultural diversity. Unacknowledged in the architecture of the public sphere is the fact that Aboriginal society itself was and is characterised by the experience of diverse peoples, communities and cultures. There was and is no monolithic Aboriginality. In relation to the remarkable demographic changes of the second part of the twentieth century, Australian society became explicitly a national home of substantive, lived and expressed cultural diversity. This form of belonging was recognised to some extent within the public sphere through the adoption of multiculturalism as a policy in the early 1970s.

However, the dominance of mono-cultural ideology within the Australian political system was unable to alter the epistemological basis of the core institutions sufficiently enough so that by the end of the century multiculturalism became a suspect and diminished position. Although the national imaginary had changed irrevocably, the project of modernity conspired with the establishment of mono-cultural borders, fixing the parameters of the public sphere.

Traditions in Australia that focussed on memorialising a range of extensive militaristic engagements for Britain, the Empire and then the United States and the ‘free world’; nationalist jingoism such as ‘We will decide who will come here’ in relation to managing a continuing influx of refugees from Asia and the Middle East; the Government’s long term resistance (until 2007) of the notion of endorsing an apology to Indigenous Australians for the effects of colonialism; and the legislation to entrench heterosexual marriage in 2004 based on fixing marriage as only between a male and female, were all signs of a retreat from the reality of cultural diversity. At the launch of the book, *The Conservative*, in 2005, the Prime Minister, John Howard, was able to rationalise that he was a ‘profound opponent of changing the social context in which we live.’ For Howard, the viability of the conservative social context was through the maintenance of borders – physical, psychological, political, cultural – framed through specific values based on a mono-cultural public sphere. The rationalisation of these borders was significantly legitimated simultaneously with British Enlightenment discourse on tolerance, a just society and ‘a fair go for all.’

Within all this, the maintenance of a heterosexual, heterosexist and patriarchal view of gender and sexuality was highly regulated through cultural as well as political management. Former Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2006) actively intervened, with opposition support, to ensure that Parliament enshrined a traditional form of marriage. Thus, the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 was passed by Parliament to insert a definition of marriage into the Marriage Act of 1961. This prescribed that marriage was ‘the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others voluntarily entered into for life’. This followed Howard’s belief that ‘Traditional marriage is one
of the bedrock institutions of our society." This maintenance of gender and sexuality boundaries and borders has become a key site of human rights and political debates in contemporary Australian society.

Ien Ang has observed in relation to the maintenance of what she describes as white fortress Australia in both the public sphere and culture: ‘what will undoubtedly heat up is the negotiation and contestation of the very meaning of the “Australian way of life,” as its condition of existence become increasingly intertwined with the rest of the world’. The debate over what constitutes Australian values has become a fault-line in contemporary Australian culture and society. Events such as September 11, the Cronulla ‘Race’ Riots in 2005, the ‘war on terror’ and marriage equality have brought Australian values powerfully into the purview of politicians and media commentators.

For the duration of the Howard Government, a deliberate focus was placed on proscribing values that are related to a values sensibility for Australia. In 2006, this culminated in the release of a discussion paper, *Australian Citizenship: Much more than a ceremony*, which outlined the basic tenets of what Australian values were and meant. At the heart of this paper, it was suggested that these values included: ‘our respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual, support for democracy, our commitment to the rule of law, the equality of men and women, the spirit of the fair go, of mutual respect and compassion for those in need.’

Against this political rhetoric, gender in Australia has been a defining organising principle in the formation of its national mythology and history. Australia mainstream society developed a hard masculinist approach to its identity and ethos. As a penal colony modern Australia was constructed as a laboratory of British Enlightenment values that forged a traditional, patriarchal and individualistic society. So, in some respects gender equality has been subsumed by these characteristics even though Australia was also one of the earliest places that gave women the vote, second only to New Zealand.

Australia can be characterised as a nation where convivial democracy is under stress. For example, although Australia now has a female head of parliament as well as a head of state, recent political debates, nominally referred to in the media as ‘gender wars’ have been aggressively framed around questions of misogyny and sexism, where gender oppression has been tested in the public sphere quite powerfully.

Although there is overwhelming public support for same sex marriage a recent vote in parliament in 2012, based on a conscience vote by the ruling Labor Party, rather than on the notion of marriage equality being a human right, failed to be passed into legislation. Although the national, ruling Labor Party has endorsed support for marriage equality as a policy platform, without the support of marriage equality as an unequivocal human right by the Prime Minister Julia Gillard, the vote in parliament was set to fail. The interesting and puzzling approach of Gillard has confounded many advocates for gender equality and marriage equality since Prime Minister Gillard is an atheist, in a heterosexual de facto (unmarried) relationship and long time supporter of homosexual rights since her student days. However, Gillard has remarked on many occasions that, ‘I think for our culture, for our heritage, the Marriage Act and marriage being between a man and a woman has a special status,’ and should not be revoked.

This is a country in which social movements for women’s rights provided the ground and inspiration for the Indigenous movement and the gay and lesbian movement. The largest gay and lesbian parade and festival in the world takes place
in Sydney every year, despite the fact that research shows widespread everyday lived experience of homophobia in schools, institutions and in many walks of life. The social and cultural diversity that is such a feature of Australian society is still dominated by white, heterosexist, patriarchal and largely masculinist values, enduring fear of the other and holding racist views.

Former Australian High Court Judge Michael Kirby, who is gay himself, writes of an urgent need to end what he sees as sexual apartheid amongst Commonwealth nations, of which Australia is a part. He writes:

The whole world knows that the Commonwealth of Nations has a problem securing action on the legal issues of sexual orientation and gender identity. It is a specific Commonwealth problem, let there be no mistake. Of about 80 countries that still criminalise same-sex, adult, private, consensual conduct, more than half (41) are members of the Commonwealth. Given that there are 54 Commonwealth countries, that means three-quarters of them still impose criminal penalties on gay people. The fact that such laws exist leads to stigma, discrimination, violence and an awful lot of personal misery.

Until 1966, Australia observed the “White Australia” policy. This totally excluded non-Caucasian immigration. We were specially frightened of the Asian “yellow peril”. We even imposed constitutional restrictions on our Aboriginal people, partly repaired by a referendum in 1967. Until 1992, Australians did not recognise the claim by indigenous peoples to legal recognition of their traditional lands. However, that logjam was dislodged. In my lifetime I have witnessed a major change for the better. It came about by quiet persuasion, good example and a bit of international pressure.

So it will be with sexual orientation. It forces a kind of sexual apartheid. It divides people into strict categories. It ignores their basic natures (sexuality not racial). It imposes harsh legal restrictions. It makes them second-class citizens. It denies them full entitlement as human beings in fundamental matters such as love, sex and identity.

It appears that Australia is yet to become a fully cosmopolitan nation. It has moved away from the closed cosmopolitan society that was represented in the White Australia Policy in the 1960s, but in so doing it has embraced an instrumentalist approach to the lived reality of being a multiculture. I would argue that Australia is experiencing cosmopolitan growth quietly, unevenly and by and large peacefully, the type that is banal, ordinary and based in the kind of transformations that occur through surprising, paradoxical, unexpected, unpredictable and often challenging ways. There are some, however, who represent a call for full engagement as a cosmopolitan and open society such as Michael Kirby, human rights advocates, feminists, Indigenous activists, writers, film directors and others.

V. Conclusion

This paper has examined four key questions. How do cultures co-exist and meet each other in the globalised world? In other words, what are the conditions for a convivial cosmopolitanism?
Second, how is marriage equality a significant issue? What does it reveal? Third, are there connections between multicultural convivial democracy, gender equality and marriage equality? And finally, how does Australia provide a litmus test that offers insights into these questions?

At the start of this paper I imagined a scenario where King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is meeting with Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, the Prime Minister of Iceland. And I wondered as I wrote about such a meeting, where in the world might it take place? Clearly if Australia is an experiment in the creation of a cosmopolitan society – from the ground up – it is as yet an unfinished project. It seems to me that cosmopolitanism is not an unconscious event that arises to reshape the values and being of a people and a society; that there has to be conscious and self-reflexive efforts for a cosmopolitan ethic to succeed. In the example given earlier about the effects of the institutionalisation of same sex marriage across Europe, it was very noteworthy that homophobia, as one example in the continuum of interrelated issues of gender, sexuality and culture, is less present in those societies in which same sex marriage had been adopted. I wonder whether multicultural convivial democracies, and Australia may be regarded as one, need to be active in their approach to conviviality, to take the lead, like Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Spain and South Africa, to end homophobia by embracing substantive equality across gender and sexuality issues. I have no doubt that marriage equality will eventuate in Australia within the next decade. Same sex marriage is as I stated at the beginning of this paper, a litmus test for the presence of a robust cosmopolitanism. But if Australia is to be regarded as a ‘test case’ in terms of where we can observe a fully realised cosmopolitan commitment, it has so far performed with less success than it should. There is a long way to go to resolve fundamental issues of race, gender and sexuality at the heart of its polity and social and cultural imaginary.

The United Nations Annual Assembly in 2012 was recently attended by the Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard with her partner Tim Mathieson. In a first, Mathieson attended the function held for wives and partners of the visiting leaders. The first male to ever attend such a function. Such a convivial moment, an apparently ordinary moment, was reported widely in the Australian media. It highlights the anomalous and contradictory nature of Australian society.

Appendix

Same-Sex Marriage Legal:
Netherlands 2001
Belgium 2003
Canada 2003–05 (provincially in 2003, nationally in 2005)
Massachusetts (US) 2004
Spain 2005
South Africa 2006
California (US) 2007–08 (now pending)
Norway 2009
Sweden 2009
Connecticut (US) 2009
Iowa (US) 2009
Vermont (US) 2009
Washington DC (US) 2009
Coquille Indian Tribe (US) 2009
Mexico City (Mex) 2010
Portugal 2010
Iceland 2010
Argentina 2010
New Hampshire (US) 2010
New York state (US) 2011
Quintana Roo (Mexico) 2011
Denmark 2012

Places where same-sex marriages are recognised but not performed:
Israel 2006
Rhode Island (US) 2007
California (US) 2007
Maryland (US) 2010
Mexico (all states) 2010
Tasmania (Aus) 2010
Queensland (Aus) 2011

Places where same-sex marriages are imminent:
New Zealand
Scotland
Washington State (USA)
France
United Kingdom
Finland
Nepal
Slovenia
Paraguay

Notes
14 Emily Dugan, ‘More than 70 countries make being gay a crime,’ The Independent, 1 August 2010.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 358.
18 Ibid., p. 360.
19 Ibid., p. 367.
20 Ibid., p. 375.
21 ‘Same-sex couples should be able to marry: Barack Obama,’ Times of India, 10 May 2012.
23 Quoted in Wilson, Tim. 2007. ‘Nothing Radical about equal opportunities for all citizens,’ The Australian. 7 March.
26 For a full account of these riots see: Baden Offord, Erika Kerruish, Rob Garbutt, Adele Wessell and Kirsten Pavlovic, 2013. Inside Enlightenment Australia (London: Anthem Press).
27 A number of recent polls in 2012 show support in the Australian electorate for marriage equality at around 62% or above.
What initially began as a domestic American financial and economic crisis following the collapse in mid-September of 2008, of Lehman Brothers, a major U.S. investment bank, almost instantaneously spread throughout the global economy. In the words of the Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance for fiscal year 2009, the global financial and economic crisis had a “shocking” impact on the Japanese economy, forcing gross domestic product (GDP) to decline at a greater rate than in any other major advanced country. In the years that followed, Japan’s GDP failed to recover smoothly. The financial and economic crisis, which was dubbed “a gigantic tsunami that occurs only once a century,” laid bare the vulnerability that was “beyond anticipation (souteigai)” of the government at the time.

On March 11, 2011, two and a half years after the Lehman shock, a gigantic earthquake and the accompanying tsunami, which were literally of a magnitude that would occur “only once in a thousand years,” hit the eastern part of Japan on the Pacific coast, also triggering a protracted radiation crisis at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO’s) Fukushima Daiiichi nuclear power plant. Several hundreds of thousands of survivors in the world’s second or third largest economic power had to do without essentials of life such as drinking water and food, and, in many cases, not simply for a few days, but for an extended period of time. Regarding the question of whether people in contemporary Japanese society can feel secure about still having access to basic necessities of life in the face of crises, the recent disaster made evident that Japan’s system for safeguarding people’s basic survival was indeed precarious and undependable.

It should be kept in mind that Japanese society, even before it was hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake or the Lehman shock, had already been beset by a host of serious social problems. Japan’s suicide cases have exceeded 30,000 persons per year for more than a decade, ranking it among the highest in terms of suicide rate of countries for which statistics were available. In addition, Japan’s poverty rate is among the highest of any
advanced country. Thus, the vulnerabilities and precariousness of Japanese society had already fully revealed themselves by the mid-2000s. The Japanese government, however, did not even officially acknowledge that poverty existed in Japan (Osawa 2010b: 45-46).

This triple disaster of unprecedented scale followed close on the heels of the global financial and economic crisis. The areas most severely affected by the disasters had been vulnerable on many counts, such as increasing rates of elderly populations, a lack of job opportunities and other income sources, and the burdens of chronic fiscal deficits weighing heavily upon municipal governments. Nuclear power plants are concentrated in these kinds of ailing municipalities. Furthermore, if we are justified in regarding the damage caused by natural disasters as being a function of both the destructive power (or hazard) of the disasters as well as social vulnerability, as introduced by the social geographer Keiko Ikeda (2011) as an internationally agreed understanding in disaster studies/practices, then some of the damage that appears, at first glance, to be the inevitable consequence of the tsunami, actually resulted from the way in which Japanese society had been organized, and could therefore have been mitigated, if not avoided.

In discussing the various factors underlying social vulnerabilities, it is customary to consider demographic (e.g., aging and depopulation) and economic (e.g., employment opportunities and incomes) factors, as well as ethnic and religious divisions. However, given the fact that elderly and impoverished populations consist mostly of women, it should not be overlooked that various facets of these vulnerabilities are threaded through one common denominator, namely, gender.

It is of utmost urgency that Japan rebuild itself into a society that is resilient to both economic shocks and natural disasters. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate, by undertaking a comparative gender analysis of livelihood security systems, the vulnerabilities inherent in the Japanese economy and larger society, and in so doing, to shed light upon how Japan should approach the project of reconstruction.

We can say that a person’s livelihood is secure, if his or her basic necessities for life are satisfied on a continual basis. In countries that are industrialized, the livelihood of individuals has been secured through the interaction of private institutions and practices, of families, private firms, labor unions, and non-profit cooperatives on the one hand, and by government-implemented “social policies” on the other. When I use the term “social policies” I refer not only to social security-related measures – social insurance, social and public assistance, the tax system and various social services including child care, education, health and medical care, nursing care – but also to government regulations and expenditures (fiscal as well as tax) concerning family and employment relations. What I call a “livelihood security system” refers to the entire matrix of laws and governmental policies on the one hand, and private institutions and practices on the other (Osawa 2007, 2010a, and 2011a).
II. An International Comparison of Livelihood Security Systems in the Mid-2000s: Japan’s System as the Epitome of the “Male Breadwinner” Model

Based on the actual conditions in advanced countries circa 1980, this theory of livelihood security system proposes a typology of the livelihood security systems in these countries using three ideal types: the “male breadwinner” model (continental European countries and Japan), the “work-life balance” model (Scandinavian countries), and the “market-oriented” model (Anglo-Saxon countries). Gender is the linchpin for an analysis of these models given that the workplaces or families are implicitly expected to operate according to specific standards and norms inflected by gender roles and the gendered division of labor.

1. Income Distribution and Redistribution

Let us examine how livelihood security systems can influence the relative poverty rate. A household in “relative poverty” is defined as one whose equivalent income (i.e., household income adjusted by the number of its members) is less than 50 percent of the median income. The ratio of the total number of people belonging to households in relative poverty to the entire population is referred to as the “relative poverty rate” (hereafter, “poverty rate”), is a measure of the state of income distribution (dispersion) below the median income, and listed as the first item in the “indicators for the monitoring of the European strategy for social protection and social inclusion” 1. The poverty rate is usually calculated on the basis of disposable income but is also often calculated on the basis of market income to enable comparison and reference.

“Market income” (also called “initial income”) is the sum total of employee income, business income, farming and livestock-farming income, family worker income, interest and dividends, rental income, remittances, miscellaneous income, and corporate pension benefits. “Disposable income” is calculated as market income plus social security cash benefits minus direct taxes and social security contributions. In other words, disposable income is the amount that an individual is left with after income transfers (other than indirect taxes) by the government. Thus, the difference in poverty rates calculated using market income and disposable income represents the extent of poverty reduction accomplished by governmental income transfers (other than indirect taxes). For the purposes of this paper, we will define the “poverty reduction rate” resulting from income redistribution as the difference in the two poverty rates divided by the market-income-based poverty rate.

As shown in Figure 1, a comparison of OECD countries in the mid-2000s indicates that poverty rates were highest in Anglo-Saxon countries (excluding the UK), followed by Japan, Korea, and Southern European countries. Poverty rates in northern European countries were low, and while those in continental Western European countries were higher, they were still lower than the OECD average, with the exception of Germany (OECD 2009: Figure 3.2). Poverty rates were high in countries with market-oriented livelihood security systems and low in countries with systems aiming at work-life balance. Poverty rates in countries with livelihood security systems based on the male-breadwinner model were the second highest,
following upon countries with market-oriented livelihood security systems; among the former, especially high poverty rates could be found in Japan and Southern European countries.

**Figure 1. Relative poverty rates of OECD Countries (mid-2000s)**

Note: Countries from Denmark to Mexico are ranked by increasing figure on the level of disposable income. The figure for retirement-age population for Korea is 48.51%.
Source: OECD 2009: Data of Figure 3.2.

In probing further into why Japan’s poverty rate was among the highest in OECD countries, let us focus our attention on members of “working-age households”, defined as those households headed by persons of working age (between 18 and 64). Figure 2 shows that poor households in Japan are characterized by the following elements. First, 40% of poor “working-age households” include two or more employed adults in Japan, Iceland and Turkey. This contrasts with countries such as Norway, Australia, UK and Germany, where poor “working-age household” either lack a working member or are single-parent households; in Japan, households even with two and more income earners find it difficult to pull themselves out of poverty (Osawa 2010b: 40-41).

**Figure 2. Structure of relative poverty in households headed by a working-age (aged 18-64) head, by work attachment of household members, mid-2000**

Source: OECD Factbook 2009.
Second, the poverty rate in Japan is higher than in other countries because of the peculiar way the government carries out “income redistribution” through taxation and social security systems. This second point needs further elaboration. As shown in Figure 3, in the mid-2000s most European countries achieved poverty reduction rates of 50 percent or higher for the working-age population, notably through income redistribution, and thus limited disposable-income-based poverty rates to 10 percent or lower. However, the experience was substantially different in a number of countries including Mexico, the United States, Canada, Spain, South Korea, and, in particular, Japan. Japan’s disposable-income-based poverty rate stood at 12.47%, which was the sixth highest among OECD countries. At 8.2%, Japan’s poverty reduction rate was the second lowest after Mexico’s. Despite the fact that Japan’s market-income-based poverty rate of 13.58% was the second lowest after South Korea’s, Japan’s disposable-income-based poverty rate showed negligible improvement over the market-income-based rate, resulting in Japan’s poverty reduction rate being among the lowest of all OECD countries.

The situation in Japan is unique not simply because of Japan’s low poverty reduction rate, but moreover, contrary to the widespread understanding of income redistribution as a means of reducing poverty, redistribution in Japan is “reverse-functional” in the sense that it ends up increasing the poverty rate. If we focus on the statistics for two groups of working-age households – those where all adult members are working (dual income couples with or without children, single working parents and single working individuals) and those where only one of the couple is working (with or without children) – we come across the following astounding reality about income redistribution in Japan: only in Japan does the poverty reduction rate for households where all adults are working actually take on a negative value (Figure 4). In other words, the direct tax system, social security contributions and cash benefits exacerbate the household’s vulnerability to poverty.
Figure 4. Poverty reduction rates, for two types of households with a head of working-age, mid-2000s

Source: OECD 2009: data contained in Figure 3-9

An overwhelming majority of households with one-earner couple are headed by male breadwinners. Redistribution in Japan is “reverse-functional” in the sense that such redistribution ends up increasing the poverty rate for substantial portion of its population except male-breadwinners. This clearly highlights the fact that, among OECD countries, Japan’s livelihood security system is by far the most oriented around the male-breadwinner model (to the detriment of dual-earning households and single-adult households), and that this orientation is attributable not so much to institutions and practices in the private sector, but to the redistribution undertaken by the government through taxation and social security. These observations beg the question, “what, in Japan’s tax and the social security systems, leads to such peculiar income distribution?”

2. An Economic and Financial System Vulnerable to Shocks

The 2010 Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance (hereafter, Cabinet’s Annual Report) mentioned that the government’s fiscal activities have a “built-in stabilizing” function. More specifically, this stabilizing function works as follows. When the economy is on an upward swing, the progressive taxation system increases tax revenues at a rate faster than GDP growth, keeping the economy from overheating. When the economy is on the decline, on the other hand, tax revenues decrease at a rate faster than the drop in GDP, while government expenditures expand as a result of increases in payouts of unemployment and other benefits, putting a brake on the recessionary trend. In 2006-07, Japan’s revenue (inclusive of both tax revenues and social insurance premiums) as a percentage of nominal GDP – which the Cabinet’s Annual Report adopts as a proxy for the built-in stabilizing function – was the smallest among advanced countries (Cabinet Office 2010: 1-6-07).

The Cabinet’s Annual Report posited that redistributive fiscal policy backed by large-scale annual revenue would help the economy become resilient to fluctuations. Given that the Japanese public finance was in the polar opposite situation to this predicted state, albeit it “shocking”, it is not “beyond anticipation (souteigai)” that Japan’s GDP was more seriously affected by the Lehman shock than that of other advanced countries.

JAPAN’S POSTWAR MODEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAS RENDERED JAPANESE SOCIETY VULNERABLE TO CRISES AND DISASTERS
To briefly review how this state of affairs developed, the scale of annual government revenues in most advanced countries had continually increased over an extended period of time until the early 2000s. In Japan, however, after peaking at 29.5% in 1990, the annual government revenue as a share of GDP declined until 2003 and stood at 27.6% in 2010. Meanwhile, the social security burden has continued to increase, accounting for 12.4% of GDP in fiscal 2010. Annual government revenues were on a declining trajectory as a result of the declining trend of tax burden as a ratio of GDP, which had decreased from 21.3% in fiscal 1990, to 15.2% in fiscal 2010 (http://www.cao.go.jp/zei-cho/gijiroku/senmon/2010/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2010/11/18/sen2kai9.pdf). The decreasing tax burden ratio was not so much the result of a natural decrease in tax revenue due to economic stagnation and shrinkage, as it was the consequence of tax breaks in the late 1990s for corporations, high-income-earners and/or propertied individuals. These tax breaks rendered the income tax system far less progressive than in the past.

Figure 5-1. Total revenue from tax and social security contribution as percentage of GDP

Figure 5-2. Tax revenue as percentage of GDP
Note: 1. Total tax revenues have been reduced by the amount of any capital transfer that represents uncollected taxes.
Source: OECD. StatExtract

The continuing growth of social security contributions, whose regressive nature is evident from Figure 6, has imposed heavier burdens on lower income earners. This is partly because social insurance contributions (or a portion of them at the least) are charged at a flat rate irrespective of the insured person’s income (e.g., a National Pension contribution paid by a Category 1 insured person, and the monthly flat premium for the National Health Insurance plan) and also because social insurance contributions are not fully proportional to the insured person’s income as a result of the imposition of a contribution cap, of the “maximum monthly standard remuneration”.

Figure 6. Social insurance contributions as a percent of equivalent market income broken down by individual’s income bracket (2001 and 2007)

Note: The percentage represents the amount of social insurance contribution as a ratio of equivalent market income. The ratios for individuals in the below-0.5-million-yen bracket were 110.4% in 2001, and 155.4% in 2007.
In other words, the manner in which social security contributions (or government revenues) are collected in Japan has grown increasingly unfavorable for low-income earners over the last two decades, and this has diminished both the economic stabilization function built into the government’s fiscal activities and the income redistribution function. In parallel with these developments, the rate of increase in social security benefit payouts was strictly curbed, especially since fiscal 2002. As mentioned earlier, Japan’s poverty reduction rate for the working population, achieved through the redistributive mechanisms of the tax and social security systems, was the lowest among OECD countries. Moreover, Japan was the only OECD country in which the poverty reduction rate assumed a negative value for households with all adult members working. It is clear that this state of affairs was brought about by the revisions of the tax system and “structural reforms” in the social security system starting in the early 1990s.

III. “Tohoku is Still a Colony.”

1. Lopsided Growth and Over-Concentration of Economic Activities and Population in Tokyo

At a symposium held in Hitotsubashi University on May 1, 2011, Norio Akasaka stated that he was shocked to realize that “the Tohoku region is still a colony.” A scholar of Japanese folklore who has proposed the establishment of Tohoku-gaku (study in the Tohoku region) as its own discipline, Akasaka called Tohoku a “colony” to highlight the fact that the region has been forced to host dangerous or undesirable facilities in exchange for subsidies, and has been condemned to supply food, labor power, and electricity to the urban areas (Akasaka, Oguma, and Yamauchi 2011: 15).

When we look back at the path of economic growth of post-WWII Japan, there is no denying that the country’s growth has been centered in the industrial areas of the “Pacific Belt,” which extends for the most part southward along the Pacific coast, from Tokyo and its environs, to Nagoya, Osaka-Kobe, and down to northern Kyushu. While the problems of population and overcrowded cities have been concentrated in this belt, an increasing number of communities in the rest of the country have experienced crippling depopulation.

By no means did the government sit still, or do nothing to rectify this state of affairs. Rather, since 1962 it has devised and implemented several versions of its Comprehensive National Development Plan, with the stated objective of attaining “balanced national land development.” Prefectural and municipal authorities in the rural areas provided various incentives to entice private firms to establish their factories within prefectural or municipal borders, which resulted, to some extent, in the siting of new factories in sparsely populated areas. Private firms that set up shop in rural areas began producing goods and services for places where there had been little local demand (Jinno and Takahashi, eds. 2010: 2-4).

By the mid-1980s, the increased siting of new factories in rural areas along with other factors appears to have slowed the outflow of population from rural areas to the three largest urban centers. Despite this step in the right direction, a new trend towards over-concentration of economic activities and population in Tokyo and its environs began to gain momentum in the mid-1990s. This new trend overwhelmed the Comprehensive National
Development Plan and its goal to achieve well-balanced economic development, ultimately resulting in the abolition of the plan in 2005. During this new phase, it became common for private firms to locate new industrial plants overseas, prompting these firms to relocate their headquarters in Tokyo. Many firms based in Osaka and cities other than Tokyo also moved their headquarters or headquarter functions to Tokyo.

As part of these developments, a large number of high-income earners with managerial and planning skills left the provincial regions for Tokyo. Unlike the population outflow from rural to urban areas during the rapid growth period, which mainly took the form of the out-migration of low-income earners or people experiencing difficulty finding local work, this “brain drain”, or population outflow since the late-1990s has consisted of relatively well-to-do residents of rural areas (Jinno and Takahashi, eds. 2010: 4).

The degree of concentration of population and economic activities in Tokyo is anomalous by international standards. At least, it is not matched by any major Western city, and similar concentration is seen only in cities in emerging industrial countries. According to United Nations demographic statistics for 2009, the greater Tokyo area topped the list of the ten most populous urban centers of the world. Among the remaining nine cities, New York City at 6th place was the only major city in an advanced country, while the remaining slots were filled by major cities of emerging countries (Jinno and Takahashi, eds. 2010: 13-14).

Japan’s economic recovery in the 2000s was no less anomalous and lopsided. Especially worth noting is the inter-regional gap in tax revenues of local governments. It stands to reason that a difference in the economic size of any two municipalities would naturally result in a difference in the tax revenues of these municipalities; however, what is astounding is that the differences in municipal tax revenues are often much larger than would be expected from the differences in economic size. The prevalence of such disparities is ascribable to Japan’s local taxation system, which functions in such a way as to concentrate tax revenues in large cities (Jinno and Takahashi, eds. 2010: Chapter 1).

The process of economic recovery or “regional revitalization” that unfolded during the 2000s led to the bifurcation of local regions into those that experienced economic recovery and those that did not. Moreover, even in those regions where employment recovered to some extent, this recovery was achieved primarily by employing a larger number of non-regular workers (Jinno and Takahashi, eds. 2010: Chapter 2). Comparing performance by firm size reveals that large firms boosted profits, while the growth of smaller firms remained sluggish. The economic recovery in the first half of the 2000s moreover is characterized by a clear decline in household incomes, with the incomes of lower-income earners decreasing by greater margins than those of higher-income earners (Osawa 2010b).

It was in the context of this lopsided economic recovery that Japan was hit hard by the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. The crisis affected different countries to varying degrees, but, as pointed out at the outset of this paper, suppressed Japan’s GDP by the largest margin among the advanced countries. The reason the crisis dealt such a severe blow to Japan’s economy was because Japan’s growth had become heavily dependent on the production and export of a very limited number of manufactured goods, such as automobiles and IT-related electronic goods (Osawa 2010b).

Based on the discussion above, it is evident that “the Tohoku region has once again been colonized,” beginning in the late-1990s, and
especially during the 2000s. In the remainder of this section, I will focus on the cases of two municipalities that were seriously affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake: Futaba Town in Fukushima Prefecture, and Kamaishi City in Iwate Prefecture.

2. The End of Dependency on Nuclear Power Plants: The Case of Futaba Town, Fukushima Prefecture

Seriously affected by the radiation leaks from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the entire town of Futaba – its residents, the town office, and the town assembly – was forced to take refuge in Saitama Prefecture since March 2011. In 2009, the town was designated, under the provisions of the Law for Promoting Financial Health of Municipal Governments, as a “municipality in need of early fiscal rehabilitation.” Futaba is the first and only municipality so designated among all the municipalities hosting nuclear power plants, which are supposedly guaranteed lucrative inflows of various revenues (Asahi Shinbun, May 28, 2011, p. 3).

Let us briefly examine the process that has led to Futaba’s ailing finances. Ground was broken for the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in 1967, and commercial operations were begun in 1971. During the processes of determining plant location, construction, and for several years following the commencement of operations, Futaba was showered with considerable revenues, consisting mainly of government subsidies to communities hosting nuclear power plants under provisions of the Degen Sanpo (the three separate laws designed to promote the hosting of nuclear plants) and property taxes paid by TEPCO for its nuclear facilities. But cash inflow peaked as early as 1983. One outstanding feature of the tax and subsidy schemes related to the siting of nuclear power plants is that cash flow would begin to decline sharply 5 to 10 years after the commencement of plant operations (see Table 1). Starting in 1981, the town spent a total of 12.1 billion yen to install a public sewage system and, in 1990, began receiving tax subsidies allocated to financially distressed municipal governments for the first time in 11 years. In 1991, the Town Assembly adopted a resolution to host two additional nuclear reactors. Subsequently, in 1997, the town started spending large sums of money for large public works projects, including a 1.9 billion yen project for building a comprehensive health and welfare facility, a 2.9 billion yen project for constructing a comprehensive sports park, and one for building four-lane town roads (Kaneko and Takahashi, eds. 2008: Chapter 5).

In 2002 when TEPCO was found to have falsified its records of nuclear reactor inspections and to have covered up problems at the plants, Futaba Town put its 1991 resolution to host additional reactors on hold. In December of 2005, Katsutaka Idogawa was elected mayor of Futaba on the platform of “slashing large-scale public works projects.” But Futaba continued to experience difficulties in regaining financial health simply by cutting back expenditures. As a result, in fiscal year 2006, the town joined the country’s 10 most financially distressed municipalities, with its real debt service ratio soaring to 30 percent. In June of 2007, the town assembly, acting in agreement with the mayor’s proposal to change the town’s existing policy on nuclear plant construction, passed a resolution to lift its 2002 freeze on hosting additional reactors. It was only a month later, however, that TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in Niigata Prefecture was damaged by the Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake off the Niigata coast, causing the plant to spew radiation-contaminated water into the sea.

Although the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa accident...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of subsidy</th>
<th>Recipient of subsidy</th>
<th>Duration of subsidy payment</th>
<th>Maximum amount of subsidy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy for dealing with matters related to initial procedures for electric power source siting.</td>
<td>A prefecture or a municipality that is expected to have within its borders either a nuclear power plant with a generating power of 0.35 million kW or more or a nuclear power plant that has been designated as a site for important power source development or for important power source promotion. (The subsidies to municipalities adjacent to the one hosting the nuclear power plant are paid through the prefectoral government concerned.)</td>
<td>Phase I: From the fiscal year following the year in which the feasibility study for siting begins to the fiscal year in which the environmental assessment begins. Phase II: 10 years beginning in the fiscal year after the year in which the environmental assessment begins.</td>
<td>Phase I: 140 million yen/year Phase II: 980 million yen/year, not to exceed a total of 5.15 billion yen. (In case the nuclear power plant is not yet designated as a site for development or for promotion, the total subsidy should not exceed 3.95 billion yen.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy for dealing with matters related to the promotion of electric power source siting.</td>
<td>The municipality hosting a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 0.35 million kW or more, and adjacent municipalities.</td>
<td>From the fiscal year in which construction begins to 5 years after operations commence.</td>
<td>To be determined based on factors such as the plant’s generating capacity, and the applicable unit price for subsidy. (The amount of subsidy paid to the host municipality should be equal to the total of subsidies paid to the adjacent municipalities.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy to municipalities adjacent to nuclear reactors.</td>
<td>A prefecture that has within its borders a municipality hosting a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 0.35 million kW or more, and municipalities that are adjacent to a hosting municipality. (The subsidies to the municipality hosting the plant and to the municipalities adjacent to that municipality are paid through the prefectoral government concerned.)</td>
<td>From the fiscal year in which construction begins until operations are terminated.</td>
<td>The total for all municipalities hosting nuclear power plants within the prefecture concerned, calculated on the basis of the number of power consumers contracting for lighting (ordinary households and small shops), the amount of power contracted by these consumers, and the applicable unit prices for subsidy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy to prefectures supplying electricity to other regions</td>
<td>A prefecture that satisfies the following two conditions: *The amount of power generated within its borders exceeds the amount consumed within its borders by a ratio of 1.5 or more. *The area of industry induction-encouraged regions in the prefecture totals 50% or more of the prefecture’s area.</td>
<td>From the fiscal year after the year in which construction begins until operations are terminated.</td>
<td>A certain maximum amount of subsidy is set for each bracket of power volume supplied to other regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy for dealing with matters related to long-term development of areas hosting nuclear reactors.</td>
<td>The municipality hosting a nuclear power plant.</td>
<td>From the fiscal year after the year in which operations commence until operations are terminated.</td>
<td>The amount is determined on the basis of unit prices for subsidy that correspond to the nuclear power plant’s capacity, duration of operations, amount of annual power generation, and other factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy for maintaining symbiotic relations with areas hosting nuclear reactors.</td>
<td>A prefecture that has within its borders a nuclear power plant, including reactors that has been in commercial operations for 30 years or more.</td>
<td>For a maximum of 5 years beginning in any fiscal year after 30 years of operations.</td>
<td>1.25 billion yen/year for one nuclear power plant, not to exceed 2.5 billion yen in total.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All the subsidies listed above pertain to nuclear power plants.


JAPAN’S POSTWAR MODEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAS RENDERED JAPANESE SOCIETY VULNERABLE TO CRISES AND DISASTERS
certainly dampened the town’s enthusiasm, the plan to host additional reactors proceeded on schedule, as the subsidies for municipalities hosting new reactors were due to be terminated soon thereafter. In the end, the town began receiving subsidies amounting to nearly 1 billion yen a year over a four-year period beginning in 2008. And yet, in the following year, the town slipped into the status of “a municipality in need of early fiscal rehabilitation” (Kaneko and Takahashi, eds. 2008: Chapter 5).

To understand why Futaba increased expenditures while struggling with deficits, it is important to keep in mind that the national government’s policy was of expanding public investment to deal with trade imbalance between Japan and the United States; this was pursued along with its stimulus policy implemented in the 1990s that induced municipal governments to increase expenditures for public works projects of their own. More specifically, in the Structural Impediment Initiative negotiated with the United States in 1989-90, Japan agreed to expand domestic demand through increasing public works as a means of reducing the US-Japan trade deficit. The Kaifu government, in power from August 1989 to November 1991, committed to carrying out a “Basic Plan for Public Investments” worth 430 trillion yen over a 10-year period and the Murayama government, in power from June 1994 to January 1996, subsequently expanded planned expenditures to 630 trillion yen. As the national government had already begun cutting back on expenditures in the mid-1980s to achieve “fiscal rehabilitation without tax hikes,” municipal governments were obliged to pay for expenditures for public works projects on their own. In this context, the “Basic Plan for Public Investments” represented an additional burden to again be borne by municipal governments (Mizuho Sogo Kenkyujo 2005: 5-6).

The prefectural government of Fukushima urged Futaba to take on a large portion of the public works projects allocated to the prefecture, on the grounds that the town, with its ample subsidies from hosting the nuclear plant, should have the financial resources to do so. The town was unable to turn down such requests and, as a result, is reported to have amassed debt. In an attempt to wean Futaba from its dependence on nuclear plant money, Mayor Idogawa launched a program to develop agricultural operations centered on the production of spinach and other high value-added vegetables (Kaneko and Takahashi, eds. 2008: 107-108, 115). The spinach crop grown in Futaba was the first agricultural product to be contaminated by radiation.

3. How to Regenerate a Former Company Town on the Wane? The Case of Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture

More than 20 years after the Nippon Steel Corporation closed down the blast furnaces at its Kamaishi Works in 1989, Kamaishi City, which was once a company town known as a “town of iron,” was trying hard to transform itself into a town based on the manufacturing of machinery and foodstuffs, in addition to iron products. What was most indispensable to this reconstruction effort, however, was enticing manufacturing firms to set up operations in the city.

Not only has the city’s population decreased from a peak of 87,000 in 1960, to one half that, or 43,000, by 2005, it has also aged, with the share of elderly-single households in 2005 at 12.4 percent of the city’s households, being the highest among the 14 cities in Iwate Prefecture. These elderly-single households are assumed to be predominantly female households. Furthermore, the percentage of individuals receiving public
assistance has increased rapidly in the 2000s. Even though the ratio of assistance recipients to total population tends to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas, the ratio in Kamaishi in 2005 was higher than the national average. Many of the households receiving public assistance in Kamaishi were elderly households. It is also reported that there is a higher likelihood of low-income elderly households in the coastal areas receiving public assistance than households in the interior, where land is available for growing vegetables and other farm products to make up for shortages of income. It should also be kept in mind that the Sanriku coastal region facing the Pacific, in which Kamaishi is situated, and which suffered severe damage from the March 11th tsunami, had been increasingly experiencing serious problems of multiple-debt since the mid-1990s (Sato 2009).

As for employment opportunities in the Kamaishi area (consisting of Kamaishi City, Otsuchi Town, and Tono City), the effective ratio of job openings to applicants averaged 0.33 in 2007-09, and 0.23 in fiscal year 2009, both of which were significantly lower than their respective national averages of 0.5 and 0.34 (Iwate 2010). What is especially noteworthy is that, in 2006, as high as 60 percent of the women employed in the manufacturing sector in this area were employed as non-regular workers, a significantly higher percentage than both Iwate Prefectural (40 percent) and national (47 percent) averages. In fact, the city made much of the abundant supply of “female part-time workers” in its efforts to lure companies (Tsuchida 2009: 244, 265). Of a total of 26 companies that were lured to the city in the 30-year period since the early 1970s, only 14 continue to operate in the city. A large number of companies move to the city, “exploit” female part-time workers, and soon thereafter relocate.

In both an opinion poll conducted in Kamaishi in 2002, and a survey of small rural cities conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2005, both male and female respondents in Kamaishi answered in the affirmative (well over 10 percentage points higher than other small cities) the question of whether they thought “males are treated more favorably than females” both at work and in the family. It is interesting to note, that it was not only the women in Kamaishi who felt they were being treated less favorably than men but that the men also recognized their preferential treatment (Tsuchida 2009: 247).

Like other areas in the Sanriku coastal region, Kamaishi suffers from a shortage of practicing lawyers. In addition, the area has long been described as a medically underserved area with a shortage of physicians. In 2006, in Kamaishi and its environs, the number of practicing physicians per 100,000 residents was 129, comparing very poorly with national (218) and Iwate Prefectural (187) averages (Iwate Hoken Fukushi-bu 2009). It should be kept in mind that the need for both medical care and legal services has increased dramatically since the 3.11 disaster.

Eco-friendly tourism and eco-friendly town projects were regarded as potential areas for economic growth that could contribute significantly to the revitalization of Kamaishi. However, the very natural resources indispensable for such projects and activities were considerably damaged by the earthquake and tsunami.
IV. Disaster Reduction through Social Inclusion

The 3.11 disaster has resulted in a paradigm shift with regard to the question of how to deal with, or prepare for, natural disasters, from one of disaster prevention to one of “disaster reduction.” Take, for instance, a report submitted by the Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake to Prime Minister Kan on June 25, 2011. The report entitled, “Towards Reconstruction: ‘Hope and beyond the Disaster,’” adopts, as an important keyword the term “disaster reduction,” which is defined as “an approach that seeks not to completely prevent or guard against a natural disaster, but rather focuses on minimizing the impact of such a disaster. Disaster reduction requires both hard measures (infrastructure-related measures including development of seawalls and coastal levees, etc.) and soft measures (people-oriented measures including disaster reduction-related training and education, etc.) to be implemented in a multi-layered approach” (Higashi Nihon Daishinsai Fukko Koso Kaigi 2011: Note 2). Similarly, the concept of “disaster reduction” is adopted as one of the “key concepts” in the “Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earth Earthquake,” which was announced by the Reconstruction Headquarters in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Cabinet Office of Japan) on July 29, 2011.

According to the Basic Guidelines on Reconstruction, a prerequisite for “making communities resilient to disasters” is full mobilization of “soft and hard measures based on the concept of ‘disaster reduction’.” This is further elaborated under subsections (i) through (vi). Subsection (i) emphasizes that “‘tsunami-resilient community-building’ should be promoted as a countermeasure for tsunamis based on ‘multiple defenses’ that combine soft and hard measures in a manner most suitable to each community. It is imperative that such community-building efforts are guided by the concept of ‘disaster reduction,’ which places highest priority on ‘escape’ to prevent the loss of human life from natural disasters and thereby minimizes the damage.” Despite the document’s emphasis on mobilizing both “soft and hard measures,” subsections (ii) through (vi) deal almost exclusively with hard measures related to the fields of civil engineering and architecture, while touching only briefly on “soft” measures such as preparation of hazard maps, evacuation plans, evacuation drills, and expediting of research on buried cultural properties to facilitate swift reconstruction (Fukko Taisaku Honbu 2011: 7-8).

In connection to this, one important point to note is that, from the widespread viewpoint that has developed based on the experiences of disasters and practical post-disaster reconstruction efforts around the world and academic research on disasters in recent decades, the need to develop and implement what are called “soft measures” here is perceived more broadly as the need to overcome “social vulnerabilities” (Ikeda 2011). In other words, it is only by eliminating social divisions, inequality, and exclusion based on gender, geographic area, age, ethnicity, and religious belief, that we can build a society resilient to disasters. As explained by Yoshiaki Kawada, Director of the Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution in Kobe, at an international symposium on disaster reduction in 2010:

“Japan’s priority in building disaster resilient communities is breaking out of the vicious cycle of cities and revitalizing rural areas. In concrete terms, Japan must maintain appropriate population density; develop appropriate income; enhance
human-information networks; and cultivate awareness of the connectivity between urban and rural areas” (Hito to Bosai Mirai Senta 2010: 9).

Although Kawada was a member of the Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, what might be called the “official” version of the concept of “disaster reduction” that was included in the Design Council’s recommendations and in the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction announced by the Reconstruction Headquarters seems to have failed to do full justice to Kawada’s concept of “disaster reduction.”

It is, however, worth mentioning that the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction explicitly underlines the importance of the “realization of social inclusion and promotion of ‘New Public Commons’” (in subsection iv), as part of its discussion of “nation-building which incorporates lessons learned from the Great Earthquake” (subsection (4)) under “Policies and Measures for Reconstruction” (section 5). We can assume that this echoes Naoto Kan’s pledge upon taking office as Prime Minister in June 2010 that he would strive to build “a society inclusive of each and every person.” The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction specifically urges the government to take the following steps to promote social inclusion by “supporting efforts by municipalities to develop capacity for outreach, and by providing comprehensive and preventive support in the form of places where individuals in need can feel a sense of belonging, by providing customized support to individual clients, by developing human capital, by creating exemplars of one-stop counseling services, and by providing client-specific assistance by empathizing with each and every excluded person in need of help” (Fukko Taisaku Honbu 2011; 24).

If we really want to achieve social inclusion, it would be best for us to follow the approach taken by the European Union since the early 2000s, whereby we first define clear goals for remedying social exclusion and then develop yardsticks by which to measure progress towards those goals (Osawa 2011b). Once these prerequisites are satisfied, it is also desirable to see that the concept of disaster reduction be expanded in such a way that efforts to realize social inclusion are viewed as one and the same as efforts to make society resilient to disaster.

It is worthwhile at this juncture to recall the report prepared as part of the research project led by Naohiko Jinno at the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, which, as early as 2003, envisaged “the multiplicity of Japan” made up of numerous “viable communities.” The report defines a “viable community” as “one which is never excessively dependent on specific undertakings, industries, or localities, but which has within its borders an appropriate mix of industries, handiwork, traditional cultures, and the like, that together encourage its residents to discover and appreciate, before all else, the resources and values inherent in their community and that enable residents to live in relative independence, while maintaining networks of mutual help and support with other communities.” With regard to future prospects, the report predicts that it will become all the more imperative “to encourage residents to discover valuable individuals, objects, industries, cultures, etc. inherent in the community, to cherish the local pride that emerges from within, and to thereby build a community that places the highest priority on securing residents’ livelihoods, rather than on encouraging residents to dream of luring factories from the outside or encouraging the dependence of communities on various large-scale projects” (Kokudokotsusho Kokudokeikaku-kyoku 2003).
V. Conclusion

By undertaking a comparative gender analysis of livelihood security systems in advanced countries, this paper aimed to elucidate the vulnerabilities inherent in the Japanese economy and larger society, particularly since the mid-1990s.

In Section 2, relative poverty rates were internationally compared to find that poverty rates were high in countries with market-oriented livelihood security systems (Anglo-Saxon countries) and low in countries with systems aiming at work-life balance (Scandinavian countries). Poverty rates in countries with livelihood security systems based on the male-breadwinner model (continental European countries and Japan) were the second highest, following Anglo-Saxon countries; among those countries centered on the male-breadwinner model, especially high poverty rates could be found in Japan and Southern European countries. Relative poverty rates are the focus of this analysis because they are the very first item in the list of indicators of social protection and social inclusion in EU.

The situation in Japan is unique not simply because of Japan’s low poverty reduction rate, but moreover, contrary to the widespread understanding of income redistribution as a means of reducing poverty, redistribution in Japan is “reverse-functional” in the sense that it ends up increasing the poverty rate. Japan’s livelihood security system is by far the most oriented around the male-breadwinner model, and this orientation is attributable not so much to institutions and practices in the private sector, but to the redistribution undertaken by the government through taxation and social security. By briefly examining tax revenue and social insurance contributions (revenues for the government), we found that the manner in which the government raises revenues, and social security contributions in particular, has grown increasingly unfavorable for low-income earners over the last two decades in Japan; this has diminished both the economic stabilization function built into the government’s fiscal activities and the income redistribution function.

In Section 3, we tracked the disparate path of post-WWII economic growth in Japan, and the fact that economic activities and the population have been extremely concentrated in Tokyo, notably since the mid-1900s. The process of economic recovery that unfolded during the early 2000s led to intersectional bifurcations between local regions, firm sizes, management and labor and income classes, to the detriment of local regions such as Hokkaido and Tohoku. In the context of this uneven economic growth, Japan was hardest hit by the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. The main reasons are that, on the one hand, Japan’s economic growth had become heavily dependent on the production and export of a quite limited number of manufactured goods, such as automobiles and IT-related electronic goods whose international trades were nearly collapsed by the crisis, and on the other hand, given that the fruits of the growth had been so unevenly, and even regressively, distributed and redistributed among different sectors of society.

In the latter half of Section 3, we looked into the cases of two municipalities, Futaba Town and Kamaishi City, which were seriously affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake; thus shed light on the desperation of their attempts to revitalize their region by enticing nuclear power plants or manufacturing firms, often in vain, given that this did not ultimately yield a more sustainable
financial situation for the municipality, nor did it lead to the creation of sustainable job opportunities.

Finally in Section 4 we explore the concept of “disaster reduction” and its role in guiding the post-311 policy framework in Japan. We suggest that this concept be expanded such that efforts towards social inclusion may be understood to be part and parcel of the same goal of making communities resilient to disaster. In retrospect, we cannot but reflect on the fact that, had we at least tried to build “a multiplicity of Japan” grounded in numerous “viable communities”, we may have been able to reduce, beforehand, much of the damage incurred by the global financial and economic crisis, and that caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake.

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The concepts of gender equality and multicultural diversity suggest at once the need to create legal and political practices that affirm the equal value of individuals, all the while being attentive to differences that might unduly penalize or tax them in their daily lives as a result of formal or informal kinds of discrimination and prejudice. The paradox of many contemporary liberal democratic states lies in the contradictory space between their presumed legitimacy as constitutional democracies with protections against discrimination, and their ongoing failure to practically advance the “democratic constitution” and material promise of those citizenship protections.

The current paper seeks to explore the challenges of gender equality and multicultural realities through a critical reflection on the theoretical promise and practical pitfalls of democratic citizenship in general, and of the implications for post-disaster reconstruction plans in Japan in particular. I will draw upon two bodies of literature that have provided international leadership on the intersections of gender equality, multiculturalism, and democratic politics, namely: feminist political theory and critical democratic theory. I make a point of mentioning the fact that we are dealing with democratic societies, and in particular advanced constitutional democracies. The challenges of “gender equality” and “multicultural diversity” have most openly been taken up by advanced industrial democracies that profess allegiance to a set of constitutional rules of democratic self-government founded on the principle of the equality and liberty of each individual, and that this ought to hold true regardless of the ascriptive sexual or diverse cultural characteristics of each legal subject. Moreover, I focus on the concept of democracy because it implies a set of legal, political, and institutional “preconditions” that often remain under-theorized by political actors and social scientists, and therefore lead to uncritical assumptions about the existing quality of the democracy in so-called advanced societies.

In her feminist and anti-racist critique of contemporary democracies, Iris Marion Young has described social justice as “the institutional conditions for promoting self-development and self-determination of a society’s members”. The current reflection is similarly interested in the theoretical frameworks capable of addressing the complex relationship between the multiple and mutually constitutive markers of political identity (nationality, race, gender, mother tongue, age etc.)
that practically affect the quality of democratic citizenship. Moreover, we are interested in exploring the institutional conditions of self-development and democratic citizenship that can equip citizens to competently practice “gender equality”, and make “intercultural fluency” an established democratic culture in the present and future. The following broad questions motivate this inquiry:

- What is the role of democratic institutions and the law in protecting against the possibility of intercultural violence, sexual oppression, and other formal or informal means by which “difference” is taxed in practice?
- What institutional practices of mutual respect must we publicly adopt in order that a majority of female and male citizens and residents might make the democratic foundation of gender equality a formal apart of their own personal culture?
- What institutional practices of intercultural partnership might help the dominant culture respect the idea that residents of minority cultures are equally entitled to influence the rules of political belonging towards “convivial” balance?
- What is the relationship between (elite and grassroots) practices of political representation, including representative self-government, the activity of norm-construction (legislating), and the civic education of citizens into gender-equal, intercultural citizenship?
- How might the post-311 aftermath serve as a window of opportunity for critical reflection on Japanese citizenship, who is considered ‘uchi/soto’ to Japan, and who ought to be included in the support programs, services, and community-building targeted by Tohoku Reconstruction policies and strategies?

In the following pages, I will first outline the

deficits of contemporary practices of democratic citizenship in light of existing commitments by countries worldwide, including Japan, towards gender equality and respect for cultural diversity. Secondly, I will outline some of the theoretical blind-spots of the literature on multiculturalism in light of the intersectional complexities of contemporary identities. Third, I will describe the complex intersections of contemporary political identities by tracing the core tensions between equality and difference that have been best theorized by feminist scholarship. This will highlight a core challenge for contemporary democracies of not only deconstructing outdated categories, but also of inscribing anti-essentialist readings of those identities (gender, race, culture, nation) into the law so that they foster solidarity across groups. Fourth, I will relate the aforementioned concerns of political belonging to practices of democratic self-government to suggest that we re-value representative democratic decision-making bodies as the practical sites wherein all citizens (elite and grassroots) may be educated into practices of power-sharing, and forced to gain competency in gender-equal, intercultural practices of mutual respect. Finally, these theoretical and practical insights will be applied to the current context of post-311 Tohoku reconstruction to assess what implications can be discerned at this historic moment in the history of Japanese citizenship.
Much of the mainstream literature on “democracy” derives from a Western tradition of political philosophy that assumed the rights and freedoms of the individual to be in tension with the needs of the community. These discussions remained silent and/or inadequately dealt with the kinds of exclusions that have stigmatized a broad cross-section of citizens and residents from being full members of the body politic. We can think of exclusions based on sex/gender, sexual orientation, race, and indigeneity, but also of nationality, age or physical ability. Many of these distinctions continue to be used to deny the rights and freedoms of many citizens and residents within contemporary democracies. In theory, constitutional democracies on all continents are expected to enhance the efficacy and scope of their gender-equality practices and/or multicultural practices in order to live up to their constitutional and international commitments. Within international law, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) constitute the legal commitments of countries to be held accountable for the failure of domestic policies to redress discrimination against social groups that have been historically marginalized by and through domestic laws and policies. The adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action (United Nations 1995) by over 180 countries, announced a broad-based political commitment to the realization of full participation and substantive equality for women as a cornerstone of good governance. The adherence of 75 countries to the United Nations Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression, the advent of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reflect the changing normative frameworks and democratic ideals underscoring the boundaries of our national and international communities, the notion of political belonging and citizenship, cultural and corporeal identities, the role of social group membership, and the democratic value of diverse ways of being in the world.

To monitor the progress of governments worldwide, multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, produce the Human Development Report with ever more numerous and increasingly nuanced indicators of persistent inequalities. Yet, the past three decades has seen the advent of neo-liberal counter-discourses confirming formal legal equality as the end goal of democratic citizenship; as such, these discourses dismiss the ongoing political influence of class, gender, race, culture, language, socio-economic status, indigeneity and disability upon the experience of citizenship. As neo-liberals and neo-conservatives like to suggest, if formal equality has already been largely achieved in the texts of constitutions, then democratic mechanisms of inclusion, such as affirmative action or specific programs aimed at overcoming systemic forms of discrimination, are unnecessary or obsolete. The irony of the past three decades of democratic “progress” is that governments have increasingly signed on to international conventions that proscribe concrete governmental and proactive legal interventions to eliminate systemic forms of discrimination, and
then have failed to honour those commitments when faced with conservative discourses asserting the achievement of “equality” and the arrival of a post-patriarchal, post-colonial, post-oppression era.

II. Multiculturalism Theories: Some Disciplinary Blind-spots

The dominant international literature on minority rights, democratic institutions and political representation has traditionally focused on consociationism, nationalism, and minority nations or cultures; as such it focuses upon various distinctions between the group-based rights of, for example, indigenous peoples, minority nations and ethno-cultural minorities within multicultural societies. Leading theorist of multiculturalism, Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka has acknowledged the shared theoretical lineage of these national/cultural concerns with issues of gender-based self-determination, however, establishing democratic rights of self-government for women and immigrants has not figured at the heart of his inquiries. Rather, Kymlicka initially grounded the normative legitimacy of democratic rights of certain groups in the migration patterns establishing white-settler societies such as Canada; he disaggregates the group-specific rights of the “old” minorities from “new” minorities. This narrow definition of the normative grounds for democratic rights to political self-representation produces an analytical and normative blind spot to concerns raised by groups such as women, ethno-cultural minorities, permanent residents, migrant workers, persons with disabilities, and young adults, whose democratic rights may not be linked to the traditional parameters of territorial concentration, migration, or national/cultural groupness. Territorial/migrant-based analyses therefore tend to advance an essentialist view of “nationhood”, “culture”, and “minorities” that allow for definitions of the group’s specificities and unique characteristics to be defined and monopolized by the views, interests, and ascriptive characteristics of the dominant leaders within the group/nation. Yet the inherent right of non-territorial groups of individuals to democratic self-government clearly predates modern conceptions of the nation-state.

Within the British context, Paul Gilroy’s post-colonial use of the term “multicultural conviviality” presents similar theoretical problems as he remains overly fixated on the monovocal concept of race and on the effects of racializing discourses alone. There is little analysis of the ways in which race and culture intersect with oppressions inflected by class, gender, ability, or sexual orientation. Despite his deep appreciation of the devastating effects of racism, Gilroy asserts a rather naïve and teleological confidence in the grassroots flourishing of respectful cooperation in the daily relations of intercultural co-existence in the United Kingdom. It is an analysis that is politically aware of the power of racism, and yet advocates depoliticizing proscriptions for action that deny the constructive political role that racialized identity might play in overcoming existing forms of racism in practice. Not only does he favour the discursive and institutional dismantling of racially-inflected forms of political identity, but he also fails to critically reflect on what institutional conditions might support the grassroots flourishing of multicultural conviviality in the future, such that it might exist by design, rather than by tempestuous good fortune. Akin to Judith Butler’s critiques of the category...
of “women” as a political identity for feminist movement activism, Gilroy challenges the legitimacy of racialized identity to figure as a “democratic” project through which marginalized groups might seek democratic self-determination and empowerment.

Moving now to the Japanese context, John Lie traces the influence of Japan’s imperial past and post-war discourse in masking the centuries-old realities of multi-ethnicity that has contributed to nation-building in Japan. As with Michael Wiener’s collection on minorities in Japan, the deep interconnections of multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, and minority realities remain the dominant focus, with the political implications of gendered and class-inflected migration left largely under-examined, suggesting that ethnicity, culture and/or race pose the only challenges to the realization of democratic conviviality among citizens/residents. For her part, Yasuko Takezawa speaks of tabunka kyosei to describe the cooperation amongst Japanese, Chinese and Korean residents in the aftermath of the Hanshin earthquake in Kobe. Although there is little exploration of other categories of identity besides race, Takezawa does connect her discussion of multicultural conviviality to emerging discourses on “local citizenship” and of the increasing importance of political suffrage to foreign residents in Japan; this, she argues, is identified by local foreign residents as a means of institutionalizing practices of convivial community-building that can ensure them a less precarious situation in the future. Reflecting more comprehensive intersectional analyses, the important fieldwork by Sunhee Lee in the Tohoku region, and the research by Chris Burgess in Yamagata both illustrates the context of globalization and increasing migration of foreign women to Japan to become wives in the rural areas. It highlights issues of democratic self-determination and political suffrage for not only their racializing, but also their gendering and intergenerational implications.

As an analytical tool, the failure of many multicultural theories to be attentive to the diversity internal to each nation, culture, or minority, and to underscore the importance of competing interpretations of groupiness that emerge from gendered, class, and generational differences, weakens the purchase of these theories. They fail to provide sufficiently nuanced guidelines that can equip legislators and policy-makers to take stock of the broader diversity and intersecting oppressions confronting its population. With this in mind, it would seem that the institutional reconstruction of democratic citizenship in ways that practically account for, but does not thereby reify various political identities, remains at the heart of inquiry for gender studies, multicultural studies, multinational democracy, globalization studies, law and policy studies, and democratic theory and practice.

To help clarify the terms of the debate and the tensions between various strategies of empowerment, we will look to the literature that has developed extensive expertise in analyzing the complexities of diverse citizenship: feminist political theory.

### III. Feminist Theories: Equality and Difference?

In *Gender in Political Theory (1999)*, Judith Squires develops a useful typology of feminist theory around three concepts, “equality”, “difference”, “diversity”; these concepts are likewise central to contemporary debates and interdisciplinary research on the impact of
“gender”, “multiculturalism” and “migration/globalization” on democratic citizenship. In the following section I will briefly resume the core orientations of each of the three currents within feminist theorizing, as they relate to the concepts of “equality”, “difference” and “diversity”.20 Thereafter, I will focus on the “diversity feminist” contributions that help us understand the complex relationship between democracy, self-determination and political identities (gender, race, culture, etc) inflected with ascriptive characteristics.

Distinguishing between sex and gender, the first current of feminist theorizing built upon social constructivist approaches within an “equality feminism” that sought to construct gender as a cultural product. In this view, gender difference was seen as an effect of sexism used to legitimate inequality between the sexes,21 rather than an effect of an ontological difference. This first current was organized around a strategy of “equality” and sought the “inclusion” of women within existing political structures that were presumed to be (and ought to remain) “neutral” to sexual differences. The project of inclusion aimed at asserting that gender ought not to be politically relevant, in theory and in practice.22 Despite attempts to distinguish between the facticity of sex and the construction of sexist gender differences, the strategy of gender neutrality resulted in a common measure that still looked strikingly like male dominance in practice.

Rejecting the notion that assimilation to the male model could ever be empowering in practice, the second family of feminism organized around the concept of women’s “difference” and argued that equality was being conflated with “sameness”. Mobilizing around strategic “affirmations” of the feminine and celebrations of women’s “difference”, they aimed to critique and re-articulate what had historically been coded as weakness, inferiority and the source of subordination. The goal was to “reverse” patriarchal values that denigrated women’s differences from men by celebrating those “nurturing, peace-loving, intuitive and emotional qualities” unique to women.23 It was hoped that the strategy of reversal might unleash a re-ordering of the public sphere to make it more open to women and positively aligned with the qualities flowing from women’s experiences.

Squires notes the tremendous political significance of the arguments advanced by equality feminism and difference feminism. At the same time, within immigrant-receiving, colonial/white-settler societies, and/or where national experiences were internally diversified by the presence of important minorities, such as Canada, the purchase of both equality feminism (liberal feminism) and difference feminism (radical feminism) relied on a presumed “sisterhood” that denied many important disparities amongst women. For example, within the Canadian and American contexts, the past forty years saw challenges to these universalizing feminist theories, and to mainstream feminist movement activism, from black women/women of colour24, indigenous women25, Québécois feminists26, postcolonial feminists27, lesbian feminists28, women with disabilities, to name just a few. The result of these counter-critiques has been that most contemporary Canadian and/or Anglo-American feminist theory and feminist movement activism has moved away from the singular sex/gender focus and no longer speaks of womanhood, but rather of “diverse women”.

Invoking a strategy of epistemological “displacement”, the political strategy of “diversity feminism”, the third current of feminist theory identified by Squires, has been to “displace” the categories of sex and gender in order to unleash the inherent “diversity” that is masked by hegemonic understandings of gender and sex as a natural
binary that correlates with the bodies of women and men. This third family of feminist theorizing is interested in the relational construction of gender through power, language or discourse. In this context, “gender becomes a fundamentally political category” that no longer presumes sex to be foundational, nor posits a causal connection between sex and gender, however culturally elaborated. This had led to a questioning of the vocabulary and political category (“women”) around which feminist activism ought to organize.

In “Current Controversies in Feminist Theory” (2003), Mary Dietz proposes a typology of feminist theory that builds upon Squire’s typology and further disaggregates “diversity feminism” into two tendencies: the diversity-tending current and the deconstructionist current. This allows Dietz to examine the strategies pursued in relation to how each theorizes democracy: associational democracy versus agonic democracy. Theorists within the associational approach (Iris Young, Anne Philips, Melissa Williams, Nancy Fraser, Seyla Benhabib) are said to “begin with politicized identity and then theorize (democratic ) politics in terms of the proliferation, negotiation, and coordination of multiple intersecting identities, selves, or groups”. Conversely, the agonic approach of diversity feminism (Chantal Mouffe, Bonnie Honig, and Judith Butler) sees politics as a practice of articulation wherein singular identities, such as “women”, or even multiple identities are “constantly vulnerable to contestation, transformation, and destabilizing maneuvers as performativity”.

Whereas the “associational democracy” theorists focus on understanding processes of exclusion (gender, racial, cultural) so as to re-construct the institutional and practical means of realizing democratic empowerment, the “agonic democracy” theorists focus on deconstructing the categories upon which exclusion has historically been organized. Both offer important theoretical insights to the practices of multicultural conviviality and gender equality. For the second current, as with Gilroy and Butler’s advocacy for deconstructing gendered and racialized identities, the focus is on abandoning the categories of belonging/exclusion to better account for the contingency of identity, leaving us in a deconstructive limbo without a common vocabulary to challenge past exclusions, nor the tools to practically re-construct an alternative future. For the first current, the focus is on challenging the power of past/existing conceptions of belonging/exclusion, and re-construction alternative political interventions and legal obligations that build upon anti-essentialist conceptions of those categories of belonging. Both currents hesitate to acknowledge that institutional practices of representative democracy are themselves contingent, engaging in a process of norm-production that is simultaneously deconstructive (past norms) and reconstructive (emerging norms). As such, to be genuinely representative, representative democratic praxis must be constituted through the consistent performance of self-representation by a diverse cross-section of politically salient identities, including historically excluded identities.

The following section will propose an alternative understanding of democratic self-government and decision-making bodies in an attempt to work through some of these theoretical and practical challenges.
IV. Representative Democracy as a Citizenizing Praxis

Dietz argues that feminist political theorists have been “engaged in debates about what it might mean to conceptualize a feminist political praxis that is aligned with democracy but does not begin from the binary of gender.” I have argued above that these central tensions are likewise present within the literatures on multiculturalism and minorities within minorities, both of which are struggling to re-conceptualize multicultural practices in ways that do not presume the unity of “culture”, nor begin from a reified binary of majority/minority positionings. Similarly, within the literature on nationalisms, multinational democracy and asymmetrical federalism, there is a struggle to re-conceptualize political belonging without the homogenizing tendencies of the “nation”. Be it “gender”, “culture”, or “nationhood”, each of these disciplinary currents is struggling to find alternative practical foundations that can lay the groundwork for a more dynamic relationship between equality, difference, and the multiple identities that require material reconstruction and practical self-determination through contemporary democratic citizenship and representative decision-making institutions.

To what extent are political rights and political representation essential to having a “say” over one’s destiny and the conditions of cooperation pursued by the political community in which we live? The theory of citizenship developed by T.H. Marshall (1950) underscored the importance and interdependence of various kinds of rights within democracy in the evolution of civil, political and social citizenship; this has led to important critiques and insights as to the differential impact and rates of enjoyment/acquisition of those rights and liberties by various groups within society, as well as the impacts of legislative, public policy, and welfare-state structures of the late modern state. Historically, women, immigrants, and in the context of contemporary globalization, foreign residents and temporary workers, have gained partial access to certain aspects of social citizenship; their relationship to civil and political citizenship has been tenuous at best. To the extent that these groups remain systematically under-represented within contemporary (local, prefectural, national) representative democratic institutions and/or are practically denied membership either legally or symbolically (in terms of the political imaginary), their demands for democratic inclusion and/or increased political representation must be understood as a plea for belonging and “a say” over the destiny of what they consider to also be their political community. It constitutes a demand for access to the spaces of ideological contestation wherein the legal, political and socio-economic partnerships of the political community will be institutionally deliberated and determined.

In her discussion of the politics of representation, Yeatman reminds us that not only “power over”, but all forms of power can be mobilized to produce both democratic and undemocratic ends. Ironically, the formal existence of constitutional democracy is no guarantee that decision-making bodies will only be used to advance democratic ends. Democratic citizenship requires practices wherein all of the key constituencies of a polity may enjoy a relatively equal proportion of “power over” one another, relatively equal access to resources that support the “power to” realize self-developmental projects, and as Frazer and Lacey further nuance, they require a relatively equal exercise of “power with” one another through decision-making institutions. Not only do practices of power-sharing...
serve to normatively and symbolically establish the equality of diverse citizens and residents, but more pragmatically, they force diverse citizens with multiple allegiances to confront one another and work through their differences in debates, discussions and exchanges that are likely to be both difficult and rewarding – that both divide and unite members of diverse walks of life around shared goals and aspirations. Working together across differences, within democratic institutions, city councils, community boards, local advisory committees and school boards, is the foundational means of democratically securing the outcomes that we seek separately, and also collectively. Working together across our differences is a praxis that increases the likelihood that attention will be paid to the perspectives, needs, and practical realities confronting all those with whom we collectively share a political destiny, but whose difficulties we may otherwise have very little awareness, limited understanding, and especially, for which we have insufficient levels of empathy. James Tully defines these pursuits to be “practices of citizenization”.

These types of civic engagements and deliberative activities practically educate us into our responsibilities and roles as citizens; they lay the groundwork for the associational ties of solidarity and the respectful ties of democratic dissent that are necessary if we are to fashion a gender-equal and interculturally competent population, by democratic design. In short, to achieve gender-equal citizens, and intercultural respect, our democratic culture must be grounded in the mundane reality, daily practices, and ritualistic routines of working across our differences within decision-making and deliberative engagements with diverse others, from the kitchen table through to the cabinet table. And as with all other skills and competencies, only practice makes perfect.

The points raised hereabove must seem quite obvious, even intuitive to human nature and democratic culture. Yet rather than tackle ongoing democratic exclusions, the systemic over-representation of dominant (sex, race, language, religion) groups of citizens within democratic institutions has largely gone unchecked within advanced liberal-democratic states, particularly within G-8 nations. To return to our second question: What institutional practices of mutual respect must we publicly adopt in order that a majority of female and male citizens and residents

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**Table 1. The State of Gender Imbalance within G-8 Parliamentary Seat Allocation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Quotas*</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>% W</th>
<th>% M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Mixed Member Proportional</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Two-Round System</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Parallel (Segmented) (PR Lists and Majoritarian constituencies)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments (31 July 2012), Geographic Regions, Ace Project, Global Database of Quotas for Women

* Party-based quotas, if set at a significant level (40%+) and if enforced with the same consistency as legal quotas, can have the same impact. They both foster a gender-equal culture within the party and work to generate net increases in gender-balanced electoral teams. In Germany, all competitive parties have quotas that are applied consistently.
Within a pre-disaster context, Japan’s striking under-performance in the area of gender-balanced governance has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, the failure of successive governments to ensure that political parties take meaningful steps to achieve gender-balanced candidacy is in evidence. Rather, largely symbolic efforts to adopt a target of 30% women only in advisory councils is problematic. In the case of Japan, the law that had previously established a male monopoly over political mandates was only reformed some 56 years ago. Since 1946, the male monopoly has only been slightly diminished in practice, as reflected in Table 1. In 2012, men’s over-representation continues with a clear hegemony over 81.4% of the seats in the Upper House and fully 89.2% of seats in the Lower House. We may clearly see that Japanese political parties have yet to acquire any meaningful competence in terms of gender-equal practices of party leadership, candidate recruitment, and electoral power-sharing at the national level, not to mention the prefectural and municipal sites of decision-making. This makes it more difficult for women to ensure that their realities and perspectives are adequately represented within the halls of power. Our own qualitative interviews with women members of the Japanese House of Representatives confirmed the importance, to female citizens, of having access to a female parliamentarian, and that women parliamentarians were specifically solicited by female residents to carry forward and represent their concerns within the formal political channels of deliberation and decision-making (Steele 2006-07). From the perspective of civic education, in-group hegemonies over decision-making institutions make it more difficult for women and men in Japan to regularly witness and directly experience practices of gender-equal partnership that might further nurture their own personal cultures towards gender-equal fluency.

- What institutional practices of intercultural partnership might help the dominant culture respect the idea that residents of minority cultures are equally entitled to influence the rules of political belonging towards “convivial” balance?

V. The State of Gender-Equal and Intercultural Competence in Pre-311 Japan

A more politically contentious issue, the fulfillment of campaign promises that would confirm voting rights for special permanent residents is a relevant area of democratic practice that can begin to foster democratic practices of intercultural competence and political belonging. Objectively speaking, the ongoing exclusion of special permanent residents from having a formal say in the political destiny...
of Japan strikes as a particularly unfair ‘tax’, given that access to Japanese nationality and processes of ‘naturalization’ are not easily obtained. In an era of post-colonial drift, where significant diaspora communities have resided in Japan for generations, it seems remarkably unfair to incur all of the burdens of the law, and yet none of the rights of democratic inclusion and representation; local suffrage in municipal and prefectural governments would seem to be a minimum ‘practice’ of democratic citizenship that could affirm the contributions of special permanent residents to the polity, and within decision-making bodies, create opportunities for intercultural understanding. In 2006, the Vice Minister of Justice released the “Report on the Future of the Acceptance of Foreigners Project”; the eighth recommendation was as follows, “The Japanese government needs to consider the demographic diversity of the resident foreigners so that they can contribute to the pluralism within Japan without disrupting Japanese society.”

Indeed, if we apply Tully’s conceptions of “civil” subjects versus “civic” citizens, the impact of colonial pasts and contemporary globalization upon many G-8 countries, including Japan, is such that increasing numbers of diaspora minorities, marriage migrants, and/or temporary workers-become-immigrants constitute net increases in the numbers of “civil” subjects – those who are maintained for purely instrumental and economic ends, with a corresponding net decrease in the numbers of “civic” citizens – those with the legal capacity and political right to shape the democratic future of the nation. Borrowing from the language of ancient Greece, as a result of both formal laws and informal processes of discrimination and exclusion, the populations inhabiting post-colonial contemporary democracies, such as Japan, are increasingly divided into “citizens” (liber – endowed with political rights of self-government) and “slaves” (servus). This growing imbalance increases the numbers of individuals who may be said to be democratically “unfree”, and simultaneously diminishes the substantive freedom of the democratic society itself.

The excesses of these kinds of monopolies over power lead to the waning legitimacy of democratic institutions, fuel voter cynicism, contribute to lower voter turnout and thereby weaken the mechanisms of electoral accountability. Democracy becomes superficially sustained through electoral practices whereby mandates of representation are confirmed by smaller and smaller proportions of the citizenry to an unrepresentative selection of candidates who, even collectively, fail to demonstrate intercultural competence and gender-sensitive insights into the core needs of the population. What is our evaluation of “democratic citizenship” and what is our criteria for judging whether or not a society is “free” when increasing numbers of the population are subjected to a way of life that yields precarious access to social/economic citizenship and/or that offers little to no access to political citizenship?

In a pre-disaster context, the abovementioned hegemonies over political power by dominant masculinity and dominant Japanese ethno-racial nationality exacerbate and sustain systemic inequalities; given that women constitute a majority of the population and that they oversee much of the primary care needs of children and a significant elderly population, the under-representation of women’s perspectives can have highly detrimental costs for up to three fourths of the polity. In a post-disaster context, these democratic deficiencies combine with the impacts of ‘natural disaster’ to dramatically intensify existing vulnerabilities to the ‘man-made disasters’ of economic precarity, legalized dependency, and political domination. The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters” observed that
“Disaster risk arises when hazards interact with physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities” (2005: 1). Indeed, it is this tragic combination of natural and man-made disasters that works to threaten the most basic of democratic ends: livelihood security, human dignity, and even the equal moral worth of all individuals.

VI. Risk Reduction, Diverse Citizenship, and Democratic Power-Sharing: Preliminary Implications for Post-311 Tohoku Reconstruction

The United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction held symbolically in Kobe, Japan in 2005 constituted an important moment when participating governments affirmed the need for attention to concerns of both human security generally, and gendered perspectives specifically. Of the eleven “General Considerations” that were affirmed at that conference, commitments to gender perspectives and cultural diversity figured fourth and fifth in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. The prescriptions were as follows:

(d) A gender perspective should be integrated into all disaster risk management policies, plans and decision-making processes, including those related to risk assessment, early warning, information management, and education and training;

(e) Cultural diversity, age, and vulnerable groups should be taken into account when planning for disaster risk reduction, as appropriate;45

In 2005, the Japanese Government’s “Basic Plan for a Gender-equal Society” named the importance of incorporating disaster prevention, and the “Basic Disaster prevention Plan” mentioned the need of a gender perspective. Ironically, the results of the 2008 Japanese Survey of the National Governors’ Association revealed that fully 100% of the individuals appointed by the 47 prefectural and 1747 municipal governments to head an evacuation center (post-disaster) were male; disaster management and evacuation center leadership was understood to require a masculine skill-set.46 The andro-centricity of these appointments hardly constitutes an institutional measure that could ensure a gender perspective is “integrated into all disaster risk management policies, plans and decision-making processes”. When placed in dialogue with the Survey of men and women living in the Evacuation Surveys post-311, the 2008 NGA Survey confirms a distinct gender gap in the “priority areas” identified by governmental respondents with respect to the types of issues that might preoccupy the populations living in evacuation centers post-disaster.47

In the Hyogo Framework’s “priorities for action” identified under the subheading entitled, “Resources”, the Report lists three areas for which Japan’s action between 2005-2011 would have been key in the aftermath of 311. Notably, on page 7 of the Report, there is an affirmation of members’ commitments to the following:

(e) Assess existing human resource capacities for disaster risk reduction at all levels and develop capacity-building plans and programmes for meeting ongoing and future requirements.

(f) Allocate resources for the development and the implementation of disaster risk management policies, programmes, laws and regulations on disaster risk reduction in all relevant sectors and authorities at all levels of administrative
and budgets on the basis of clearly prioritized actions.

(g) Governments should demonstrate the strong political determination required to promote and integrate disaster risk reduction into development programming.48

As late as 3-4 years after the Hyogo Framework, the track record of the Japanese government remained dismal, with the Gender-equal Society Basic Plans 2008 and 2009 both having budgets that effectively allocated 0 yen to concerns relating to ‘Disaster and Reconstruction’ (Yamaji 2009: 45). In short, not only was there a failure to understand the distinct priorities that emerge from the gendered perspectives or cultural diversity of the population, this breadth of human experience and the various social and caregiving contributions of women failed to be adequately understood and appreciated. Not surprisingly, these crucial human resources failed to be harnessed adequately to reduce risk and human suffering, and to be formally mobilized and empowered to share in the responsibilities of deciding and guiding post-disaster response and reconstruction strategies that meet the needs of the population.

What are the practical consequences for a population when their government fails to promote and then maintain a political cultural endowed with gender-equal practices and intercultural competence? What are the implications of these democratic failures in the face of natural disasters that impose widespread trauma and loss of historic proportions? What are the unique needs of societies, such as Japan, wherein gender-based stratification of roles continue to limit the breadth of “knowledge” and “understanding” available to leaders acting within institutional cultures that are disproportionately androcentric in form and content? Indeed, it would seem obvious that societies with highly stratified gender-based roles are in the greatest need of gender-balanced leadership, decision-making, and grassroots implementation of public policies and services.

Not surprisingly, in the immediate aftermath of 311, a feminist network was created under the leadership of Domoto Akiko and Hara Hiroko as a result of growing concerns that the realities and perspectives of diverse women might not effectively reach the ears of decision-makers. Without an adequate organization and renowned representatives who could explicitly amplify the voices of women, it was felt that women’s specific challenges might be left unaddressed, and unsupported by recovery and reconstruction policies. Indeed, one month after the triple disaster, the Reconstruction Design Council established on April 11th 2011 included only one woman among the 15 appointees. The “Principles of Reconstruction” announced by that Council on May 10th focused on economic recovery, and completely failed to identify gender equality as a cross-cutting challenge and pre-established commitment for disaster reduction. Nor was there evidence of a gender-sensitive analysis of the health, welfare, environmental and educational challenges that lay ahead (Hara 2012). Within just three months of the triple disaster, the Gender Equality and Disaster Network’s resourceful response was to convene women’s organizations and women’s groups working in the affected areas for a Symposium on the theme “Disaster/Recovery and Gender-Equality”.49 Following the Symposium, the members of the Organizing Committee formed the “Gender Equality and Disaster/Reconstruction Network” and have continued their advocacy activities. Held on June 11th, the 3-month anniversary of 311, this foundational Symposium publicly aired the concerns of women to help put them on the political agenda.

Three core demands were put forward to the Japanese Government: 1) actively promote
women’s participation in decision-making; 2) ensure that disaster prevention and restoration measures included commitments to gender equality; 3) create mechanisms that would allow affected parties to participate in the formulation and implementation of Recovery Plans. These demands were met in part within the content of the “Basic Act on Reconstruction’ being adopted on June 24th, 2011. Point (2) of the Basic Philosophy outlined the need to respect “the opinions of the residents in the disaster-afflicted regions” and take into account “the opinions of a wide range of people including women, children and the disabled persons.” Point (ix) of the “Basic Guidelines on Reconstruction’ affirm that “From the standpoint of gender equality, women’s participation will be promoted in all aspects/organizations of the reconstruction process.” Under “Human Resources Assistance to support of municipalities”, point (4) aims to “Improve the environment that is likely to reflect opinions of women, children, youth, elderly people, the disabled and foreigners in the process of town-building, for instance, through appropriate composition of coordinating meetings or similar conferences.” The extent to which the national government has facilitated the mainstreaming of these gendered and intercultural concerns remains contested.

Indeed, one year later, the Gender Equality and Disaster/Reconstruction Network deemed it necessary to host a second Symposium, held on June 22nd, 2012, to raise the lack of a gender perspective in reconstruction strategies focused on economic revival, employment, and community development. These ongoing demands for inclusion have been conveyed by the mobilization of grassroots through to elite women’s activism in the name of bearing witness to the diverse realities of women in the affected areas: pregnant and nursing mothers, women health care practitioners and volunteers who stayed on the front lines to offer support to those in dire conditions, the elderly and persons with disabilities, as well as foreign women whose lives had been established in Japan through marriage migration to Tohoku. Arguably, there has been a keen sensitivity within this Network, as with other post-311 mobilizations of women, to the vulnerabilities of various groups, and to the need for solidarity with these marginalized voices and bodies, to publically re-affirm their right to socio-political belonging and status as “uchi” to the Japanese political community.

VII. Conclusion

The current paper has attempted to explore some of the theoretical and interdisciplinary challenges of supporting advanced democracies to establish institutional practices of gender equality and cultural diversity so that their populations, from the elite-levels through to the grassroots, may acquire competency in intercultural respect and gender-sensitive cooperation. In advanced G-8 democracies, as in Japan, further research is required to document the various democratic deficits that persist: experiences of formal exclusion of non-Japanese residents, local-to-national policy failures that merely pay lip service to gender equality, conscious decisions to allocate zero public tax revenues into critical national responsibilities such as disaster prevention and gender equality, the failure to publically document and address the systemic expulsions of many different “bodies” from a “Japanese social imaginary” wherein primarily male Japanese
nationals are exclusively empowered to be the protagonists of the nation. With some of these research goals in mind, a new interdisciplinary Network of scholars (based in Japan and Canada) have been collaborating to combine their research insights towards a preliminary reflection on “The Post-311 Challenges and Opportunities of Mainstreaming Gender and Diversity in the Priorities and Planning of Tohoku Reconstruction”. A first Workshop was held in Victoria, Canada in June 11, 2012, some 15 months after the triple disaster, and exactly one year after the Symposium of the “Gender Equality and Disaster/Reconstruction Network”.

Building upon the insights from law, political science, public policy, sociology, anthropology, and geography, the Preliminary Report, entitled, “Gender, Diversity and Tohoku Reconstruction; Post-311 Challenges and Opportunities” will be launched in late February 2013, on the eve of the second anniversary of 311. Extending the tremendous work undertaken by the “Global COE on Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization” of Tohoku University, this international Network and many other scholarly and grassroots organizations are mobilizing to hold workshops, symposium, and conferences across Japan. These educational, and indeed, “citizenizing” efforts underscore the crucial importance of social science research, interdisciplinary conversations, and evidence-based law and policy reform recommendations; if and when elected leaders decide to rigorously “take stock” of the systemic inequalities, irrational discriminations, and multifarious democratic deficits that are crippling the freedom of the polity, there will be no shortage of empirically-founded insights to guide future legislative reforms.

Ideally, the memory of 311 will not simply be linked to the tragic loss of over 19000 lives, the nuclear devastation, and the destruction of livelihood economies and communities along the North Eastern coast of Japan. With reflection and political action, ideally the legacy of 311 will reside in the ways in which Japanese governments, political parties, hand-in-hand with women’s movements and civil society, were successful in charting a new course for Japanese citizenship for the century to come. This legacy would speak to the practical steps taken by democratically elected leaders to listen to, honour, and politically empower, the tremendous diversity of perspectives, realities, and bodies that constitute the Japanese political community. If there is any democratic progress to be gained from the post-311 reconstruction era, it will be grounded in a critical reflection and realization of who is and was already apart of Tohoku, and therefore who ought to be practically welcomed into the body politic and decision-making processes of the nation. Democracies worldwide would do well to learn from the tremendous challenges and opportunities that 311 has imposed upon Japan and to learn with humility from this unimaginable calamity, and from the tremendous wisdom and citizenizing praxis that has been manifest in much of women’s mobilizations in the aftermath of 311. In sum, it is our belief that Tohoku Reconstruction is first and foremost a window of opportunity for democratic reconstruction, institutional diversification, and civic revitalization, a window of hope that the women of Tohoku, and their allies across the country, are fighting hard to keep open.

Selected References


Notes

1 I wish to thank Professor Mari Osawa for the insightful feedback she offered for this manuscript.


11 The term “self-government” is used to insist upon the fact that the concept and practice of representation within political philosophy too often focusses on the representation of others, when it is first and foremost a practice of self-representation, including within democratic institutions. For these nuances of ‘self-representation’, see Steele 2009.


20 Squires’ typology is grounded primarily in Anglo-American feminist political theory, and as such , it does not situate the feminist literature coming from Japan. For a discussion of contemporary Japanese feminist theorists, such as Chizuko Ueno and Yayoi Okano, and how they might be situated within this conceptual framework, see (eds.) Amano Masako et al, (2009) Shinpen Nihon no feminizumu shinsai keiken to aratana kadai - kekkon imin josei no toranunshunarusei o dou toaryaeruka, in (ed.) Suzuki Eriko, Komai Hiroshi, Kanshu Diasupora nenpo 2: Higashi daishinsai to gaikokujin eijusha tachi, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. see also, Chris, Burgess (2008) “(Re) Constructing Boundaries: International Marriage Migrants in Yamagata as Agents of Multiculturalism,” in (eds.) Nelson, G., John Ertl and R. Kenji Tierney, Multiculturalism in the New Japan: Crossing the Boundaries Within, 63-86.


22 Squires: 117.

23 Squires: 118.


APPRAOCHING GENDER EQUALITY AND INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE AS A DEMOCRATIC PRAXIS
I. Introduction

This research mainly builds on comparative studies that examine how international norms domestically have impacts on migration policies and expansion of migrant workers’ rights in Korea and Japan. With emphasis on the role of international norms, this research attempts to figure out the puzzle why Japan maintains the most restrictive migration policy among the developed countries, yet Korea is moving toward more liberal policy.

In this research, I would like to compare how two industrialized and democratic countries such as Japan and Korea have responded to the increase of international migration, and its impacts on politics and society in the respective countries. Both Korea and Japan have experienced a rapid rise of foreign migrant workers as well as international marriage migrants since the late 1980s. During the past two decades, Japan and Korea have passed so called, “migratory transition,” which means that both countries turned from labor-sending countries into labor-receiving ones. As latecomers to immigration, both countries have some similarity in formulating immigration policies. The two countries have faced a structurally embedded demand for foreign labor such as aging population and low birth-rate, and labor shortage in dirty, dangerous, and difficult sectors. Japan and Korea had shared almost identical policies against the inflow of foreign workers until 2004. Japan claims that unskilled foreign workers are officially not allowed. In 1991 following the Japanese model, Korea launched a similar program. However, Korea adopted a new system in 2004, and it is aimed at allowing unskilled migrant workers to work legally with a status of worker, and at providing equal treatment to foreign workers including basic labor rights, employment insurance and legal minimum wages, so that it can prevent human rights violation, which was chronic in the former trainee system. The debut of the new program signals that Korea switched the position from side-door mechanism to front-door one. This research tries to figure out the puzzle why Japan is still maintaining the restrictive foreign labor policy to import the foreign workers, yet Korea is moving toward more open policy even though Korea
began with a carbon copy of the Japanese policy. To answer this question, this research mainly aims to examine how international human rights norms domestically have impacts on immigration policies and expansion of migrants’ rights in Korea and Japan.

Within the literature of migration studies, several scholars have emphasized the role of international human rights norms as one of the key factors to shape migration policies or citizenship by constraining the policy choice of the state. Yasemin Soyal introduced “top-down” theories that argue the diffusion of norms through international organizations such as the UN (Soysal 1994), while Amy Gurowitz suggested a “bottom-up” approach that stresses on how NGOs mobilize international norms as a tool kit to fortify their claim-making for the expansion of migrant workers’ rights. (Gurowitz, 1999) However, both theories cannot explain the variance of foreign labor policies between Korea and Japan because many scholars have reported that Japan and Korea were exposed to many of the same international norms, and pro-migrant NGOs in both countries tried to use international norms to strengthen their arguments. If international norms simply affect state policy, and constrain the policy option, we would have expected Japan to change the migration policies much earlier than Korea because Japan’s international status as a major developed country could have made it more sensitive to international pressures. (Lee and Park 2005) In reality, however, the Korean government is modifying the foreign labor policy in more liberal way, while the Japanese one is maintaining the most restrictive policy. Why is it so?

Due to little attention to the mechanisms and processes by which international norms can acquire domestic salience, the former literatures on international norms failed to reveal the different impacts of international norms on domestic policies. Therefore, I will focus on the domestic political structures in terms of state-society relations, especially the dynamic process among states, NGOs, and international norms. I will argue that while acceptance of international norms in Japan has been discussed within the context of internationalization, Korean NGOs and government considers human rights and compliance with international norms as part of national development. Further, the growth of Korean NGOs, the strong cooperation between the government and these civic groups as a consequence of democratization were the key factors to explain the changes of the migration policy, while in Japan expansion of migrant workers’ rights has been achieved at the local level, rather than at the national level thanks to higher level of autonomy found in the Japanese bureaucratic system and lack of NGOs’ influence over the national level of public policies.

**II . International Human Rights Norms Approach**

One group of scholars within political science suggests international norms approach to immigration policy. They “stress the extent to which the individual rights that are at the heart of democratic states displace interests and limit the actions of states.” (Freeman 2005) James Hollifield argues that migration policies in liberal states are affected by embedded liberalism. The organizational framework which emerged in the post-World War II era implicitly supported freer international mobility of labor forces. Embedded liberalism with emphasis on individual rights has
developed rights-based discourses and policies. Therefore, the structure and culture of the democratic states as well as international regimes bring out more open and generous patterns of immigration policies in the liberal democracies. Further, they claim that once embedded liberalism is installed, it will be difficult to roll more open policies back to more restrictive ones due to nature of path dependency. While the political economy approach explains expansive immigration policies in the liberal democracies with regard to the mode of client politics, international norms approach focuses on the process of path dependency in which rights of immigrants and asylum seekers have been evolved.

While agreeing that rights do matter, one question still remains: how rights influence state behavior? Is the power of rights coming outside the state or inside the state? Do the states constrain their actions by complying themselves with external pressures or by self-limiting themselves? Regarding this issue, Saskia Sassen, David Jacobson, and Yasemin Soysal see transnational processes as a key force in regulating states’ sovereignty over immigration policies. An emergent transnational regime of human rights is limiting the basis of state sovereignty, and pushing right to self-determination toward rights of individuals regardless of nationality. However, some scholars do not agree with the idea of this globalization thesis. For example, Christian Joppke mockingly addresses, “the capacity of states to control immigration has not diminished but increased – as every person landing in Schipohl (Amsterdam) or Sidney airports without a valid entry visa would painfully notice.” (Joppke 1998) Joppke argues that the liberal democracies are not losing capacity to control migration, but self-limiting that capacity. Joppke illustrates the idea of self-limited sovereignty by focusing on the legal processes in democratic countries as the underlying force of expansionary immigration policy. Put simply, courts and judges protect rights of immigrants from anti-immigrant populist voices and from client politics. These judicial decisions provide the strongest framework for expansionary and inclusive immigration policy-making. In sum, expansion of immigrants’ rights is rooted in domestic political process.

While the tradition of political economy approach to immigration policy emphasizes domestic factors such as interest groups, geographical location, and factor endowments, other scholars, so-called “globalists” began to pay attention to international factors including economic globalization and international norms. “Globalists” refers to “scholars who emphasize the blurring of domestic and international boundaries in an interdependent world, which relies on the free flow of goods, money, people, and ideas or norms.” (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, p. 164) International relations and comparative politics have focused on to what extent globalization has diminished national sovereignty, and how international norms impact domestic policy change. International migration as a form of transnational flows is in the middle of this ongoing debates between globalization and national policy making. Linking international migration with large-scale social change including post-industrial change and intensified globalization, “globalists” highlight the decline of sovereignty in the sense that nation states can no longer hold their own autonomy over controlling international labor movement under the global pressure outside of nation states. They argue that socio-economic global transformation and increasing international human rights norms are reducing the power of nation states when they enact and implement immigration policies, and leading to convergence of immigration policies.

Globalists locate the source of policy change
outside the nation states in the age of globalization as well as in the increase of international human rights norms. Saskia Sassen claims that economic globalization and the emergence of global cities have made multinational corporations demand more generous immigration policies in receiving countries. (Sassen 1996) Yasemin Soysal (Soysal 1994) and David Jacobson (Jacobson 1997) argue that international human rights norms have contributed to shifting traditional citizenship-based rights into “postnational” rights based on universal personhood. According to them, international human rights norms, which are embodied in “charters, treaties, and transnational organization as well as in proliferating governmental and nongovernmental “rights talk,” (Surak 2008, p. 552) have provided migrants with rights previously limited to citizens. Studies of globalists imply that international norms and standards can constrain immigration policy making, even on sovereignty-related issues.

With regard to the relationship between international human rights norms and state’s sovereignty over immigration policy, the previous researches can be divided into two groups. The first group is the “top-down” theory that emphasizes the diffusion of norms through international regimes such as the UN and the European Commission on Human Rights. The post-national scholars such as Yasemin Soysal emphasize the power of universal human rights, and they claim that international human rights norms embedded in international regime constrain the decisions of the states from the outside. Soysal argues that the legitimacy of human rights is located at the transnational level rather than the national level when rights of migrants are discussed. Guestworkers in Western European countries have received permanent residence status and have formed large “foreign communities” there, even though they are not naturalized. She addresses that the traditional concept of national citizenship is shifted to what she calls a post-national citizenship based on “personhood” detached from nationality due to international human rights norms. In sum, whereas national citizenship is rooted in territorialized concept of cultural belonging, post-national citizenship is anchored in deterritorialized persons’ rights. To explain these changes in citizenship, the post-nationalists assume that international norms directly affect the national government’s decision to expand the rights of immigrants. Since the post nationalist scholars do not specify the intermediate mechanism between international norms and expansion of immigrant rights, Hideki Tarumoto calls it “international-legal path.” (Tarumoto 2003)

However, this approach is criticized “although an international human rights regime may indeed affect states, this has yet to be demonstrated.” (Gurowitz, 1999, p. 414) Soysal demonstrates a list of the agencies and the organizations, but does not explain how these agencies and organizations play roles in diffusing international norms and in changing the national government’s policies.

International norms do not acquire domestic salience automatically, and norms do not have the same importance everywhere. Thus, another camp on the role of international human rights norms argues that we need to focus on the dynamic mechanism embedded in the interactions among the state, international norms and civil society in expanding the rights of migrant workers. The second group is a “bottom-up” theory that underscores how NGOs utilize as tools to fortify their arguments on the issues of expanding rights of migrant workers. Gurowitz claims, “The role of international norms has been central in part because these standards have provided pro-immigrant actors with a tool to use in their arguments against the government in the face of domestic resistance to change.” (Gurowitz, 1999, p. 415) Tarumoto calls this mechanism as
“domestic-political path.” The second group of globalists constructs the basic model that explains the causal chain flowing from international human rights norms through pro-migrant organizations to government’s responses to expand immigrants rights. The domestic-political path highlights the roles of social movements and pro-migrant NGOs activities as engines for expanding immigrant rights.

Globalists raise the core question as to “whether and how the capability of the state in liberal democracies to control immigration has been eroded by a combination of international agreements and the increased role of courts in establishing individual and collective rights.” (Schain 2009, p. 94) Although critics admit that international norms circumscribed the government’s options for immigration policies, they argue that the power of international norms is exaggerated. Rather, they claim that normative constraints on migration control come from domestic liberal norms guaranteed by constitutions, legislation, and jurisprudence. Embedded liberalism in the political system makes it difficult to roll back the expansive immigration policies, and the domestic norms in the legal system also keep protecting immigrants’ rights.

Debating on the influence of international norms, the critics of globalists’ argument address “bring the state back in” because “It is still the states themselves that decide whether and how they will abide by international norms.” (Schain 2009, p. 98) Since it is not clear to what extent international norms have influence on decisions of political authorities, we should look into the state or domestic institutions that mediate or filter transnational ideas and international norms.

III. Immigration Policies in Japan and Korea: overview

1. Japan

Japan has been considered a unique “negative case” in the literature of immigration studies, which means during rapid economic growth in the post-war period, Japan unlike other developed countries successfully resisted the import of foreign labor forces by using internal labor migration from rural area to urban cities. (Bartram, 2000) However, in the 1980s, Japan’s local labor began to shrink, and therefore, “the increasing labor shortage in non-tradable sectors, such as construction and small manufacturing, prompted a heated debate over the use of unskilled foreign workers, polarizing opinions on the grounds of economic necessity and the potential loss of racial homogeneity.” (Kim, 2004, p.40) To figure out this tension, the Japanese government initiated an ambiguous foreign labor policy, so-called Training Program in 1982. Through this program, the government was able to maintain their original position that Japan does not allow unskilled migrant workers, and at the same time, the government could import the migrant workers through side-door in the name of “trainees.”

As Tsuda and Cornelius (2004) explain it, the two main pillars of the side-door mechanism “are the admission of the nikkeijin and the expansion of the ‘trainee’ program” (Cornelius et al. 2004, p. 453). In the trainee program established in 1982, only companies with capital or trade relations with foreign countries and with more than 20 employees were allowed to hire foreign workers from this system. In 1990, however, the program was significantly changed to allow any company to utilize trainees. Further, the government eagerly
expanded this program by establishing the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO) to help companies to accept foreign trainees. As a result, the number of trainees dramatically increased. In 1987, the number of trainees was 17,081, but by 1997, the number increased almost threefold to 49,594 (Shipper, 2002, p. 57). However, the problem is that the large majority of trainees were treated not as real trainees who should receive technical training, but as cheap, unskilled laborers for 3-D jobs where native Japanese no more works. Another problem is that legally they are not classified as workers entitled to standard wages and to the protections guaranteed under Japan’s labor laws. In short, the trainee system was vulnerable to turn into highly exploitive system and designed to create marginalized lower class within the Japanese labor market.

In 1993, the Ministry of Justice revised the Training Program with the introduction of the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). Although it still maintained limited improvement, the new program allowed trainees to change their residence status to “technical interns” after a minimum of nine months, and after passing a “skills evaluation”. (Cornelius et al, 2004, pp. 454-455) Under the TITP, the trainees would become official employees entitled to regular wages and full protection under Japanese labor laws. While Tsuda and Cornelius argue that “it moves closer to an officially acknowledged (front-door) guest-worker program when compared to the old trainee system”(Cornelius et al, 2004, p. 455), it is hard to assess that Japanese government accepted front-door mechanism to import foreign workers because in 2000, the Ministry of Justice released a new basic immigration control plan that mainly reiterated the original position that the government maintain its policy of not accepting unskilled foreign workers.

Another important side-door mechanism is to encourage nikkeijin to work in Japan, and these descendants of Japanese emigrants in Latin America returned to Japan to supply the largest number of new foreign workers. Most of the nikkeijin come from Brazil, but there are also significant numbers from other countries, including Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, China, the Philippines. There are currently over 330,000 nikkeijin, (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004, p. 455), yet the total number of nikkeijin is much higher because many bring their spouses and children with them. Most nikkeijin work for small subcontractors in unskilled or low-skill production jobs. This fact totally belies the government’s official position that the policy toward the nikkeijin is designed as an opportunity for learning Japanese language and culture, for meeting Japanese relatives, and for chances to search their ethnic heritage (Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). However, it is obvious that few nikkeijin come to Japan to learn their cultural roots. According to one survey, 80 percent of nikkeijin returned to Japan in order to find job. (Shipper 2002, p. 44). Compared to trainees/interns and illegal workers, the nikkeijin enjoy some privileges. Their salaries are relatively higher, there are no restrictions on the type of work, and they have a legally protected right to stay in Japan with permanent residence. Yet, it does not mean the nikkeijin enjoy the same economic status as the native Japanese. They are located in the Japanese labor market as second-class because the majority of nikkeijin are working for the manufacturing sector as a form of indirect employment, meaning they are employed by labor contractors and dispatched to production lines. With contract periods limited to three months or even shorter, nikkeijin workers have become a source of extremely flexible labor for many businesses. Despite their lower economic status, it seems that the government’s effort to replace foreign workers with nikkeijin
is successful. *Nikkeijin* surpassed the number of the undocumented workers and legal trainees combined. (Kim, 2004, p. 48) The policy toward *nikkeijin* clearly shows how much the Japanese government has made efforts to maintain the racial homogeneity in the face of the labor shortage.

2. Korea

The labor shortages in economic structure and restrictive immigration policies mainly generate the problems of migrant workers. (Moon, 2000, p. 174) To solve the labor shortages in small and mid-sized firms the government had to import limited number of foreign labor forces in the name of trainees, yet at the same time the government attempted to control numbers of foreign workers on a short-term basis. One of the principles for the migrant workers in South Korea is to prevent them from settling down in a long term, and to force them to work only within a restricted period.

The major role of migrant workers in South Korea is to fill in vacancies of 3D sectors which suffer from labor shortage. During the 1970s Korean government successfully switched the industrial structure from light-manufacturing to heavy industries by implementing policies that encouraged economic concentration to a few large companies, so-called *Chaebol*. As a result, automobile, ship-building, chemistry, electronics, and LCD become Korea’s main engines for economic growth. However, small-sized manufacturing began to lose the comparative advantage in the world market, and this tendency was accelerated by wage hike as a consequence of political democratization after 1987. To maintain profits and reduce labor costs small-sized enterprises were forced to close or moved abroad to countries where cheap labor existed, such as China, Vietnam, Indonesia, or Philippines. The small-sized enterprises, which could not shift the facilities abroad still suffered from labor shortage. Especially, construction and fisheries are impossible to go overseas because they are geographically dependent and immobile. Time-constrained business like cleaning, maid service and printing cannot move abroad. (Park, 2002, p. 67) Timothy C. Lim’s study shows how the importation of foreign workers was helpful to figure out the labor shortage in Korea. Lim illustrates that “Beginning in the mid-1980s, the labor shortage rate for small firms (10-20 employees) grew steadily from 1.5% in 1985 to 7.78% by 1990. For “unskilled” labor, the shortage rate was even more severe, growing from 4.9% to 20.13% during the same period. Moreover, in certain industrial sectors such as plastics, electoral machinery, and commercial fishery the vacancy rate was even higher, reaching upward of 30% and even 40%.” (Lim, 2003, p. 424) After Korea received foreign labor forces from 1991, the vacancy rates in these sectors promptly declined.

Korean government began the Industrial and Technical Training Program for Foreigners (ITTP) from 1991 as a response to the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSB) and other organizations’ demand for labor. According to this program, the government did not give foreign workers a work permit. They would go to Korea as trainees, not workers. However, they in fact worked in factories without any training. Since their visa status is trainee, they could not have any basic workers’ rights such as unionizing, collective bargaining, and collective action. Further, the foreign workers paid for brokerage fees, usually from US $2,000 TO US $8,000 to work in Korea. In many cases the migrant workers borrow these brokerage fees before they depart from their countries. The agencies in their countries deducted the payment from the trainees’ monthly wages. Yet, the monthly wages were quite lower than they expected. As a result, large number
of trainees escaped the companies, and became illegal workers to get more reasonable wages or to pay off their debts. In conclusion, the Korean government tried to achieve two goals through ITTP. The one was a solution to labor shortage, and the other was a restriction of foreign workers’ long-term stay for employment. Therefore, ITTP actually functioned not as a training program, but as a program for employing foreign workers on a short-term basis.

After the ITTP was criticized for its dysfunctional results, Korean government implemented the new program, the Work-After-Training Program (WATP), which allows trainees to obtain legal status as workers after the two-year training period. However, activists for migrant workers argued that WATP was just an extended version of ITTP because during the training period, the trainees cannot be protected by legal guarantees for workers.

Even though migrant workers have contributed to solving the problem of labor shortage in manufacturing sectors of South Korea, too strict policies caused enormous amount of illegal migrant workers, and they are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by employers. They are suffering from unpaid wages, withholding travel documents, physical and verbal abuses, sexual harassment toward female workers, and inability to gain insurance in the case of industrial accidents. According to the survey conducted by Seol, Choi and Han on behalf of National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 51% of migrant workers had experienced verbal abuse, and 68% of them responded that they had been abused by Korean colleagues and 49% answered that they had been abused by supervisors. In terms of wages, 32% of migrant workers said that they are discriminated in the workplace. According to Seol and Han, many migrant workers did not receive their wages in the case of bankruptcy of their companies. In some cases employers intentionally avoided paying the workers. The survey illustrates that 41% of migrant workers did not get wages despite Korean co-workers were paid. This discrimination against migrant workers can be mostly attributed to their illegal status caused by restrictive policies.

On August 16, 2003, a new legislation, “Foreign Worker Employment-Related Law” went into effect. This new law provides the legal framework for the implementation of the Employment Permit Program (EPP). The EPP generally aims to correct mistakes and problems taken place under the previous policies. First of all, the new system attempts to figure out the problems of undocumented workers including the former trainees who ran away from the companies with which they were contracted. From September to October in 2003, the government legalized undocumented workers, yet the unauthorized workers who have stayed illegally over five years were excluded from the legalizing process, and they were not allowed to apply for the employment permit. The government intended not only to absorb undocumented workers into the properly legalized framework, but to prevent the long-term settlement. Secondly, while the previous ITTP was run by privately owned recruiting agencies that had withheld wages, and imposed hidden costs, under the EPP, both sending and receiving countries exchanges Memorandum of Understanding which contains the outlines of the government’s responsibility for managing foreign workers. Finally, the EPP endows foreign workers to the same rights as domestic workers. While the previous system insufficiently guaranteed the rights of foreign workers, the EPP “issues employment permits up to three years…under the Labor Standards Act… [Foreign workers] have access to the National Health Insurance, the Casualty Insurance, the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, and the National Pension.” (Kim, 2005,
In this part, I will examine how acceptance of international norms and its roles have been discussed differently in Japan and Korea, and how different state institutions and structures of civil society in Japan and Korea are linked with impacts of international norms on the rights of migrant workers in both countries.

1. International norms and Internationalization in Japan

The debates over migration issues in Japan cannot be understood without the trend of internationalization. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s the term, “internationalization” gradually dominated the Japanese society. The internationalization refers to “such diverse things as learning English, traveling internationally, keeping up with other advanced industrial states and the latest high technology, and fully participating in international institutions.” (Gurowitz, 2006a, p. 156) In addition, local governments in Japan made efforts to advance internationalization projects with funds from the national government under slogans such as “internationalization of the countryside.” They increased international exchange activities, and induced the number of foreign students. (Lu, Menju, and Williams, 2005, p. 119) As a part of internationalization project, the Japanese government participated in international affairs more actively. For example, the government began to be involved in aid to other regions such as Eastern Europe and Asia, and increased the role in United Nations human rights process and the UN in general. Behind these scenes, the Japanese government had an idea that “economic power bring with it new responsibilities that extend beyond the purely economic realm.” (Gurowitz, 2006a, p. 156) To achieve this goal, Japan was pressured to be more open culturally and socially at domestic level. Thus, Shimada claims, “It is undeniable that Japan has forged ahead of the world, and even of the other industrialized countries, in terms of economic and income opportunities, and yet it still protects its homogeneity on the human level, and plainly gives the outside world the impression that it is a closed society.” (Shimada, 1994, p. 202)

The move to internationalization had significant impacts on the use of international norms for expanding the rights of migrant workers in Japan. Pro-migrant activists linked the mood of internationalization with the issues of immigration in Japan, and they have utilized this linkage to pressure the Japanese government by arguing that Japan is against or lags behind international norms regarding the rights of migrant workers. Under the internal pressure of internationalization, Japan has ratified several major international human rights norms such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1979, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1982, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1985, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in
1995. As Amy Gurowitz names this process as “change from outside-in,” pro-migrant activists, lawyers, and scholars use the ratified international conventions to advance their demands to expand the rights of migrant workers in Japan, and further to press the government to change their policies.

A series of ratification of international human rights norms entailed the improvement in court decisions and policy toward minorities in Japan. Before 1982, Koreans in Japan, who migrated or were forced to migrate under the Japanese colonial rule, were excluded from the national pension plan. However, with the help from Japan’s ratification of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, nationality restrictions were abolished in the pension plan. After Japan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1985, Japan modified its citizenship law to allow not only children born to Japanese fathers, but also those born to Japanese mothers to acquire Japanese citizenship. In 1993 the practice of fingerprinting required for permanent resident aliens was eliminated. The court argued that “there was to suspect that the policy of fingerprinting violated several ICCPR.” (Lu, Menju, and Williams, 2005, p. 115)

As previously noted, the internationalization and Japan’s ratification of several international human rights norms contributed to improving the rights of foreigners in Japan. While Amy Gurowitz positively assesses the impacts of international norms on domestic policies, crucial changes to transform the basic framework toward migrant workers in Japan are lack at the national level. Tegtmeyer Pak argues in her study of differences between national and local responses to foreigners in Japan that local actors frequently invokes an idea of internationalization and local governments are compensating for the national government’s unwillingness to admit the migrant workers. In short, as Yasuo Takao claims, “while the Japanese national government has been extremely reluctant to engage fully in international norms, Japanese local governments have been cultivating new categories of norms about foreigners’ rights.” (Takao, 2003, p. 530) However, it is obvious that international norms alone are unlikely to engender the major changes in policies toward migrant workers at the national level. Therefore, we need to raise a question why the Japanese national government has been reluctant to make efforts to match domestic policies with international standards.

2. Human rights as a part of national development in Korea

While Japanese acceptance of international human rights norms has taken place in the context of internationalization, Korean political leaders and some parts of the bureaucracy have pushed human rights as part of national development. Gurowitz found a pattern in Japan that pro-migrant advocates use international human rights norms as a tool for NGOs to legitimate their claims, and to challenge against the Japanese government. According to Seol and Skrentny, however, a similar pattern in Korea is found “but somewhat more muted pattern.” (Seol and Skrentny, 2001, p. 11) They argue that human rights norms for expanding the rights of migrant workers in Korea are already internalized, and Korean NGOs legitimize their claims based more on human rights norms domestically grown from the experiences of democratization, rather than on international human rights norms.

South Korea ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1990. They acceded to the CERD in 1978, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1995, CEDAW in 1984, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in
1991. However, it is quite controversial whether these ratifications of international human rights norms have affected the recent policy change from ITTP to EPP in South Korea.

Joon K. Kim positively assesses the impacts of international norms on the policy change stating relationships among the state, civil society, and international conventions “can provide a mutually reinforcing system of checks-and-balances and foster a greater accountability from the state in implementing international norms regarding the protection of foreign workers.” (Kim, 2005, p. 385) Kim illustrates that in 1998, the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK), an umbrella organization for migrant worker advocacy has taken part in the campaign for the ratification of the UN convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Prior to the passage of the EPP in 2003, pro-migrant NGO groups pushed the government by reporting the problems of the existing trainee system to several UN committees such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. (Kim, 2005, p. 411) In addition, several activists argue that international human rights norms have neutrality and some legitimacy factor, thus it helps to justify a policy change. (Seol and Skrentny, 2001, p. 11) However, according to Seol and Skrentny’s interviews, some activists denied that they used international norms as a tool for migrant advocacy. Shin straightforwardly states they do not use international norms as part of their struggle. Another activist, Park Seok-Woon, director of Seoul’s Association for Foreign Workers’ Human Rights, mentioned international norms “don’t really concern us. As fellow laborers, we feel that we basically need to reform solidarity and ensure that they are guaranteed the same rights as us. So that’s the level at which we are proceeding with our movement.” (Seol and Skrentny, 2001, p. 12)

Korean NGOs have appropriated human rights as part of the strategy of national development. NGOs utilize the context and symbol of democratization movement in South Korea to enhance the rights of migrant workers. For instance, the protests for migrant worker rights are frequently held in at Myongdong Cathedral in downtown Seoul, a regular site of democracy and labor activity. The workers demanded reform of the trainee system and complained of human rights abuse by invoking Koreans’ previous poor working conditions during the era of rapid economic development and dictatorship. Koreans have been educated about human rights by the democracy and labor struggles, and in the migrant worker case, they rely more on human rights norms inherited from domestic experiences rather than on international norms. Thus, Seol and Skrentny argue that international option is not a decisive factor in policymaking. (Seol and Skrentny, p. 13) The domestic option that we shouldn’t mistreat foreign workers when Korean once went through lots of painful experiences as illegal aliens in Germany and Japan or when Korea passed through poor and severe working conditions put pressure on policy-makers. Further some NGOs leaders understand the expansion of migrant worker rights as a chance of national development. For example, Reverend Hae-Sung Kim, one of activists for migrant workers warned in an interview with Hankyoreh newspaper that if the government does not stop the crackdowns on illegal migrant workers, we will have “notorious names” such as underdeveloped countries in terms of labor relations and human rights. He says, “legalizing the illegal migrant workers is a good opportunity for us to be reborn as “new human rights country.” (Hankyoreh, 21 November, 2003)

It is true that Korean policymakers and some ministries find a reason to confirm to international human rights standard in the national interest. As
I mentioned above, Korea has ratified several UN conventions and covenants relating to civil and political rights, economic and social rights, and racial discrimination. These efforts result from the politics of national development, national image maintenance, and the internalization of human rights norms in the context of interaction between nationalism and globalization. The representative case is the National Human Rights Commission’s “National Action Plans for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights” announced in January, 2006. To comply with international human rights standard, the Commission established the detailed plan to increase the rights of social minorities including migrant workers, and recommended each governmental agency to follow the guideline and action plans. However, the behind logic of this plan is that Korea should advance to human rights country following the achievements of economic development and democratization. Even the characteristics of the National Action Plans quite resembled Korea’s Five-year Economic Development Plan used as a model of state-led economic development. Further when the Ministry of Justice announced the plan of future immigration policy, the Ministry clearly stated that they will carry out the new immigration policy as the national development strategy.

Korean policymakers also are concerned that Korea would be conceived as an anti-human rights country resulting from mistreatment of migrant workers in Korea. Park Hyo-Ouk, policy director of the Korean Ministry of Labor, explained that after the Nepalese protest in downtown Seoul and other related events, human rights became a more serious consideration. He states, “It is not so much a matter of paying attention to international norms as it is recognizing that Korea in general has to conform to international standards and trends. Korean policy-makers feel that this is the natural thing to do and try to move in that direction.”

In Park’s view, this shift is related to other trends of globalization taking place in Korea. In Korea, globalization is a new language of nationalism. Gi-Wook Shin argues that the Korean state proactively appropriated globalization for nationalist goals, and globalization can strengthen national identity in reaction. (Shin, 2006) The Korean government perceived globalization based on Social Darwinism, principles of competition and survival of the fittest. Shin claims, “This reflects the social Darwinism thinking in Korea’s drive toward globalization that has utilized an instrumentalist treatment, which has aimed at maintaining competitive edge for the nation.” (Shin, 2006, p. 203) It is obvious that the term, globalization was introduced by the Korean government, and the government spread the term as a form of national campaign from “internationalization” (kukjehwa) through “globalization” (segyejehwa) to Korea as a hub of a new Northeast Asia. The governments have claimed that the globalization must be achieved through ‘competitiveness’ and economic minded-nationals. Globalization is one of the historical stages toward the developed country, superpower, and a center of Asia. Under these goals, the government heavily imposed the discourse of the globalization colored with economic and nationalistic rhetoric on the Korean public. Korean policy making elites understand that Korea must aspire to international standards as part of national development and national pride. To be survived in the age of globalization, they argue that it is necessary to enhance our viewpoints, way of thinking, system and practices to the international standards.

3. Developmentalist State and intra-governmental competition in Japan

Many scholars locate this way of policymaking
within the framework of developmental state. A developmentalist state is defined by “the dominance of the professional bureaucratic staff over politicians with regard to policymaking authority or power.” (Bartram, 2004, p. 136) The scholars reported how a strong bureaucracy are insulated from politicians and civil society, and they argue a core of the developmentalist literature is that the bureaucrats can resist social pressures and attempt to implement policies to advance the general welfare. (Pekkanen, 2004a, p. 363)

While most scholarly works based on a developmentalist state focus on industrial policy (Johnson, 1982), David Bartram applies the argument of the developmentalist state to the Japanese immigration policy. (Bartram, 2004) In his comparative study of immigration policy between Israel and Japan, Batram characterizes the state structure of Japan as a developmentalist state. He argues “foreign worker initiatives are more likely to be adopted in a country with a clientalist state than in a country with a developmentalist state,” (Batram, 2004, p. 137) From this point of view, the Japanese bureaucrats dealing with immigration policymaking has been enormously isolated from economic and social pressures. Tsuda and Cornelius mention, “it is dominated by the bureaucracy, with little active participation by the democratic elected Diet, beyond rubber-stamping legislation handed down by the bureaucrats after pro-forma policy debates.” (Cornelius et al., 2004, p. 450)

Seventeen government ministries and agencies were involved in immigration policymaking. However, each ministry and agency reacted to different view points and agendas. Tsuda and Cornelius argue, “On the liberal end of the policy spectrum were those ministries most responsive to the demands of labor-deficient Japanese industries, most notably the Ministries of Construction, Agriculture, Transportation, and Forest and Fisheries, all of which generally advocated the legal admission of foreign workers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is most concerned with Japan’s international responsibilities and bears the brunt of foreign criticisms over Japan’s exclusionary immigration policies, also took a liberal stance.” (Cornelius et al., 2004, p. 451) On the conservative sides, the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for social order, has the most conservative stance on the issue of migrant workers. The Ministry of Labor, which is concerned with lowering the standard of labor due to influx of migrant workers, is also conservative on the issue. However, in terms of controlling immigration, those two ministries have a great degree of substantial authorities such as entry and exit, and hiring migrant workers. Therefore, within the government, the voices from labor and justice must have been heard loudly. Further, as Tsuda and Cornelius assert, “there is relatively poor coordination and cooperation between the ministries, which rarely produce policies based on a balanced discussion and compromise between a diversity of represented opinions and positions.” (Cornelius et al., 2004, p. 451) Due to the lack of well-coordinated system, policy has tended to follow the approach of the most conservative parts of the Japanese bureaucracy, represented by the Ministries of Justice and Labor.

The Ministry of Labor argued that unskilled foreign laborers would downgrade wages and working conditions and cause labor market segmentation. The Ministry of Justice, which monopolizes immigration controls, pursued complete control over immigration policymaking from other ministries and agencies. However, the main concerns of the Ministry of Justice are not protecting human rights of migrant workers, but cracking down undocumented workers, and preventing the crimes committed by migrant workers. This is one of the reasons why Japanese
government maintains quite restrictive policy toward foreign workers. In this sense, Tsuda and Cornelius’s quotation is meaningful. “Former Justice Ministry insiders (retired bureaucrats) report that the Ministry is one of the most conservative, closed-minded institutions in Japanese society and is still dominated by domestic security and ideological concerns to maintain the nation’s ethnic homogeneity and cultural purity. Because the Ministry of Justice emerged on top of the bureaucratic hierarchy in terms of immigration policymaking, its restrictive position was directly reflected in Japan’s 1990 revised immigration law.” (Cornelius et al., 2004, p. 452)

In sum, I argue that the reason why Japan clings to the most restrictive immigration policy among liberal democratic countries, and reluctant to change migration policies at the national level is found in high degree of bureaucratic isolation in the context of developmental state and domination of most conservative governmental branches such as the Ministries of Justice and Labor. Further, without any political coalitions between the bureaucrats and social actors such as employer’s association and pro-migrant NGOs, it is almost impossible to expect any changes in immigration policy in Japan. As I will explain later, while we can observe political coalition between the Labor Ministry and pro-migrant NGOs, and it contributed to implementing the new policy in Korea, it is difficult to see such a coalition in Japan because Japanese civil society has tended toward a passive and more parochial position. Pekkanen claims, “Japan has an abundance of small local groups but a striking dearth of large independent advocacy groups.” (Pekkanen, 2004b, p. 224) Such a dual structure of Japanese civil society implies that many small local groups facilitate high level of social capital, but fewer civil society voices are heard in the terrain of public policy. The dearth of voices from civil society in the area of immigration policy also made a difference between Korea and Japan. Pekkanen states, “Japanese civil society groups have also been weak on issues ranging from whaling to human rights.” (Pekkanen, 2006, p. 181)

4. Intra-governmental competition and political coalition in Korea

Seen in the Japanese case, the Justice Ministry and the Labor Ministry dominate the process of immigration policymaking in Korea. However, one key difference is that the Labor Ministry opposed the position of the Justice Ministry since 1993. For example, “the Labor Ministry, which has been tasked with monitoring human rights violations, is sensitive to Korea’s international image”, (Cornelius et al., 2004, p. 499) and they have supported the front-door policy toward migrant workers, while the Justice Ministry has been against the EPP and attempted to maintain the ITTP with KFSB. The former President Kim Dae-Jung instructed that the Labor, the Justice, and the KFSB worked together in developing policy, but the Labor Ministry obviously has conflicts with the other two. Seol and Skrentny reports, “According to Choi Tai-Ho, deputy director of the Employment Policy Division at the Labor Ministry, The Labor Ministry holds the position that migrant workers should have legal worker status for a specified period, and also that an objective assessment is needed to determine the overall number of migrant workers needed in the labor market… The Justice Ministry and KFSB, on the other hand, feel that the current trainee system should be maintained.” (Cornelius et al., 2004, p. 499)

The cleavage between the Justice Ministry and the Labor Ministry took place in the Korean government’s attempts to balance economic

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interests with human rights concerns. In conjunction with the increase in the number of foreign workers, infringements of human rights have become widespread: hard labor under confinement, work without pay, reduction in wages without explanation, dismissal without proper notice, exploitation by brokers and lack of compensation for injuries due to work-related accidents. Reflecting these matters, the emerging politics of immigration policies in Korea has largely been led by the debates between proponents of economic interests and of human rights. When the government debated the reforms of immigration policy, political coalitions were built on this line. It is observed well in Korea’s road to the enactment of the EPP, which entitles foreign workers to bonus allowance, retirement pay, and the three basic rights as a worker.

As I explained earlier, the ITTP generated a great amount of human rights violations for foreign workers. The ITTP ended up with a total failure as the program became a site for generating illegal foreign workers, thus creating more workers to human rights violations. A significant number of trainees escaped from their designated companies to become undocumented migrant workers whose wages more closely resembled native labor market price. As a remedy to the failure of the ITTP, the ruling New Korea Party and the opposition National Congress for New Politics submitted a bill in 1997 of the EPP to the National Assembly with the intention to curtail human rights abuse and labor exploitation. The Labor Ministry also supported the bill on humanitarian grounds along with the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK), an umbrella organization for migrant worker. Established in 1995, JCKM let a number of protests, and nation-wide campaign calling for the end of discrimination and the adequate protection of migrant workers’ basic rights. In the face of the strong opposition from proponents of economic interests spearheaded by the Korea Federation of Small Business (KFSB) and the Ministry of Justice arguing that the passage of the bill would place a heavier financial burden on small Korean business due to the expected rise of foreign workers’ wages and welfare benefits, the EPP turned into a diluted form called “the Working After Training Program for Foreigners (WATP)” in April 1998. Through the WATP, foreign workers became entitled to the Labor Standard Act, the Medical Insurance Law, and the Industrial-Disaster Insurance Law, as well as receiving severance pay and various other allowances. However, as the WATP still fell short of reducing human rights abuses, the second attempt was made in April 2000 under the Kim Dae Jung administration. However, the attempt of the EPP was once again dropped in favor of economic reasons on January 9, 2001. This time, the EPP bill did not even reach the Standing Committee of National Assembly due to economic downturns. Despite the continuation of the staunching opposition, the EPP bill was finally approved in August 2003 under the Roh administration. The one of the reasons for succeeding in enacting the EPP is that the political coalition to support the EPP on the basis of human rights was much wider than before. In 2002, a consortium of 166 advocacy organizations formed the Common Committee for Opposing Crackdown on Migrant Workers, Abolition of Trainee System and Securing Migrants’ Rights (COCATS). Further, two largest labor unions in Korea, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) sponsored a mass meeting in June 2003 urging the government to implement the EPP. (Kim, 2005, p. 405) Without in-depth studies, it is difficult to judge how the political coalition based on human rights( the Labor Ministry, pro-migration NGOs,
and trade unions) defeated another coalition on the basis of economic interests (The Justice Ministry, and KFSB). Yet, it is obvious that the active coalition-building on the consensus of human rights delivered more liberal policy in Korea in comparison to Japan.

However, I do not argue that the wider political coalition solely contributed to the change of the policy. Besides that, I claim that political environment or political opportunity structure was favorable to the political coalition. Thus, another factor for the change is the role of the state emphasizing human rights, especially the will of presidents. The first attempt to change into the EPP came from the former president, Kim Dae-Jung’s instruction. He stated, “We should be ashamed about the discrimination against foreign workers when we are aiming at establishing state safeguarding human rights in global era.” The next successor, president Roh’s will to human rights as a former human rights lawyer, contributed critically to passing the new policy. President Roh pledged to the enactment of the EPP during his presidential campaign. He claimed, “The responsibility and rights are inseparable, the nation, joining the ranks of advanced countries and the UN human rights conventions, should hold up labor policies meeting the international norms and standards not only in name, but in reality.” (Korea Times, February 2, 2003) Finally we should examine the role of state institutionalizing human rights issues. In support of the Roh administration’s initiative, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which was established in 2001, critically helped the government to completely abolish the ITTP and to introduce the EPP to better protect human rights of foreign workers.4

V. Conclusion

Gary Freeman proposes three keywords to develop the theoretical tools for comparative immigration studies: Interests, Rights, and Institution. (Freeman, 2005) The one of the goals in this paper is to throw two keywords, rights, especially rights-based arguments from international norms and institution into the cases of Japan and Korea. I conclude that approach based on international norms alone has lesser explanatory powers than institutional approach in order to explain the development of immigration polices in Japan and Korea as well as the difference between two countries. The impacts of international norms on domestic migration policies are little found in Japanese policy regime, especially at the national level despite of several key decisions by the courts because the Japanese bureaucrats enjoy higher degree of autonomy than any other bureaucracies.

Although Korean NGOs and governments sometimes have utilized international norms to enhance the rights of migrant workers in Korea, the real impacts on policy change came from domestic reasons rather than outside-in. In this sense, I argued that institutional approach focusing on intra-governmental competition and political coalition can explain better the difference of two countries. In both countries, the key ministries in the immigration policymaking regime are the Ministry of Justice and Labor. However, while in Japan two ministries are standing on the conservative side, in Korea, the Justice Ministry represented the interests of business on the conservative side, and the Labor Justice kept opposing the stance of the Justice Ministry. Moreover, this intra-governmental competition was extended to the cleavage between political
coalitions respectively based on economic interests and human rights. Thus, Korea had more opportunities to change the immigration policies within more competitive environment rather than Japanese policy regime, which was dominated by two conservative ministries, and was lack of political sway from civil society. The different statue structure and political opportunity structure could make difference in the immigration policies between Japan and Korea. Focusing on a state’s domestic structure as a source of variations in the impact of international norms, this study attempts to demonstrate the role of the Korean state and its connection with Korean NGOs in accepting and developing international human rights norms domestically. In contrast to the previous studies that tend to dichotomize between states and human rights activists, this paper tries to argue that state actors in coalition with human rights activists were actively involved in the process of enacting the EPP in Korea. It is obvious that various state actors themselves such as the presidents and the National Human Rights Commission have been an integral part of mobilizing international human rights norms in Korea. As Lee and Park claims, “an arsenal of international human rights norms would not have been effectively translated into the adoption of the EPP if state actors had not been actively involved in working the EPP into the political processes domestically.” (Lee and Park, 2005, p. 159)

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Notes
1 The political economy approach was first developed by Gary P. Freeman. He bases his model on the work of James Q. Wilson, who identifies four types of politics depending on the distribution of the benefits and costs of a certain policy. The political economy approach attempts to explain immigration policymaking through which economic interests and societal preferences are mobilized and channeled. It assumes that while benefits of the immigration policy tend to accrue to well-organized interest groups including employers and ethnic groups, the costs of the immigration policy are widely diffused over the general public. Since the relevant interest groups have more incentives to mobilize in order to further their economic interests through more open immigration, the immigration policy is made based on a cliental relationship between policymakers and these well-organized groups.

2 The ITTP was operated by Korea International Training Cooperation Corps (KITCO), similar to Japan’s JITCO. But, KITCO is dominated by business interests from the KFSB, while Japan’s JITCO is collecting the opinions
from the government, labor and business. Further, KITCO had exclusive rights to import and allocate trainees to the companies.

3 While Japanese trade unions oppose the imports of migrant workers, Korean trade unions do not oppose hiring migrant workers as far as they play supplementary role to domestic workers’ jobs. Most of company trade unions are affiliated with the FKTU and KCTU, which is considered as more progressive federation than FKTU. On the issues of migrant workers, KCTU was actively engaged in this issue. Both federations agree that the rights of migrant workers have to be protected by trade unions since they are also subjects of the unions.

4 NHRC has authority to investigate and research policies containing human rights issues and recommend solutions for correcting human rights violations.
I. Introduction

Happiness is an important measure of our quality of life. Recently, many economists have investigated the determinants of happiness. In 2010, The Commission on Measuring Well-being, Japan, was organized to seek the indicators of happiness. Economists in general aim to improve people’s happiness (welfare). Thus, if happiness depends on how society is constructed, there are policy implications for Japan’s government. This article provides fundamental information to guide happiness strategies.

Happiness is a subjective index. Therefore, we economists had considered that happiness was not suitable for economic analysis. Blanchflower (2008), however, points out that determinants of happiness are common among countries, which is also the case with the estimation of the Mincerian wage equation used in labor economics. Thus, we are able to conduct an international comparative analysis of happiness.

Many studies looking at determinants of happiness have noted that females feel happier than males. Even after controlling for the effects of other factors influencing happiness, such as age and highest level of education, females continue to report feeling happier than males. One possible explanation is that the biological gender gap accounts for the difference. That is to say, females inherently feel happier than males. If this is true, there should be gender gaps in happiness in any empirical model. Another possible explanation for the gender gap in happiness is socioeconomic conditions. Specifically, it is possible that in societies where females generally live freely, there should also be gender gaps in happiness separate from other individual characteristics.

The article investigates determinants of happiness and the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and gender gaps in happiness. For this type of analysis, we need individual data collected from many countries. We thus analyze data from the International Social Survey Programme 2007 (ISSP 2007), which was conducted in 32 countries.
II. Previous Research

There are already many studies investigating happiness. Here, we briefly introduce some of these studies’ results on gender gaps in happiness.

First, Blanchflower (2008) summarizes the common determinants influencing happiness from many existing studies and points out that females feel happier than males in many countries. Graham (2009), however, reports empirical results from areas such as the U.S., South America, Russia, and Central Asia and also finds that females do not always feel more happiness than males. Specifically, females have been found to feel happier in the U.S. and less happy in Russia, and there are no differences between the genders in South America and Central Asia. As for Japan, Sano and Ohtake (2007) find that females feel happier than males in Japan but find no such gender gap in the U.S.

As mentioned above, females generally report feeling happier than males. However, this is not the case in all regions. Inglehart (2002) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) have found that females do not always feel happier than males and that females’ happiness has been declining. This paper investigates the association between the diversity of gender gap in happiness and socioeconomic conditions using more regions’ data.

III. Data

1. ISSP 2007

This study uses individual data from the ISSP 2007 “Leisure Time and Sports”. The reason for using this survey is that it has information about health status and many factors influencing happiness other than happiness itself. Moreover, it also contains information about leisure, an economically important factor of happiness.

Throughout the paper, we abbreviate country names in the tables and figures according to the abbreviations used by ISSP. Table 1 shows the abbreviations.

Note that because the ISSP 2007 respondent age ranges vary among countries, we limit the data we use to that from respondents aged 18 to 64 years.

Table 1. ISSP country abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Country Abbreviation</th>
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<td>AR-Argentina</td>
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<td>AU-Australia</td>
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<td>AT-Austria</td>
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<td>Great Britain (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UY-Uruguay</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Degree of Happiness

We here explain the happiness indicators we used in this study. The ISSP 2007 uses the following question and answer choices:

Q. If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole?

A. (1) Very happy, (2) Fairly happy, (3) Not very happy, (4) Not at all happy, (8) Can’t choose

We tallied each person’s score, and higher scores reflected greater happiness. In addition, we did not include any “Can’t choose” responses. Figure 1 shows the distribution of happiness using data pooled from all 32 countries; without counting the “Can’t choose” responses, there were 16,649 male respondents and 20,703 females.

![Figure 1. Distribution of happiness](image)

We note that there is no gender gap reflected in the distribution of scores. Approximately 85% of respondents reported being either very happy or fairly happy. According to Blanchflower (2008), happiness shows this kind of distribution in many studies, meaning that the results of our study using ISSP 2007 happiness data are comparable with the results of other similar studies.

Figure 2 shows average happiness scores by gender and country. Males and females in Ireland show the highest average happiness scores of all surveyed countries, followed by Mexico. On the other hand, both males and females in Russia have the lowest happiness scores of all countries, and Bulgaria’s scores are the second lowest. Based on this data, there does not seem to be a particular pattern of higher happiness scores in developed countries. In addition, in terms of the gender gap in average happiness, males score higher in some countries and females score higher in others. Thus, it is difficult for us to draw any conclusions about a happiness gender gap.

In Japan, males and females report mid-range happiness scores. The total average score across all 32 countries for male is 3.10 and for female is 3.09; in Japan, the average score for males is 2.96 and 3.09 for females. Japanese female’s score is the same as the female total average, but Japanese male’s average score is somewhat lower than the male total average. Thus, Japan, females report higher happiness scores than do males; Figure 2 shows that this gap appears to be somewhat greater.
than the gender gap in other countries.

It should be noted that each country’s average is a crude average; that is, the effects of other factors that influence happiness were not excluded. Figure 2 shows that happiness levels and the gender gap in happiness show diversity among countries. Figure 2 also indicates that the correlation between male and female happiness is quite high – the correlation coefficient of average happiness between male and female is 0.920.

Figure 2. Average happiness score by gender and country

![Graph showing average happiness score by gender and country across different countries.]

**IV. Descriptive Analysis of Happiness**

In this section, we explore the relationship between happiness and certain crucial factors by gender. Again, the data used here are pooled from all 32 countries in the ISSP 2007 and are only based on scores from respondents aged 18 to 64 years.

Blanchflower (2008) summarized happiness scores by category and found that happiness is higher among (1) women, (2) people with lots of friends, (3) the young and the old, (4) married and cohabiting people, (5) the highly educated, (6) the healthy, (7) those with high income, (8) the self-employed, (9) people with low blood pressure, (10) those who have sex at least once a week with the same partner, (11) right-wing voters, (12) the religious, (13) members of non-church organizations, (14) volunteers, (15) those who take exercise and (16) those who live in western countries. From among these many factors, we look at some of the available ISSP 2007 variables and observe the association between those variables and happiness.

First, Figure 3 shows the relationship between age and happiness, specifically that happiness decreases with age up to the early fifties and then reverses after that. This fact is consistent with Blanchflower’s summary mentioned above. There does not appear to be an age-related gender gap in happiness.
Next, Figure 4 shows the association between marital status and happiness. Married people have the highest average happiness scores and both widows and widowers have the lowest scores; these data are also consistent with Blanchflower’s results. With regard to gender, there is no gender gap among married individuals; however, in the other marital status categories, females have higher happiness scores than do males.

Figure 5 depicts the relationship between education and happiness, and shows that happiness appears to increase with higher education levels; except for “No formal qualification,” both males and females in the category of “University degree completed” report the highest happiness scores. This gender similarity, however, does not carry across all categories; although “Above higher secondary level” females report the second highest happiness, “Higher secondary completed” males report the second highest happiness scores. In addition, these facts are also basically consistent with Blanchflower’s results, except that there does seem a slight difference by gender.
Figure 6 shows the association between self-rated health and happiness. The ISSP 2007 asks respondents “In general, would you say your health is …” and offers the five choices shown in Figure 6 plus the option of “Can’t choose.” We did not include responses of “Can’t choose” in the data for this study. From Figure 6, it is clear that healthier people feel happier and that these factors have a linear relationship. This result is completely consistent with Blanchflower’s summary, and in addition, there also appears to be no gender gap here.

Figure 7 shows the relationship between work status and happiness. Both males and females in the “Student, school, vocational training” category feel the happiest. The fact that the young feel happier, as shown in Figure 3, reflects this relationship. The categories with the second highest happiness scores are “Housewife, etc.” among females and “Employed” among males. We observe that the relationship between work status and happiness varies greatly by gender. It is also interesting that unemployed females report higher happiness than males, but retired males feel happier than retired females.
Figure 7 depicts the relationship between leisure and happiness using a line graph. This figure indicates a positive relationship between these factors. There seems to be a slight gender gap at each leisure level and females’ happiness is slightly lower than males’.

Lastly, Figure 9 shows the association between residence and happiness. People in the “Farm or home in the country” category feel the happiest, and the second highest happiness score is among those reporting as living in “Urban, a big city.” There is little gender difference in other residence categories, and there is no observed gender gap in happiness by residence.
As described above, we saw the relationship between happiness and nine other factors very descriptively and observed some associations. In the next section, we estimate the happiness gender gap that remains after these competing factors are excluded from the analysis.

V. Gender Gap in Happiness

1. Estimation Using Pooled Data from All 32 Countries

Here, we estimate the happiness function using the pooled data from all 32 countries and the following equation:

\[
\text{Happiness} = f(\text{Female, Age, Marital status, Education, Self-rated health, Work status, Residence, Country}).
\]

In this equation, factors mentioned previous sections are used as independent variables. The estimation models used were the ordered probit model (OPM) and the ordinary linear model (OLM).9

As the indicator of a gender gap, we used the “Female” dummy (male = 0, female = 1). If there is a gender gap in happiness even after controlling for other factor’s effects, the female dummy will be estimated to be statistically significant. Age is used as the continuous variable. Graham (2009) has reported the u-shape of happiness with age, and we test this observation. The effect of marital status is estimated by using “Married” as a reference category. In the education category, the baseline is “Higher secondary completed.” With regard to self-rated health, the baseline category was “Fair.” The influence of work status is calculated using the category of “Employed” for comparison. “Leisure” is used as a continuous variable. The reference for the “Residence” variable was “Urban, a big city.” Moreover, we use “Country” as a dummy, but we do not show those results here.

Note that we have ISSP 2007 information about income, but we do not use it in this pooled data estimation because the unit of income variable varies among countries (for example, continuous or categorical). However, in the later estimation we conducted for each country, this does not pose a problem, and thus we use the
income variable in the happiness function in the next estimation.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the data used in this paper. These values are calculated using the pooled data of 32 countries.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>64</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Above higher secondary level</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housewife, etc.</td>
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<td>Leisure</td>
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<td>Residence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban, a big city</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suburb, outskirts of a big city</td>
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<tr>
<td>Town or small city</td>
<td>0.2441</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County village</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farm or home in the country</td>
<td>0.0526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

Sample size is 34,972.

Next, Table 3 shows the estimation results of the happiness functions discussed above and compares the results of OPM and OLM.

The female dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in both models. This means that the gender gap in happiness remains even after removing the effect of crucial individual factors. In addition, the positive coefficient of the female dummy indicates that females feel happier than males, a result that is consistent with the results of many previous studies.

We next describe the results of other variables.
## Table 3. Estimation results of the happiness function

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ordered Probit Model</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ordinary Linear Model</th>
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<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>0.0407</td>
<td>0.0158 **</td>
<td>0.0220</td>
<td>0.0087 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0425</td>
<td>0.0051 ***</td>
<td>-0.0233</td>
<td>0.0025 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.0001 ***</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0000 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status (Ref: Married)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>-0.4041</td>
<td>0.0723 ***</td>
<td>-0.2282</td>
<td>0.0369 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>-0.3804</td>
<td>0.0368 ***</td>
<td>-0.2114</td>
<td>0.0168 ***</td>
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<td>Separated</td>
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<td>0.0519 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>-0.3742</td>
<td>0.0331 ***</td>
<td>-0.2005</td>
<td>0.0149 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Ref: Higher secondary completed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No formal qualification</td>
<td>0.0216</td>
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<td>0.0086</td>
<td>0.0362</td>
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<td>-0.0250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Above lowest qualification</td>
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<tr>
<td>University degree completed</td>
<td>0.0436</td>
<td>0.0261 *</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
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<td>Self-rated health (Ref: Good)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>-0.8746</td>
<td>0.0674 ***</td>
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<td>0.0327 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
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<td>Very good</td>
<td>0.3398</td>
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<td>Excellent</td>
<td>0.8864</td>
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<td>0.4395</td>
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<td>Leisure</td>
<td>0.0366</td>
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<td>Residence (Ref: Urban, a big city)</td>
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<td>Suburb, outskirts of a big city</td>
<td>-0.0663</td>
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<td>Cut3</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2/R2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
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<td></td>
<td>34,972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance level, ***, p<0.01, **, p<0.05, *, p<0.1.
Standard errors are clustered robust standard error.

Age is statistically significant and has a u-shape with a bottom around age 38 or 39.\(^{10}\) Regarding marital status, every status is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect
of education is ambiguous: university degree completed is significant in OPM but not in OLM. Good self-rated health has a statistically positive effect on happiness. Concerning work status, the results show that the unemployed feel less happy and the retired, housewives, and others feel happier than do the employed. The coefficient of leisure is positive and statistically significant, meaning that people who enjoy leisure time feel happier. Lastly, in terms of the effect of residence, people living in suburbs or on the outskirts of a big city feel less happy than do those who live in a big city. The results mentioned here are consistent with those of previous studies.

2. Gender Gap in Happiness for Each Country

We have found that females feel happier than males using estimations from the pooled data. Here, we estimate the happiness function for each country, adding income as an independent variable. Note that only the OLM is used here, because, as we saw in the pooled estimation, the OPM and OLM showed generally the same results. In addition, it is not easy to measure the gender gap in happiness with the coefficient of OPM.

Thus, although we conduct estimation of 32 happiness functions, we here show only the estimated coefficient of the female dummy. Table 4 shows the coefficients in with descending order. Shaded parts indicate statistical significance of the female dummy at the 10% level. Females feel happier than males in seven countries and less happy in one country. Some countries show negative but statistically insignificant results. All of these results indicate that the gender gap in happiness varies widely among countries.

Paying attention to the degree of gap, Great Britain has the biggest positive gap and the Philippines come next. Except for the Philippines, many countries showing a positive gender gap are developed countries. However, many countries other than France and Russia that indicate a negative gap are developing countries. Although, Japan shows a positive gender gap, it is not statistically significant. In section 2, we noted that Sano and Ohtake (2007) had reported that females in Japan felt happier than males. This study, however, does not find such a result in Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gap</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>PH</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>-0.0129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.0192</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-0.0213</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>AR</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>-0.0653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>CY</td>
<td>-0.0929</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries estimated statistically significant at the 10% level are shaded.
VI. Gender Gap in Happiness and Gender Equality in Socioeconomic Conditions

We here compare the gender gaps in happiness for each country and the indicators of gender equality in socioeconomic conditions. The GGI (Gender Gap Index) 2007 is used here. The GGI is an indicator of gender equality published by The World Economy Forum every year and consists of four factors: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment.

First, Figure 10 shows the relationship between the happiness gender gap estimated in this study and aggregated GGI 2007 scores. These two variables showed a positive correlation – as gender becomes more fully equal, the GGI will show a score of one. Therefore, the greater the gender equality, the happier females feel.

![Figure 10. Gender gap in happiness and GGI 2007](image)

We next investigate the relationship between the economic and the political aspects of the GGI and the gender gap in happiness. GGI education and health indicators mostly reach the highest GGI score in the countries used in this study, and thus, we do not use these two GGI indicators.

Figure 11 shows the relationship between economic participation and opportunity and the happiness gender gap. This scattergram indicates the same positive correlation with the aggregated GGI data, and Figure 12 also indicates this positive correlation.
Finally, we here calculate the correlation coefficients of these three relationships and summarize them in Table 5. As the table shows, these relationships have positive correlation and statistical significance at the 10% level. Therefore, the happiness gender gap that remains after other
crucial factors are excluded is affected by gender equality in socioeconomic status. Additionally, the effect of economic indicators is stronger than that of political indicators.

Table 5. Correlation coefficient between gender gap in happiness and GGI indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator GGI 2007</th>
<th>GGI 2007 economic participation and opportunity</th>
<th>GGI 2007 political empowerment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>0.3011*</td>
<td>0.3286*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* : statistically significant at the 10% level.

VII. Concluding Remarks

This paper investigated the diversity and determinants of the gender gap in happiness scores using individual data from 32 countries. We found that females in general feel happier than males, as has been found in many previous studies. However, we also found that in some countries, females reported lower happiness scores, meaning that there is diversity in the happiness gender gap. Additionally, this diversity has a statistically significant relationship with the macro indicator of gender equality. We can conclude that encouraging a gender-equal society affects the happiness gender gaps.

One remaining difficulty is that the finding that females feel happier means that males are less happy. From the point of view of gender equality, some might feel that this particular gap needs to be addressed. However, as mentioned before, GGI does not reach a score of one in any country. This datum indicates that females overall are still in a disadvantageous position in societies around the world. The reason females feel happier than males even without societal equality is that females’ socioeconomic statuses have been steadily improving. As a result, looking at the long term, females’ happiness may decrease as they adapt to new circumstances. Stevenson and Wolters (2009) found that females’ happiness possibly decreases as female socioeconomic status and participation increase. Thus, it is important to continue to observe the gender gap in happiness in the future.

References

Notes
1 Please see the website of “The Commission on Measuring Well-being, Japan,” http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai2/koufukudo/koufukudo.html
2 Econometric model for the determinants of wage based on the idea by Mincer (1974). Major determinants are years of education completed and years of work experience.
3 ISSP is a social survey program aiming for comparative analysis among countries and cultures. As of May, 2005, 48 countries are cooperating. Some themes such as family, politics, and work are surveyed in every year. The survey in Japan was conducted by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute through Central Research Institute from November 11 to 25 in 2007.
4 Urakawa (2011) and Frey (2008) also survey the research papers about happiness.
5 ISSP 2007 has 34 countries’ data. However, we cannot use Hungary and Chinese Taipei because of lack of macro indicator related to gender equality. Thus, in this study, we used 32 countries’ data.
6 In economic theoretical model describing individual behavior, it is assumed that people’s utility $U$, that is, happiness, depends on consumption of commodity or service $C$ and leisure time $l$.
$$U = U(C, l)$$
Therefore, information about leisure is important when considering happiness.
8 Leisure indicator used here is made as follows: ISSP 2007 asks respondents “Please indicate how much enjoyment you get from time activities” about four activities, “Reading books,” “Getting together with friends,” “Taking part in physical activities such as sports, going to the gym, going for a walk,” and “Watching TV, DVD, videos.” Respondents choose their answer about how much enjoy their leisure form six choices for each activity. We score these six choices as follows: 1 (“I never do this” and “No enjoyment”), 2 (“Not much enjoyment”), 3 (“Some enjoyment”), 4 (“A fair amount of enjoyment”), and 5 (“A great amount of enjoyment”). We then summed scores of four activities; minimum score is 4 and maximum score is 20. Thus, a high score of leisure means that respondents enjoy their leisure time.
9 As shown in Figure 1, happiness has four values one to four as ordered categorical variable. It is appropriate to use ordered model when estimating this kind of dependent variable. However, we here use linear model too. One of the reasons is that the result of OLM is convenient for the analysis conducted later. We thus show the results both of OPM and OLM. As for the ordered model, please see Maki, etc. (1997) and Kitamura (2009).
10 Using the result of OLM, we calculated the bottom of age as follows. First, we extract a part of the result of age,
$$-0.0233 \times Age + 0.0003 \times Age^2.$$
From the principle of calculus, we differentiated above equation, put it equal to zero and solved for age.
$$-0.0233 + 0.0006 \times Age = 0$$
$$Age = 38.8333...$$
11 As the indicator of gender equality, we have GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure) and GII (Gender Inequality Index). This study uses ISSP 2007; GEM was discontinued and GII started from 2010. Thus, in consideration of future policy, we used GGI2007 in this study. As for the details of GGI, please see the website of the World Economic Forum (http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-gap).
Part II  Submitted Papers

ON JEROME FRANK AND HIS CONSTRUCTIVE SKEPTICISM
CHEN Rui

DIVERSIFYING WELFARE RESPONSIBILITIES AND MOBILIZING
THE VOLUNTARY AND NON-PROFIT SECTOR:
Comparative Analysis of China and Japan
KANDA Fumi
Jerome Frank, as one of the most representative figures of American Legal Realism in the early years of the twentieth century, is known for not only his extensive legal practice experiences, but also his radical theories. The sharp and unique style of his theory, gives people enduring impression so that the other scholars refer his Legal Realism as “Frankification(464,393),(583,435)”. Regardless how the later scholars praise or derogate from him, they cannot annihilate his contribution to American Jurisprudence enough, and even, the western legal thoughts.

In general, it is believed that Frank’s contributions to legal theory are mainly used for reference and introducing the theory of Freud’s psychological analysis. Yet in fact, Frank’s thought originally is widespread, far more than Freud’s psychoanalysis theories, from legal to physicals, from politics to economics. In fact, he just depends on Freud’s theory on analysis of the mode of a judge in judicial activities. This seems to make a lot of legal scholars just focus on Frank’s psychoanalysis which he relies on and his famous proposition, “basic legal myth” and “fact-skepticism”. When such a version is gradually formed, people tend to label him as “Iconoclast”. It is certain that he has compressed other aspects discussed in his own system of thought. (it will be discussed in following sections.) However, it is undeniable that Frank’s theory and its influence are still having significant impacts on American jurisprudence in the 21st century. As a result, despite it has been almost 60 years since his death, it is still necessary to discuss his theory in-depth.

In this paper, based on such judgments, I will try to point out that the “constructive skepticism”, which includes absolute truth skepticism, absolute causality skepticism and fact-skepticism, is of systematic and mature rather than fragmentary and temporary in his legal philosophy. Furthermore, I will try to make a comment on Frank and his constructive skepticism.

I . The Background of the Constructive Skepticism

It is well known that United States is established on the basis of freedom and democracy. However, it was unfortunate that Frank worked mainly from the 1930s to 1950s, at the time that
the Absolutism, the sworn enemy of liberalism, prevailed the world widely and made impacts on the founding faiths of the U.S.⁶ As a result, for Frank, the core proposition of his political and legal thoughts, with all his force, was to keep American society and the people away from the Absolutism. And it run throughout all his writings. For example, in his book *Law and the Modern Mind*, he said, “I felt that, in a democracy, the citizens have the right to know the truth about all parts of their government, and because, without public knowledge of the realities of court-house doings, essential reforms of those doings will not soon arrive…. Man can invent no better way to balk any of his ideals than the delusion that they have already been his ideals than the delusion that they have already been achieved. If we really cherish our ideals of democratic justice, we must not be content with merely mouthing them.”⁷ In the book *Fate and Freedom, a Philosophy for Free Americans*, a book that represents his political ideas, he emphasizes again that, “I am not a philosopher but an ordinary person humbly reflecting on some of man’s major problems. A more correct sub-title would be this; some materials for and some gropings toward a philosophy for Americans who believe in freedom.”⁸ In the book *Courts On Trial: Myth And Reality In American Justice*, a book that concentrated on his legal thoughts of his later years, he kept addressing the importance of democracy. He affirmed that, “I am--I make no secret of it--a reformer, one of those persons who (to quote Shaw) ‘will not take evil good-naturedly.’… I repeat that, in a democracy, it can ever be unwise to acquaint the public with the truth about the workings of any branch of government. It is wholly undemocratic to treat the public as children, who are unable to accept the inescapable shortcomings of man-made institutions…. It is the essence of democracy that the citizens are entitled to know what all their public servants, judges included, are doing, and how well they are doing it.”⁹

Rather than keeping silence or conniving on potential dangers to Absolutism, which did exist in judicial authority, Frank decided to “provoke constructive skepticism” in order to “arouse you, to call attention to some court-house government activities which are less adequately performed than they could be, largely because they have been too little publicly discussed.” The approach he used is quite modest instead of negative or radical. He explained constructive skepticism in the Preface to Sixth Printing to his book, *Law and the Modern Mind*. Originally, it is intended to substitute the label “fact-skepticism” and “rule-skepticism”. In Frank’s opinion, the “realism” in philosophic discourse, “has an accepted meaning wholly unrelated to the views of the so-called ‘legal realists’”, and they have “a negative characteristic already noted; skepticism as to some of the conventional legal theories, a skepticism stimulated by a zeal to reform, in the interest of justice, some court-house ways.”¹⁰ That means that “constructive skeptics” and “constructive skepticism” may be a better choice than “Legal Realists” to explain the substance of “Legal Realists”.¹¹ Although, his proposal had no response from his colleagues, it showed more clearly and accurately the attitudes and substances of Frank’s theories.

Furthermore, it seems that the abstract doctrinal label and the doctrinal contents should remain the same. Prejudiced doctrinal label is apt to prejudiced doctrinal evaluations. Frank had pinpointed issues on human cognition that “conclusions determined their reasoning.”¹². It is a universal thesis without exception, no matter what they are, either judges or layfolks. We ignore easily the theoretical integrity and practical functions of Frank’s legal philosophy if we were restricted to his academical skepticisms and criticisms. That is why we find that image of Frank in nowaday common views is split into
the iconoclast in academics and the pragmatist in practice. Skepticisms are not just the empty or esoteric deconstructions, but the legality of the necessity of constructions.

What’s more, there are several differences between constructive skepticism and factskepticism. In Frank’s legal philosophy, fact-skepticism just stands out his philosophical views on judicial process. But Frank expounded much more than judicial process. Besides, his famous fact-skepticism is based on the criticisms of the absolute truth, which I name it as absolute truth skepticism. And on logics, he questioned the absolute causality skepticism, which should give way to free will when they conflict with each other. Because free will, to Frank, was the core of the philosophy of freedom and American social values. The law in modern society should protect this value from every potential erosion.13

But above all, whether from Frank’s intentions or academic rigours, constructive skepticism may be a better label to summarize Frank’s core ideas. Constructive skepticism consists of three aspects, “absolute truth skepticism”, “fact-skepticism” and “absolute causality skepticism”. Among them, “absolute truth skepticism” constitutes the main idea of Frank’s legal thought system.

II. “Absolute Truth Skepticism”

Walter E. Volkomer had pointed out that the core theme carried out by the works of Frank was skepticism, and that Frank denied the validity of all creeds which claimed to be the absolute truth.14 Suspicion and denial of absolute truth continues to be the core of Frank’s constructive skepticism, and became the premise for the establishments of “fact-skepticism”. We call such attitudes and views “absolute truth skepticism”. However, due to fact that the words Frank used were abstract and obscure, the viewpoints were often associated with Frank’s critics on Platonist. His attitude to absolute truth skepticism was difficult to understand and, therefore, was misunderstood by American traditional jurisprudence. So it usually submerges under the attention of fact-skepticism.

Frank’s criticisms and doubt on the absolute truth started from the critique of modern science. Frank suggested that, with the industrial production technology extensively being used, modern science had been altering several aspects of American society. Not only did it produces great social material wealth and set up a continuous progress of human civilization, but also made significant influence on traditional areas of knowledge, which could not get the legitimacy as a new and modern subject without the foundation of “science”. Law seemed to be no exceptions. “It became the mode that law should be made scientific.”15 In spite of keeping optimistic to science and its influence, Frank retained the anxiety and high degree of caution to the possibility of negative influences of science.

Firstly, the Platonism, hidden in the core of modern science, pursues for the eternal truths. He suggested that Plato followed the origin of the modern science, to illustrate, the atomic theory in ancient Greeks, relativity and pragmatism, “Plato, in his youth, was taught and was greatly impressed by the views of the earlier scientific-minded Greek thinkers. From their teachings he became acquainted with doctrines which would now sound modern, for the atomic theory, relativity and pragmatism then had their beginnings.” However, it is a regret that Plato “did not help to foster those beginnings. On the contrary he was the
great leader of the reaction.” It is because Plato was against the earlier scientific-minded Greek thinkers, who took an open-mind to the real world instead of insisting on the Idealism.

To Frank, the reason why the modern science was able to reach such achievements was that it succeeded to the ideas of earlier scientific-minded Greek thinkers’ and operated it in the real world. However, according to the idealism, sensible things “are ever-changing, ever in flux, that there is no absolute, and that all standards are relative”. Therefore, sensible world was not real, while it is also secondary and subordinate to the Universals, “which are Eternal, True and Real” In other words, once the modern science abandoned the ideas of earlier scientific-minded Greek thinkers, but to the direction of Idealism of Platonism, it was inclined to be far away from the scientific method of observations, lost ourselves in the studies of abstractive idealisms, and finally ruined the achievement we had.

Secondly, in the seeking process of Platonists for the absolute truth, it constrained the desires and impulses of the explorers from exploring the unknown world. And, because of the blindly worship of scientific rationality, the mathematical reason “could work out flawless solutions of every problem arising from the multitude of factual occurrences.” As time went by, negative consequences occurred. The mathematical rationality would gradually become an unshakable authority, leading to a new Absolutism in scientific community.

Thirdly, the lawyers, who were essentially conservative, rather than paying attention to the observation on what the law was, got drunk in Platonism for the abstract and eternal Idealism. “[T]he jargon of the nineteenth-century philosophy of science was taken over by the lawyers, not in the interest of aiding an open-minded observation of what law is, but to support once again the worship of an ‘invisible law’ consisting of vague jurally rules which are vastly superior to specific decisions, such decisions being governed by, or mere evidence of, those ultimate legal truths which constitute the real and true law.”

What’s more, although the mathematical reason itself was neutrality, once the lawyers manipulated it, it is possible to become a new Absolutism. “The emphasis in legal science is the exact reverse of that in natural science, it is not on observation of the particular but on the attainment of universals which are above and independent of experience. Not novelty, but fixity, is the goal. Certainly, stability, rigidity is to be procured by reason. And this is to be accomplished through the over lordship of arid abstractions. With the lawyers, the reign of Reason becomes a new Absolutism.”

In addition, due to the traditions of Common Law, it was the lawyers who monopolized the litigation. In other words, the lawyers tend not to reveal the actual operation of the law to non-lawyers. Therefore, in Frank’s opinion, constructive skepticism would challenge the monopoly status of the lawyers who operated on the truth of law.

III. Absolute Causality Skepticism

If the reason why Frank assailed the absolute true skepticism, was the similar pursuit of absolute true and absolutism for absolute authority to suppress pluralism, then, in the next step, Frank tried to
prove that freedom was outside of causality. Then, after criticizing the absolute truth, Frank turned his criticisms to absolute causality. We take Frank’s demonstration on this part as absolute causality skepticism.

The questioning of the absolute causality was originated from the criticisms and doubts of Inevitabilism. To Frank, free will had been the metaphysical expression of human freedom. Yet for a long time, free will was strangely used to express Inevitabilism, which had opposite meaning. In Frank’s point of view, behind this misrepresentation, actual human cognitive abilities were implicitly questioned. That was why we “believe that man has a will separate and apart from his intelligence and emotions, or that human beings escape from a regime of complete determinism while everything else in the universe is governed at every point by inflexible laws, or that any man is ever free to act wholly as he pleases, regardless of circumstances.” 22

This limitation was known as determinism in philosophy. In this view, “nature exhibits loopholes in its uniformity and inflexibility of which man can avail himself; that men at times face real and not illusory choices.” 23 To a large extent, it limited human beings from pursuing happiness by using their intelligence and the ability to change their fate.

However, it was possible for us to change this situation. We could manifest “determination” as distinguished from “determinism”, “[T] he point is that those who disbelieve in determinism believe that human purposes, guides by human intelligence, ‘have a chance’, that in the universe there is sufficient contingency — chance — to make some human freedom possible.” 24 This limitation on philosophy also reflected in our cognitive process of law, and these showed a positive correlation. If the absolute causality was established in philosophy, then it also should be established in law and practice. So, if it could be proved that absolute causality had not been established in philosophy, it also should be applied to the situation in law beyond question.

As it is mentioned above, freedom is everything for Frank. When there is a conflict between freedom and determinism, then the latter must give way to the former. That means that absolute causality in legal had to make a concession to freedom. Hence, the term “absolute causality skepticism” plays a role in transition from absolute truth skepticism to fact-skepticism.

Then, Frank proved as the following: “The controversy about free will — really a controversy about the character of the universe — is probably as old as man.” While, “with the triumphs of modern science, the anti-free-willists, the determinists, seems in the nineteenth century to have the better of the argument.” The achievements of modern science in 19th century had proven that the existence of ultimate laws of nature was behind the natural phenomena. However, quoting the results of quantum mechanics in 20th century, Frank claimed that even the most authoritative quantum mechanics physicists, such as Planck and Heisenberg, admitted that the law of nature was statistical.

“Statistical laws relating to non-living matter … resemble those unreliable statistical laws relating to human groups: A slight and unpredictable change in the conduct of one or a few of the individual particles composing some physical ‘systems’ can bring about a substantial change in the average mass habits of all the particles in such systems; a statistical law as to such systems is therefore not reliable….that is, it cannot be said with assurance that they are such that one who knew all the conditions existing at any moment, could infallibly tell what would happen the next moment; the ‘self-evidence’ of causality has evaporated; the dogma of causality is
Fact-Skepticism

The fact-skepticism begins with Frank’s observations on the process of judging. In the trial, with the help of the conclusions of the psychologist, “[T] he process of judging... seldom begins with a premise from which a conclusion is subsequently worked out. Judging begins rather the other way around — with a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find premises which will substantiate it.”

Then, if judges are human beings, there is also no exception for judges. This means, the logics of traditional justice theories, which could be called as “from the norms to decisions”, following the formal logic of syllogism strictly, are not tenable. “Judicial judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most cases, are worked out backward from conclusions tentatively formulated.”

Frank also points out that when we associate with others and comment on events, emotions would affect our judgment on affairs. The same thing occurs for the judges. Not only would the view of political and economic policy of people around them influence judges and the judgments they made, but also the experience of judges contact with witnesses, lawyers and litigants, and even the particular preferences or bias of the judges, nasal, cough or position would affect the result of the trial. Therefore, the different results of judges in a particular case are the differences of the recognition facts instead of the differences on legal point of view. From the perspective of cognitive theory, when the judges face a particular case in trial, he is also a specific “witness”. Judges must determine what the facts of the case are and this depends on what he heard and saw from the other witnesses’ statements, positions and actions in court. Thus, special characteristics, prejudices and habits of a particular judge are the determining factor in his decision process. Finally, Frank points out that “if the law consists of the decisions of the judges and if those decisions are based on the judge’s hunches, then the way in which the judge gets his hunches is the key to the judicial process. Whatever produces the judge’s hunches makes the law.”

A judgment is the portrayal of whole life experience of a judge. Then, Frank advances the fact-skepticism. He believes that legal uncertainty is not only for the uncertainty of the law, but mostly for the uncertainty of facts, which is determined on trials. Differences of the judges’ judgments appeared in similar cases, because the judges found it difficult to decide the facts of the cases. In trials, the judges’ personality and psychological qualities would make differences in determining the fact.

The fact ascertained in a judgment is neither based on the fact actually happened nor the fact expressed by the parties, but the fact that what the judge thought had happened. The judges “must
determine whether to fit a particular case into the terms of some old rules (either because they are working well, or because men have acted in reliance upon them and he considers the protection of such reliance socially valuable) or to ‘legislate’ by revising and adjusting the preexisting rules to the circumstances of the instant controversy.”

In short, causal factors which relates to the judge’s personality or the psychological once has changed, the fact in decisions would get changed. According to “fact-skepticism”, Frank summarizes the myth and reality in judicial decisions for two different formulas. The myth formulas is “R (Rule) plus F (Fact) = D (Decision)”, but the real formulas is “S (Stimulus) plus P (Personality) = D (Decision)”. Then, for the latter formula is lack of prediction function, he proposes another formula, which is “R (Rule) plus SF (Subjective Fact) = D (decision)”.

He believes that the latter formula expresses the characteristics of Legal Realism clearly, which emphasizes the facts which relates to the judgment are subjective facts (the fact found by judges and jurors). The actual situation happens in the particular time and place before the first instance is called “objective facts”. Those aspirations that judgments depended on objective facts are “myths” which could not be achieved. On the issue of uncertainty of the facts, Frank maintains that the subjective facts occurred not only to the judges but also to the witnesses. Frank suggests that the witness not only states the fact he went through, but are still reporting his judgments of the facts.

V. Conclusion

For individuals and human society, both freedom and democracy are not only the most basic value for the American society, but also the most appropriate guarantee for human being to pursue stability and happiness. Frank continued the tradition of keeping vigilant watch over power in every possible erosion and damage, and he made every effort to defend such value of the cornerstones of the American society. As the old saying goes, “Power corrupts, Absolute power corrupts absolutely.” The power inherently has self-expanding nature in every form and appearance. While the reforming desire, which was originated from goodness, has the risk of degenerated into absolutism of violence as well. In addition, when facing the danger of the erosions for freedom and democracy, we have reasons to be vigilant, not any exceptions for any system or desires, though they would be settled up for goodness at the beginning. Remember, “Revolution devours their own children”. Therefore, for the tasks of political-law theories, which play an crucial role of a guidance to social practice, it seems that it is more desirable to pay attentions on the guarding against possible risks, take note of the possibility of the system degenerate and make perspective predicts and designs for it. The Constructive skepticism is the theory we need. It is a theory that keeps reflection-reform- reflection by itself, or, in other words, it is a core political and legal theory for soundly social developing. There is no beginning or ending in such theory, while it seems that it would be handed down from generation to generation in the form of a movement. Perhaps, for this reason, in the waves of critical theories and ameliorative movements after Legal Realism, we could find the trace of Legal Realism and the shadow of Frank.

On the other hand, in his time, Frank observed keenly that the modern life, which had kept advocating porcess, science and technology since it was born, probably would breed Absolutisms in
some anonymous form or another. Modern meant not only advanced and convenient but violations of freedom. It got worse than before for its deeper disguise of science, as well as a whole set of philosophical theorie. Frank worried about it, kept on high alert for signs of law being invaded by science, and tried to boycott the influence through criticizing the contexts of modern mind and constructive skepticism and waking up the pursuit of free will. It might be Frank’s special contribution to American legal theories.

These are the reasons why Frank and his constructive skepticism should still be remembered by people today. From this perspective, Frank’s intense and acidulous words and radical points of views should be critically understood.

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Notes
* Doctoral Candidate of School of Law, Tsinghua University; Doctoral Candidate of School of Law, Tohoku University.
4 Though some jurists think little of Jerome Frank and his theory, but they still admit that “the Basic Legal Myth’ dominates the legal culture”. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide, at 14, (2010).
5 Robert Ferome Glennon’s Supra note 1.
8 Jeremy Frank, Fate and Freedom, A Philosophy for Free Americans, at vi, (1945).
10 Frank’s Supra note 7, at xxii, 2009 (1930).
11 Id. at xxii.
12 Id. at 110.
15 Frank’s Supra note 7, at 102, 2009 (1930). Early in the 1910s, Roscoe Pound, the Dean of Harvard Law School, had been appealed for introduction of scientific methods and the object of studies, such as the facts that related to the norms or the decisions, to the Sociology of Law. Besides, he suggested that the lawyers should take the validity of legal norms as the standards of laws. In all, Pound tried to make jurisprudence Scientific for the purpose of social control through the legal approach. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 Harv. L. Rev. (1911) and 25 Harv. L. Rev. (1912).
16 Frank’s Supra note 7, at 100, 101.
17 Id. at 105.
18 Id. at 103.
19 Id. at 105.
20 Id. at 105.
21 Frank’s Supra note 9, at 2.
22 Frank’s Supra note 8, at 145.
23 Id. at 145.
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25 Id. at 157.
26 Id. at 160.
27 Frank’s Supra note 7, at 108.
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30 Frank’s Supra note 7, at 111. Frank’s Supra note 9, 159-163.
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DIVERSIFYING WELFARE RESPONSIBILITIES AND MOBILIZING THE VOLUNTARY AND NON-PROFIT SECTOR: Comparative Analysis of China and Japan

KANDA Fumi

Abstract

The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the differences and similarities in diversifying welfare responsibilities and mobilizing the voluntary and non-profit sector in China and Japan. To achieve the objective, the study attempts to demonstrate socio-economic and political factors that are significant in explaining the changes and varieties of social policy reforms in the two countries. The discussion is divided into five sections. Following an introductory section, the second and third sections review the existing literature and clarify the official definitions of voluntary and non-profit organization (VNPO) in both countries, with an intention of drawing a clear image of the current and general landscape of the sectors. Section Four analyzes the experience of the Japanese welfare restructuring and Chinese social reforms since the 1980s in order to shed light on the rise of the VNPO sector and the changing relationship between the state and the society. Subsequently, Section Five attempts to distinguish differences and similarities in transferring welfare responsibilities and utilizing VNPOs in China and Japan. Finally, this paper concludes that the VNPO sector in the two countries has emerged through different contexts and developed within different institutional structures and backgrounds. In addition to such differences, each country has adopted a diversity policy of using voluntary and non-profit providers based on their unique characteristics of state-society relations.

Key words: Voluntary and non-profit organization (VNPO), non-governmental organization (NGO), non-profit organization (NPO), civil society, aging population, societalization of social welfare.

I . Introduction

Over the past two decades there have been dramatic welfare developments and social policy reforms in East Asia, along with socio-economic and political transformations. In particular, the region’s two most influential countries, the People’s Republic of China and Japan, despite their different political systems and administrative structures, are undergoing a
similar transformation. Societal and demographic shifts such as the aging of populations, women’s strengthening socio-economic position, changes in family structure and emergence of urban and rural poverty and inequality have caused unpredictable and negative consequences for both societies. An outcome of this change has been a re-evaluation of the relationship between the state, society and the individual. This is partly an effect of the influence of globalization on national cultures and the convergence of social and economic systems; it also reflects the changing nature of society itself.

As a consequence of these transformations, the traditional political institutions of China and Japan have faced a range of common challenges. However, the dominant institutional structures and administrative systems lack the flexibility to deal with numerous social needs arising in contemporary societies. This paper argues that such flexibility can potentially be provided by voluntary and non-profit organizations (VNPOs), since the VNPO sector is capable of offering public services responsive to local needs, providing voice and advocacy for disadvantaged and marginal groups, and playing a central role in meaning political or economic reform of the current state. For a society with changing family structures and an aging population, the development of VNPOs can be regarded as a bridge to fulfill the role of missing family or welfare care of elderly and children.

In fact, the importance of the third sector and civil society has grown steadily among Western Europe countries and the U.S since 1980s. The third sector is often known as the voluntary and community sector in the United Kingdom. The sector has experienced rapid growth during the last decades, since the UK government has provided fewer social services. In the United States, non-profit organizations (NPOs) are normally recognized as any organization whose purpose is one of described in §501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. They have engaged with a wide range of projects that are related to art, science, technology, education, health, community improvement, culture and the environment.

Since Salamon and Anheier (1996/1997) pointed out the emergence and important role of the VNPO sector by generating a systematic analysis of comparative data, the sector has emerged and expanded as the focus of much attention to the active non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and non-profit organizations (NPOs) and well-developed civil society in both Chinese and Japanese societies. On March 1998, the ‘Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities’ (NPO Law) was established in Japan, for the purpose of strengthening the infrastructure of NPOs with particular reference given to developments after the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake in January, 1995. Coincidentally, in the same year, Tsinghua University’s NGO Research Center (NGORC) was founded in October, 1998 as the first research center on NGOs in China. The center aims to provide training programs for managers in NGOs, to promote research on Chinese NGOs, and to contribute to related public policy and the capacity in NGOs and civil society. The two different events suggest that NGOs/NPOs have gradually been conceptualized and recognized by the public and media in each society.

This paper aims to investigate the differences and similarities in diversifying welfare responsibilities and mobilizing the VNPO sector in China and Japan. A central theme of this paper is how the VNPO sector is constituted and located in different contexts of society and how it relates to the government. This study proposes that the sector’s contributions can be explained from a comparative perspective by asking: Can the differences in how the government of China and Japan diversify welfare responsibilities and
mobilize non-profit actors be explained by their different welfare arrangements and their particular state-society relations?

The paper begins by reviewing the existing literature and examining the current situation of what is often referred to as VNPOs in each society. Subsequently, this paper attempts to demonstrate socio-economic and political factors that are significant in explaining the changes and varieties of social policy reforms in China and Japan. The paper argues that the rise of the VNPO sector since the social policy reforms of the 1980s in both countries has emerged through different contexts and developed within different institutional structures. In addition to such differences, each country has adopted a diversity policy of using voluntary and non-profit providers of public services based on their unique characteristics of state-society relations. The research compares the developmental process of the sector in each country by regarding its overall structure as based on policy choices made by the respective governments.

This study is a contribution to the comparative research on welfare state development and voluntary sector growth, scope and composition. Its aim is to contribute both to an increased theoretical and empirical understanding of the role of VNPOs in different contexts, and to the varied and changing interrelationships between government and the VNPO sector in different countries. This paper also contributes a conceptual analysis to the existing literature on comparative social policy research, by looking at the differences and identifying the situation and problems in each country.

II. A Review of the Literature

1. Review of Existing Literature in the Social Welfare Research

Theoretical and empirical research on the role of VNPOs has been nearly absent in the extensive literature on the historical development of welfare states. However, the relatively few, but an increasing number of research on voluntary organizations have widely been accepted by current research on of welfare state development. Nevertheless, there is a major challenge that must be addressed to highlight the gap of the relevant literature.

Except the remarkable comprehensive research report of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project (JHCNSP) directed by Salamon, there are only few challenges of conducting comparative studies on cross-national VNPO sectors (see for example Salamon and Sokolowski, 1999/2004). In most cases, however, such forms of study are mainly composed of collective country chapters and descriptive case studies in numerous societies. It lacks coherence and a common theoretical foundation for the comparison, thus, the main focus only remains within individual chapters discussing each particular country. Therefore, it is hard to say that research style with detailed descriptions of the national institutions and systems is systematic and analytical comparative research (Clasen, 2004).

In addition to this issue, most of the existing literature concerning comparative non-profit sector have focused on Western Europe countries and the U.S rather than on East Asia. It is true that most comparative social policy and welfare research pay more attention to the advanced societies and developed countries rather than on developing countries. A good example is welfare regime
theory, which has attempted to exclusively involve members of the OECD, so that exclude large parts of the world, many developing countries and a number of developed Asian Pacific societies. Although an increasing number of comparative studies have been carried out recently, especially on the five East Asian developed welfare societies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong), in particular, China has often been excluded from recent research due to its complex political and social systems. Neither academic researchers nor government agencies have conducted in-depth comparative studies of social policy in both China and Japan. Moreover, in some comparative studies, Japan has been regarded as one of a ‘unique’ or ‘exceptional’ category, because Japan does not fit comfortably with Western models (Kasza, 2006).

While JHCNSP has published a series of reports on NPOs/NGOs around the world, the focus still remains on a detailed introduction to each organization without including China. Dekker and Halman (2003) have also demonstrated the diversity of volunteering using empirical evidence from various countries all over the world, but China is not included within their analysis. Instead, the cross-national research conducted by Shigetomi (2001) pays great attention to the role of Chinese NGOs in a comparative perspective. However, its main focus is on the institutional description of management and registration of government-sponsored environmental NGOs in China. In contrast to the sector’s growth in public discourse, there is comparatively little written about voluntary organizations and their role in relation to Japanese social policy (Osborne, 2003; Pekkanen, 2000). Furthermore, there is only little English literature on the Japanese voluntary policies and few discussions about the sector. In order to fill such descriptive gaps in the existing literature, hence this paper aims to conduct a comparative research of the process of developing the VNPO sector in China and Japan.

2. Globalization and the Changing Face of Welfare States

In the modern world, the linkage between globalization and the welfare state is the central key in examining socio-political phenomena. A large amount of literature upon the impacts of globalization on social provision has paid closer attention to the debates of the welfare state and social policy. There has been a large quantity of debates regarding the impacts of globalization on welfare state, namely government expenditure and social programmes of welfare (see for example Deacon et al., 1997; Pierson, 1998; Mishra, 1999; Deacon, 2007; Yeates, 2008; Hudson and Lowe, 2009). In particular, most current debates refer to globalization as an influential phenomenon, which generates a threat to the main structure of national welfare states (Deacon, 2007). Some researchers maintain that the process of globalization has weakened the function and the role of nation-state, and shrunken the capability of national governments. On the other hand, others argue that globalization and complex webs of interaction among the state have reduced the scale of national state (Hudson and Lowe, 2009).

The seminal work is Deacon et al.’s (1997) account of ‘global social policy’. They point out that numerous supranational organizations have partially influenced social welfare of a country. For instance, the World Bank has promoted the Chilean pension scheme, and the OECD has been a main investor for human capital. Moreover, the idea of neo-liberal global capitalism has been promoted as the key agenda by the World Bank and the IMF. That is to say, social and environmental issues have been essential common agendas at international conferences (Deacon et
Therefore, it is useful to ask: whether the growing economic competition and global governance will threaten existing welfare states; and what the implications of international and global dimensions for the study of welfare state and social policy are.

The whole welfare state system now is facing dramatic transformations and challenges. Plenty of arguments have been provoked regarding the changing face of welfare states (for example see Pierson, 2001; Powell and Hewitt, 2002; Clasen and Siegel, 2008). It has become increasingly common to argue that the social consensus of Keynesian macro-economic management has lost its explanatory power. Instead, in the new era of a globalized world, a neoliberal agenda has been central in emphasizing deregulation, privatization and the efficiency of the ‘free market and trade’, aiming to limit the autonomy of nation states (Jessop, 2004).

As a consequence of this ideological shift, policy researchers are paying greater attention to the changing roles of the government and transnational factors in policy-making (Yeates, 2008; Hudson and Lowe, 2009). Jessop (2004) argues that the concept of nation-state has been hollowing out since the 1980s. According to his argument, several significant factors can be considered to contribute to the declining power of the nation-state: (1) the emergence of global capitalism; (2) transnational problems; (3) the increasing influence of identity politics and social movements surrounding the transnational issues; (4) new forms of terrorism and the fragmentation of the welfare network (Jessop, 2004: 11). Hence, he concludes that the political-social transformation which states are undertaking is a transition ‘from state-based government to network-based governance’ (see for example Pierre and Peters, 2000; Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). Following his sense, therefore, it can be concluded that the ongoing global transformation has raised fundamental questions with respect to the role of welfare states. Moreover, this change has caused significant shifts in the current research paradigms relating to welfare states and social policies.

Indeed, many developed countries are forced to deal with a number of complex social issues, such as higher rate of unemployment, increasing inequalities, the growing demands of an aging population and declining fertility rates. Esping-Andersen (1996: 2) points out that there has also been ‘welfare state failure’: welfare states have been unable to cope with new kinds of risks and needs. As Esping-Andersen (1996: 6-7) has indicated, changes taking place within the family structure and workplace and in people’s lifestyles pose two key challenges to advanced welfare states. First, there has been an increasing dissatisfaction with the welfare state’s failure to manage new demands, such as child care for working mothers, support for non-conventional families, old-age care and so on. Second, the changing surrounding economic environment and demographic conditions have threatened the capability of welfare states. Consequently, welfare states receive less funding and are forced to service more people.

In fact, a number of developed countries, despite their different political systems, are facing or are expecting to face rapidly aging populations and declining birth rates. According to the UN’s World Population Aging report (2009), for instance, the birth-rate of most of the developed countries has declined below the replacement rate, namely, the level of 2.1 children per woman. This ongoing population decline due to low fertility rates will have severe consequences in the near future. Although the global population overall will increase by one-third over the next 40 years, from 6.9 to 9.1 billion (United Nations, 2009), this population growth is a new kind of phenomena.
The rising population will not be driven by birth rates, but primarily by an increase in the number of the elderly. In fact, the world’s population of children under five is expected to drop by 49 million as of mid-century. On the other hand, the number of people over 60 will increase by 1.2 billion (United Nations, 2009). The rising number of elderly people in most OECD countries will, within the next few decades, have a significant impact on the social security systems for pensions, medical insurance and so on. Hence, with the increasing demands for welfare provision, many countries have recently expanded their social welfare spending and welfare programs (see Table I).

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Source: OECD (2010)
3. Aging Populations: Making Comparison between China and Japan

Along with this global trend of socio-economic and political transformations, there have also been dramatic welfare developments and social policy reforms in East Asia. In particular, the region’s two most influential countries, China and Japan are undergoing a similar transformation over the past two decades. The two countries have much in common. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, They are faced with the same problems caused by economic growth and globalization, despite their different political systems and cultural backgrounds.

However, clearly there are large differences between them. No country can match China for size and diversity. The over one billion population of China is impossible to compare with Japan. Both governments have distinctly different political systems as well as administrative structures. While Japan is urbanized and post-industrial with a services economy which creates more opportunities for employment, China still relies greatly on manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Income levels in Japan are far above those in China on average.

How relevant such differences are is unclear. A number of challenges facing policy makers and policy analysts in Japan are similar in nature, though they might differ in scale to what has emerged in China. Given the convergence of demographic transformations in the two countries, making comparisons between them offers a great opportunity to investigate different causes, mechanisms and possible consequences to tackle common social needs. It also provides possibilities to learn about the causes and consequences of policies in the way the other government responds to the same issue can be found in their different actions.

One of the most serious concerns for both Japanese and Chinese society is the high speed of aging. In fact, the two countries are facing (in the case of Japan) or are expecting to face (in the case of China) rapidly aging populations in which the percentage of working-age people is diminishing in proportion to the elderly, and serious declining birth rates. Both countries have also experienced changes in family structure and poor conditions for caring for the elderly. The rising number of elderly people in both societies will, within the next few decades, result in a significant impact on the social security systems with regard to pensions, medical insurance and so on. Pension payment and the cost of health and care for the elderly are considered to push up social expenditure. Therefore, both countries have recently expanded their social welfare programs especially for the elderly. Consequently, those challenges have forced the two governments to meet similar needs for welfare provisions (see Figure 1 and 2).

The rate of aging (proportion of over 65 years of age in total population) in Japan reached the world’s highest level of 23.1% in 2010 and the number is expected to exceed 27% by the year 2020, according to the latest figures released by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Japanese population of 128 million is predicted to shrink by a third, and over 65 years will account for 40% of people by 2060. On the other hand, ‘population explosion’ in the 1950s and 1960s and the strict birth-control policy under the ‘one child’ policy over the last two decades have made China enter an aging society since the 21st century. The statistics published by China’s State Statistical Bureau in 2003 announced that Chinese population aged 60 and above are nearly 130 million, which accounts for 10 percent of its entire population. Furthermore, those aged 65 or above have already exceed 7% of the national
population. It is assumed that the population of
Chinese senior citizens aged 60 and over will
exceed 200 million by the year of 2015, and the
number will rise to 280 million by 2025. If such
predicted demographic trends come true, there
will be approximately 400 million Chinese elders
by 2040 or 2050. That is to say, China will have to
face more and more social and political pressures
in the next few decades to offer social security,
health care, housing and personal services for a
large elderly population.

Given the convergence of demographic
changes in the two countries, an opportunity for
teaching about the causes and consequences of
policies in the way different governments respond
to similar issues can be found in their different
actions. Policy makers in both governments
can receive ideas; in terms of which program
is more or less effective, from comparing how
different countries react to the same challenge.
While it is still underestimated how policies
and reforms undertaken by both countries are
effective in responding to the challenges, the
Japanese experience may offer the Chinese
government some useful lessons. First, the process
of demographic aging in Japanese society is
faster than any country in history with significant
consequences for its economy and society, thus,
Japan’s experience alone has demonstrated that it
is significant to preserve the traditions while taking
into account widely demographic changes and new
expectations for social policies such as pensions,
health insurance, and other programs. Second,
the modernization and economic level of Japan is
higher than that of China, so China might need to
draw lessons from Japan in restructuring of public
services, transferring government’s responsibilities
and promoting the development of the voluntary
sector. Experiences in policy-making from Japan
can be divided into two groups. One group of
lessons and experiences can be imitated as soon
as possible, and the other can only be used for
references in the long term. Policy makers from
China can take advantage of previous experiences
from Japan and avoid policy risks at the same
time. They can also examine other possibilities for
alternative policies in response to the problems of
social policy reforms.

Figure 1. Percentage of Older Adults (Age 65+) in Japan and China, 1950-2050

![Graph showing percentage of older adults in Japan and China, 1950-2050.](source: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision (2009).)
III. Terminology

1. Definition of the Voluntary and Non-Profit (VNPO) Sector

The past two decades have witnessed a growing interest in organized voluntary, private and non-profit activities in many countries, developed and developing, capitalist and former-socialist nations, along with the rise of great demand in public social services (Anheier, 1987; McCarthy et al., 1992; Fisher, 1993; Salamon and Anheier, 1997). Because of its increasingly important role of VNPOs in the processes of economic and political change, the sector has come to be recognized not only as a fundamental contributor to social life, civic infrastructure and human lights, but also as a significant factor for economic growth and political stability (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; World Bank, 1995). Despite the fact that the sector has apparently grown in scale and importance, however, the common definition of this set of organizations remains only dimly understood.

In the first place, this trend seems to involve Asian countries, where an expansion of the public attention to voluntary activities has rapidly grown over recent years. In particular, the VNPO sector is an emerging and important actor in contemporary China and Japan (Li, 2008; Koga, 2010; Imada, 2006; Tanaka, 2008). The sector could offer public services in an efficient and effective way that contributes to the decentralization and downsizing of the state. Generally, the role of VNPOs could be considered as: (1) facilitating the development and sustenance of a civil society; and (2) agents of sustainable development across the world (Osborn, 2003). The sector is capable of taking over personal social services such as welfare, medical and education from local governments. Given the fact that both providers for social welfare and the social needs of the recipient have diversified, the sector could play a significant role in developing essential local public services flexibly. Because social governance is often derived from grass-roots
networks (‘from the bottom-up’), VNPOs can act as main players in promoting the growth of ‘good governance’ in society (Jinno and Sawai, 2003). Hence, a prospering VNPO sector could lead to the growth of so called ‘civil society’ in both China and Japan.

It has been widely accepted among international scholars and non-profit leaders that the existence of ‘third sector’ has occupied a distinctive social life outside of the conventional two broad sectors: the market and the state, or the private and the public sectors. Despite its increasing characteristic features and dynamics, however, the sector is poorly understood due to its conceptual ambiguities and terminological confusion, and its existence still remains a debatable space in the academic world (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). This is a complex field, given the range of concepts and terms used, and the legal system governing the sector in different countries; non-profit sector, voluntary sector, charitable sector, independent sector, tax-exempt sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), non-profit organizations (NPOs) and many more. As Salamon and Anheier (1992) argue, since each of these terms only focuses on one feature of the substance of these organizations, other important aspects are somewhat neglected or overlooked.

Therefore, in order to develop a clear understanding of a relationship among different sectors, this section aims to define what the VNPO sector is. More importantly, the development of a definition of the sector would permit both the similarities and differences between the two countries to become evident. However, this is not an easy task due to the complicated of traditional, modern, and imported institutions that exist in two societies.

Generally speaking, definitions of the sector are essentially aggregates of a set of organizations that are considered to possess characteristics apart from states, markets, or households. That is, the voluntary sector consists of activities that are indeed voluntary in the sense of being free of governmental control and the economic constraints of profitability and the distribution of profits. More specifically, relying heavily on the research report by the JHCNSP, this paper refers to the VNPO sector as the set of institutions that share six key characteristics as its organizational features:

- Independence from government
- Profit not divided among members
- Involves voluntary participation
- Excludes trade associations
- Some elements of public benefit
- Self-governance

In addition to the definition above, a rough outline of a three-sector model (see Figure 3); the state, the market and the voluntary sector, could also somewhat provide a basic understanding of the sector (Wuthnow, 1991: 5-7). The state sector sometimes referred to as the public sector or the government sector, can be regarded as a set of activities legitimated by forcible powers. The market sector, in comparison, can be defined as a set of businesses which involve buying and selling similar goods and services for profit, based on the supply and demand mechanism. Seen in this way, the voluntary sector (or third sector) can thus be considered as a set of activities which exclude coercive enforcement and the profit-oriented exchange of products. Instead, the sector engages in a variety of voluntary activities that are free of the coercive actions and economic controls and distribution of profits.

Despite of its apparent simplicity, however, it should be noted that the three-sector model is at least a useful explanation in the dual sense of drawing attention to the voluntary sector and helping keeping clearly those differences in mind.
To develop further a detailed definition based on the definition above and the three sector model demonstrated by Wuthnow (1991), this paper suggests that the voluntary sector is a mixed sector, and thus three sectors overlap and complement each other, sharing similar objectives and missions in the field of social welfare (see Figure 4).

Although no single VNPO sector exists throughout the world, this paper generally uses this term to represent the whole sector based on the following two reasons. First, the voluntary sector emphasizes the significant ‘input’ aspect made by volunteer activities towards civil society. Second, the non-profit sector is the term used to highlight that organizations don’t exist essentially for their own profits. A primary focus of the research is on those organizations that participate in volunteer activities, focusing on wider public benefit and delivering social welfare services. In particular, Three key terms are employed to refer to the sector in the paper. The first is ‘voluntary and non-profit organization’ (VNPO), which is perhaps most accurate in describing the links of the sector to voluntarism and civil society. However, the term ‘non-profit organization’ (NPO) is prevalent in Japan and is used particularly in relation to the relevant legislative framework, the 1998 NPO law. On the other hand, ‘non-governmental organization’ (NGO) is the preferred term in China, as it emphasizes independence from the government. Where specific use of these terms, or others, is made later in this study, they will be explained in the start of the section.
2. The Concept of NGO/NPO in China

As the term non-profit sector does, the concept of NGO/NPO also varies among societies with different political systems and cultures. Before the set of reforms since 1978, there were no non-governmental agencies officially operating in the field of social welfare in China. Over the past decade, however, there have been a rapidly growth in the number of NGOs at various levels (Zhao, 1998; Kang and Han, 2008; Li, 2008; Koga, 2010). At the local level, almost all urban community organizations, namely resident community associations, have become to offer community services to most local residents. These organizations have shifted into a kind of NGOs after the reforms, since they realized that governmental financial budget is no longer able to rely on (Ma, 2002). Instead, they started to mobilize a variety of local financial resources, including conducting profitable activities to provide local residents with finance community services and activities, such as personal services for the elderly, the disabled, the poor and children, and even the general provision of public sanitation and public security.

Furthermore, some specialized non-governmental and non-profit welfare agencies have been established to provide personal services, mainly for the elderly (Li, 2008). At national and regional levels, some charity societies and other non-governmental welfare organizations have developed to offer social services, such as poverty relief, education, and medical care for poor people in both urban and rural areas. Some international NGOs have also become to provide welfare services and financial aids for local socio-economic development, mainly in the remote poverty areas (Koga, 2010). Although the VNPO sector in China is still a developing area comparing to the public sector and market, this sector has grown rapidly and played a meaningful role in welfare provisions in the past ten years. It becomes more common for the state to have interactions with the sector regarding the field of social welfare.

On the other hand, the Chinese government has employed legal registration to control and supervise the growth of social organizations (Chen, 1997). Organizations that want to receive a positive attention from government must pass for such registration. The current legal structure of NGOs has brought by the 1998 Registrations for the Administration and Registration of Social Organizations (Shehuituanti dengji guanli tiaoli). Utilizing the registrations, the central government has attempted to manage and control the development of registered NGOs in order to: (1) ensure that groups do not obtain too much autonomy; (2) limit capacity building; and (3) keep a watchful eye on the organization. In China, central government plays a key role as the supervisor and regulator of non-profit activities (Ma, 2002; Li, 2008).

Chinese NGOs (fei zhengfu zuzhi) could be divided into three categories: (1) social organizations (SOs, shehui tuanti); (2) non-governmental non-commercial enterprises (NGNCEs, minban fei qiye danwei); and (3) foundations (jijin hui). Friends of Nature (FON) is the oldest environmental NGO in China. It was founded by a group of concerned Chinese intellectuals in Linglong Park, Beijing, and officially registered at the State Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1994, as one of Chinese environmental NGO pioneers. Chinese researchers prefer the term ‘NGO’, while the government tends to use the word ‘shehuituanti’ (social organization) to refer to its special linkage with the government.

According to the Recent numbers announced by China’s Official Yearbook of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the figures of registered NGOs have increased to 136,841 in 2000, 153,000 in 2004 and
220,000 in 2008. However, those numbers do not include the rising number of registered community based organizations (minjian zuzhi). Because the social organization registration is considerably strict and complex, approximately 80 percent of NGO in China are not taking a registered NGO, but choosing a form of business organization. Thus, a large number of grassroots NGOs have been emerging as corporations or companies. Such grassroots organizations are indeed the product of local communities and voluntary initiatives (Li, 2008; Koga, 2010).

Figure 5. Figures of NGOs (Sos and NGNCEs) in China

Source: China’s Official Yearbook of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2008)

3. The Concept of NGO/NPO in Japan

Since the 1990s, the American concept ‘non-profit organization’ (NPO) has become widely-used and familiar to Japanese people. According to Imada (2006), several civil organizations have played central roles in the establishment of the concept of NPO and NPO law: (1) research team led by Masaaki Honma, an Osaka University economics professor; (2) Suntory Cultural Foundation; (3) Nippon Life Insurance Foundation; and (4) The Osaka Community Foundation. All organizations have also generated a great contribution to the establishment of NPO Research Forum of Japan in Tokyo in 1993, as the first supporting organization for NPOs in Japan. Along with policy and legislative advocacy for NPOs, NPO Support Center has attempted to provide various projects which have contributed to the development of NPOs, such as offering information to local communities, providing support and consultations as a business incubator for startup organizations, developing human resources, working on public relations.

Despite of the sector’s increasing attention by public discourse, there are only a few written on the Japanese voluntary sector (Osborn, 2003). Certainly, defining the Japanese non-profit sector is a complicated work for researchers, since quite a lot of organizations are not officially registered.
On the one hand, many NPOs are obviously regarded as part of the government. On the other hand, there are also a large number of civil society organizations and community-based groups which greatly rooted in Japanese society and cultures. In attempting to define VNPOs in Japan, first, it might be useful to reveal what types of private organizations exist in Japan (Amemori, 1997: 195):

- Kōeki hōjin (charitable organizations, or public benefit organizations), including Shadan hōjin and Zaidan hōjin
- Shakaifukushi hōjin (social welfare corporations)
- Gakko hōjin (private school corporations)
- Shūkyo hōjin (religious corporations)
- Iryo hōjin (medical corporations)
- Tokushu hōjin (special public corporations)
- Kōekishintaku (charitable trusts)
- Kyōdōkumiai (cooperatives)
- Nin-idantai or Jinkakunaki shadan (unincorporated organizations)

NPOs and NGOs are regarded as the same category of social organizations in Japan, although the term NPO emphasizes its non-profit management and NGO focuses its independence from the government. Generally speaking, NPOs are known as civil society organizations in Japan, while NGO is considered international in structure and scope of activity. NPOs can be defined as organizations that are: (1) not for profit; (2) provide social and local public services; and (3) have a foundation in the legal system. Therefore, the definition in fact excludes various citizens’ activity groups which are not incorporated such as juridical foundations (zaidan hōjin) and juridical associations (shadan hōjin) (Yamauchi, 2001; Imada, 2006).

Deguchi (2001) points out the very difference between institutionalized non-profit organizations (I/NPOs) and non-institutionalized non-profit organizations (N/NPOs). The former is heavily incorporated into the state and depends upon the state for their very existence in providing local services. They are denoted as kōeki hōjin (including shadan hōjin and zaidan hōjin) and act as mainstream social welfare providers, such as social welfare corporations (shakaifukushi hōjin) and special public corporations (tokushu hōjin). The latter group is seen as so called ‘grassroots VNPOs’ and they are independent from the government in terms of management and recourses. This paper focuses primarily on the latter category in considering its role to civil society.

As will discuss in the following sections, the 1998 NPO Law has set up the fundamental direction for the development of the sector and the recent 2000 Long Term Care Insurance Law. It has offered possibilities of stable long-term funding for the VNPOs from the state. As a consequence of legal reforms, social welfare providers were diversified by making the other actors and sectors more prominent in welfare provision. The number of registered NPOs in Japan has been increasing rapidly since 2003. There were 5,000 increases from 2003 to 2007, and 3,000 increases from 2007 to 2010. The current figure of NPOs in 2010 has reached 39,214. Most of the organizations are mainly engaged in health, medical and social welfare services located in local areas.
Examining the experience of the Japanese welfare restructuring and Chinese social reforms since the 1980s, this section sheds light on the rise of voluntary organizations and the relationship between the state and the sector. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to give a full description of Japanese and Chinese social policy and reforms. Therefore, the aim here is to highlight socio-economic and political factors that led to the recent development of the VNPO sector.

In order to downsize the government and reduce the roles for the state, the two countries have undertaken a series of social reforms. While the reforms have resulted in a reallocation of welfare responsibility among state, society, family and individual, there are significant differences in how state transforms its welfare responsibilities in both countries. This paper attempts to distinguish the ways in which the governments of China and Japan diversify welfare responsibilities and mobilize non-profit actors by examining: (1) their different institutional welfare arrangements; (2) the changing structure of welfare responsibilities among state, society and family; (3) the role of family and other traditional social relationships in the supply of welfare provisions; and (4) the aims of official voluntary policies and its influence on the growth patterns of NGOs/NPOs.


In most cases, among the literature on comparative social policy across East Asia, Japan has been regarded as one of a variety of existing welfare regime models conceptualized from a Western framework (Goodman and Peng, 1996). Analysis
has tended to allocate Japanese welfare system to a unique category, since Japan does not fit comfortably with Western models (Izuhara, 2003). Japan has also been recognized as a ‘hybrid’ welfare regime in the analysis of Esping-Andersen (1997). However, his analysis framework has been challenged by Peng (2000) within the argument that the usage of indicators by Esping-Andersen, namely ‘decommodification and stratification’ cannot appropriately demonstrate the case of Japan. Furthermore, she reveals two significant factors which should be taken into consideration within the Japanese welfare system. Firstly, she stresses the connections between individual-family, and individual-labor markets, since generally in Japanese society the family and the labor market play an important role in providing welfare services. Secondly, she suggests that the primary purpose of welfare since post-war Japan has been an establishment of employment security system and a basic economic security for the family. Therefore, in the discussion of Japanese welfare society the links between the roles of family, the labor market and the welfare provision are essential elements.

On the other hand, scholars in comparative social policy (see for example Gould, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1990) regard the Japanese welfare state as minimalist and liberal-residual system, in which welfare provision is seen as a safety net provided by the state for the very poor and most citizens who are expected to meet their own welfare needs from the market and the family. The Japanese government nowadays attempts to effectively cut down its heavy burden of social expenditure by emphasizing the important role of family and neighborhood help in providing services. Japanese people do not rely on the national pension and care for the elderly very much, due to the limitations and inadequacy of social services provided by the public sector. Hence, it can be assumed that one of the backgrounds for the development of VNPOs is an attempt of society to fill the gap left by the government provision of social services.

Before World War II, the government only offered limited welfare provisions. It was voluntary organizations that provided almost all social services. After the end of the war, however, in 1951 the Social Welfare Services Law was enacted and social welfare became the responsibility of the central government, supported by a municipal government, or a registered social welfare corporation. Although those registered welfare corporations are considered as non-profit organizations, their action is strictly controlled by the government.

In 1963, The Old-Age Welfare Law was enacted and it introduced a number of essential local welfare services such as nursing facilities, home helpers and daily welfare service centers for the elderly. The government started to offer free medical care for all people over 70 years or older in 1973. Japanese people enjoyed a rather high level of social welfare in the early 1970s. However, the oil crisis and the country’s obsession economic growth made it difficult to maintain such high standard of welfare. Consequently, the Japanese welfare state began to decline.

Since the 1980s, the system was under pressures to change for two main reasons. First, the government needed to control rapidly rising social expenditures for long-term care. With the growing number of elderly people in the Japanese aging society, the government needs to increase financial burden in order to provide long-term care. Moreover, the needs of senior citizens also greatly changed. In the 1960s and 1970s, the needs of the elderly mostly came from poverty, such as lack of food, clothing or housing. The centralized system at that moment was able to provide material support efficiently for the demands. However, seniors’ needs shifted away from such material needs,
since their financial condition had improved with the maturation of the national pension system and with the overall growth of the Japanese economy. For example, seniors living alone in urban areas complained of the lack of support in daily living activities, such as cooking and cleaning. Besides, due to the changing structure and function of family, Japanese families or households as care providers have been diminishing their fundamental role.

Through its historical development, the Japanese welfare system has been learning and adopting concepts and ideas from other welfare states. After enjoying a long economic growth, Japanese people have started to desire spiritual and humanistic satisfaction, rather than material satisfaction since the late 1980s. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has brought a great attention to a civil society not only in Eastern Europe, but also in Japan. Many people in Japan began realizing the importance of a civil society (Osborn, 2003). Expressing dissatisfactions toward a conventional socio-political structure governed by the Iron Triangle, since the late 1980s citizens have began attempting to create civil organizations to provide care for the increasing number of elderly people, offer support for the large number of foreign laborers in urban and rural communities, and improve the natural environmental protection against industrial pollution (Fujimura, 1999; Miyamoto, 2008).

2. Privatization and Social Policy Reform in Japan

It was considered that a decentralized system is able to meet new needs that varied from individual to individual. In the mid-1980s, Japanese government started to privatize and devolve welfare provision of public services in response to severe challenges resulting from socio-economic and demographic shifts (Suda, 2011). To reduce public expenditures and improve the quality of services, the central government decided to transfer welfare responsibilities over public services to local governments and even devolved control to the municipal authorities. Corresponding to growing demands for the increasing number of the elderly, insufficient child care, deterioration of the local community and solutions to environmental problems, voluntary activities became diversified and various kinds of voluntary organizations were founded in the late 1980s. The central government announced that local governments could contract out certain services to other private organizations in addition to social welfare corporations in 1990.

The Japanese welfare state restructuring after the 1980s provides some useful lessons not only for Japan, but also for other countries. A set of social policy reforms has resulted in a visible redistribution of responsibilities for social care provision among family, market, state and the voluntary sector (Peng, 2002; Takegawa, 2005). Furthermore, while these significant transformations were taking place in the public service system, volunteers and community organizations were rapidly growing. Numerous voluntary organizations began to engage not only conventional daily-care services but also new programs such as home-delivered meal services, in order to respond to the new needs of seniors and to make up for the shortage of government-run services. Thus, an expansion of voluntary welfare action has grown rapidly over the years and more and more non-governmental and non-profit welfare organizations have materialized (Osborn, 2003; Suda, 2006).

Some of the local governments have involved the volunteers in their activities by creating stronger collaborative relationships. However, such effort was made based on informal contracts, because these voluntary organizations did not
have any legal status. The only legal agreement appropriate for their activities was the status of a social welfare corporation at that moment. Until the enactment of the NPO Law in 1998, there were great barriers for VNPOs to have an access to the existing social system especially in the area of public services. As will be discussed below, the new NPO law enabled smaller organizations to acquire the legal status of NPO corporation without following conventional complex procedures.

3. The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the NPO Law in Japan

In particular, it was the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of January 1995 that drew the attention of the public and mass media to the existence of this VNPO sector. This large-scale natural disaster was truly a major turning point in the development of the voluntary sector as well as civil society in Japan. In fact, after the earthquake a number of voluntary agencies and volunteers emerged to engage in helping the victims and disaster relief. At the same time, more people have become concerned about volunteering and the activity fields of volunteer. In parallel to this attention, there has also been a sharp growth in debates emphasizing the need to develop the sector. Together with such concerns, many ministries and departments of the Japanese government and several local authorities began to recognize the significant role of citizens’ voluntary action.

This recognition eventually made a great contribution to the enactment of the NPO Law in 1998. It was not easy task for the new voluntary organizations to be established and incorporated, since they were small grassroots organizations and cannot meet the strict criteria of approval incorporation. Furthermore, under the existing laws, those citizens’ organizations must be controlled and regulated by the government. As a result of a lobbying movement for new legislation, in November 1994 the Coalition for Legislation to support Citizens’ Organizations (C’s) was established to achieve tax benefits for voluntary organizations, and then the NPO Law was eventually enacted in 1998.

The NPO Law is regarded as special legislation under Article 34 of the Civil Code. It enabled small VNPOs to be incorporated through an authentication process especially in the case they work in specified activities, such as:

- Promotion of health, medical treatment, or welfare
- Promotion of social education
- Promotion of community development
- Promotion of academic research, culture, the arts, or sports
- Conversation of the environment
- Disaster relief
- Promotion of community safety
- Protection of human rights or promotion of peace
- International cooperation
- Promotion of a society with equal gender participation
- Sound nurturing of youth
- Promotion of information technology
- Promotion of science and technology
- Promotion of economic activities
- Development of vocational ability or promotion of employability
- Consumer protection
- Administration of organizations that engage in the above activities or provision of liaison, advice, or assistance in connection with the above activities

After the enactment of the Law, more than 35,000 NPOs have been established in various areas of activity. Furthermore, only ten years after
enacting NPO Law, three new laws were executed, with a purpose of reforming the fundamental law for VNPOs. As explained above, the Japanese non-profit sector is quite complicated, consisting of two folds: well-organized non-profit corporations and grassroots citizen organizations. Established non-profit corporations include public-benefit corporations chartered under the Civil Code, social welfare corporations under the Social Welfare Services Law, private schools under the Private School Law, private hospitals under the Medical Services Law, and religious organizations under the Religious Corporations Law. According to article 34 of Civil Code, voluntary organizations can be incorporated with the approval of the competent authorities. Under the new legal system which started in December 2008, VNPOs became much easier to be founded without the approval of the government. In gaining legal and tax benefits, however, they must successfully be qualified to proceed to the next stage as public interest organizations, in which the criteria are complex and hard to meet.

4. Socialist Economic and Welfare System in Pre-1980s Reform China

Chinese traditional social welfare was based on its socialist economic system and socialist ideology. Before the 30 year reform, the Chinese government was running a large social welfare program in both urban and rural areas. The Chinese people, particularly urban residents enjoyed a certain level of universal benefits of welfare provisions even under the lower economic condition. In rural areas, welfare services had been covered by the collective organizations under governmental strict regulation. Thus, some researchers argued that Chinese society before the reform represented a ‘welfare society in a lower income country’ (Guan, 2000). It was obviously an advantage of socialism system that results in such high standard of welfare in the urban state sector. In spite of low personal income, the government aimed to ensure Chinese people’s basic living and provided sufficient services in health care, education and housing. Although there was a huge gap between rural and urban areas in levels of living and welfare, the basic idea was the same: low income, but high welfare benefits (Ma, 2002).

In this traditional system, the state programs covered and paid for almost all services in most important fields, either directly from the state budget or through government enterprises. In addition, almost all the expenditures were covered from public financial sources, since individuals did not need to pay tax in the traditional economic system. Therefore, the common expression ‘welfare services from cradle to grave’ was also used to describe the welfare pattern in China before the reform, as the European welfare did (Ma, 2002). China’s high level of welfare provision had resulted remarkable evidence of social developments, such as the improvement in adult literacy, school enrolment, life expectancy rates.

This old pattern contains three significant features (Guan, 2000/2003; Cheng, 2000). First, the means of production was considered to belong to the government. This state ownership can be seen as a basic idea for the government intervention in social affairs. The central government dominates in the distribution of power between state and society, so that it controls the entire public sphere and monopolizes all resources for collective action (Kang and Heng, 2008).

Second, welfare provisions were provided by the state based on a centrally planned economic system. In this system, all industries were under the tight control of the state-planned economy and the most important resources and procedures with regard to economic activity were controlled by the government. Mobilizing such resources,
the government can easily develop various kinds of social welfare programs. Furthermore, the traditional system prevented people from having associational rights and independent social organizations were strictly forbidden. In the distribution of power between the state and society, the state dominated and involved every corner of society, including both the public and private sphere (Kang and Heng, 2008).

Third, the ideology of traditional system was dominated by egalitarian concepts. Egalitarianism was traditionally considered as the significant characteristic of a socialist society in China. Given this circumstances, the government was expected to play a central role in the provision of social welfare.

5. Reform and Development in the Context of Marketization and Globalization in Contemporary China

Despite of its remarkable achievements, however, the Chinese government had to reform its welfare system due to two reasons. First, some features of the traditional model appeared to reduce economic efficiency, and bring negative effects on economic development. Second, the socio-economic changes created by market reform and the open door policy have forced the welfare system to be modified.

As a result of the market reform and open door policies since the early 1980s, Chinese welfare system has changed considerably. Market reform has meant the loss of the traditional welfare system, as well as the shift to a multiple-ownership economy, a market-oriented free trading system and the people’s greater tolerance of inequality. These changes have led to two significant impacts especially on welfare provision. First, market reform has caused weaker governmental control over the financial resources and various kinds of enterprises in social welfare. Second, the emerging, developing private sector remains outside the traditional welfare such as pensions, medical insurance (Shi and Zhu, 2000).

In recent decades, particularly since the market reforms launched in 1978, China has experienced a more rapidly economic growth than any other country worldwide. The extraordinary growth rate has had a number of positive impacts; one obvious benefit is a fundamental improvement in the average standard of living of Chinese people. More people in urban areas receive higher incomes, and better choice of goods, and they are living in more comfortable housing than ever before.

On the other hand, the growth has also resulted in some negative impacts; a wider income differences among provinces and regions, as well as among households and individuals. Income inequality has risen sharply from a comparative low level in the early 1980s to a considerable level nowadays (Gustafsson et al., 2008). Gustafsson et al. (2008) argue that, inequality is not necessarily a serious problem since it usually occurs hand in hand with economic development. Most researchers would agree that past Chinese policies has contributed to dwindle the gaps between income differences, thus small increase cannot be avoided. However, awareness has arisen when income differentials expand excessively in ways which decrease efficiency and infringe on fairness and justice. Furthermore, inequality can even disturb social cohesion, produce social and political instability, and eventually prevent economic development. The speed and the level with which such inequality has risen is remarkable.

Recent discussion regarding increasing inequality has been a major subject not only in Chinese political fields, but also in international settings. Concerns in China’s income distribution have expanded around the world. China is the most populous country in the world, hence changes and variations of its income distribution have
implications for global inequality and poverty. Knowledge about characteristics of the problems in China is vital in understanding changes inequality and poverty on a global dimension (Gustafsson et al., 2008). Besides, China is also a familiar subject of general interest, since its experience may offer evidence and insights in order to interpret the relationships between inequality and economic growth. In recent years the leadership team of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao that came to power in 2002-2003, has account the increasing inequality as a serious social issue. They have attempted to encourage a number of policy changes which aim to alleviate rural poverty. For instance, rural taxes and fees were reduced, and then rural school’s tuition fees are being cutting, the grain taxes was also limited, and an attempt to design a new village medical insurance system in rural areas including a version of the minimum livelihood stipend system (dibao) which has only been existed in urban communities. Chinese government has attempted to tackle with the greater inequality through a number of policy interventions.

It is true that thirty years of reforms and economic growth have brought a degree of prosperity never experienced by Chinese citizens. Becoming more diversified and modernized, China is now an important driver not only in East Asia region’s economy, but also in the global community. Although, poverty has been dramatically improved, yet there are still numerous challenges facing China; environmental pollution, inadequate health care, aging society, massive internal migration, water and energy shortages, persistent poverty. However, the government alone cannot effectively deal with all necessary tasks; offer solutions for social issues and provide social welfare services. The Chinese government by the 1980s realized that the engagement of social organizations and citizens action through civil society could generate social forces to cover its limited capacity for social welfare services (Guan, 2000). Since civil organizations operate as intermediaries between citizens and the government, those organizations may provide essential services to others in their communities. Therefore, it can be argued that a growing Chinese civil society will lead to create a fundamental infrastructure for internal development and contribute to sustainable development of society.

6. After the Reform - Societalization of the Welfare System

The key points of the entire reform of Chinese welfare system can be summarized as follows.

(1) Societalization of the Welfare System

Similar to the case of Japan, ‘big society and small government’ has also become a slogan in China since the mid-1990s (Ma, 2011). As have seen above, Chinese social policy has changed considerably as a result of the reform. China’s welfare system has been moving away from the state welfare model, but towards a more socially divided and market-oriented welfare model (Guan, 2000; Saunders and Shang, 2001). Under the single governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the government has enhanced its efforts for coverage extension for both urban and rural areas, with an intention of creating a new Chinese version of a ‘National Minimum’. As Wong (1998: 71) indicates, there must be an active engagement directed by ‘all strata of society: local communities, mass organizations, work units, families and individuals’.

In the spring of 2000, the Ministry of Civil Affairs officially publicized the so-called policy of ‘societalizing social welfare’. A basic idea of the reform is to societalize the welfare system, namely, involve a wide range of social actors and
institutions in the improvement of public services, with an intention of reducing the government’s financial and administrative responsibility and encouraging more non-governmental actors to participate in welfare provisions (Ma, 2002). The new policy includes communities and private sectors (for-profit or non-profit) as major providers of all kinds of services.

A big difference in Chinese social policy exists between the new market economy and the traditional model of centrally planned economy. In contrast to the traditional system, the central role of the government is not to pay for all kinds of welfare services from the government budget or state enterprises, but to mobilize other recourses, particularly to encourage non-governmental and non-profit organizations in order to share the welfare responsibilities.

With the respect to a series of decisive reforms, there have been significant changes in the roles of various actors, more precisely;

(2) The Public Sector: Government
The Chinese government has insisted on the necessity of meeting increasing demands to tackle the new situation and improving the quality of services. While the government still remains the main actor in the new system, it has transferred large amounts of its traditional roles in financial provider to individuals and other organizations. As a consequence, the reform demonstrated a clear shift in its policy orientation: changes in the welfare delivery system and a transformation of the structure of responsibility. The decline of party control and the state’s withdrawal from society has also resulted in a rapid growth in the voluntary sector and non-governmental welfare agencies in social care (Chen, 2003).

In short, the government’s current welfare responsibility can be summarized as following four characteristics: (1) regulation-maker: to establish the rules and set up criteria for welfare services; (2) administrator: hold accountable for most welfare projects, and control the action of related actors in other welfare programmes; (3) financial provider: although on a limited level, the governmental budget still remains the essential capital for some welfare projects; (4) financial guarantor: in some services such as social insurance, the government remains responsible for guaranteeing financial viability (Guan, 2000).

(3) The Voluntary Sector: NGOs and NPOs
Before the set of reforms, there were no non-governmental agencies officially operating in the field of social welfare in China. In the last few years, however, Chinese NGOs have played important roles in the management of public services, and have offered a number of high-quality services (Chen, 2003). In particular, there has been a rapidly growth in the number of NGOs at various levels since the late of 1990s. At the local level, almost all urban community organizations, namely resident community associations, have provided local community services to local residents. Since those organizations realized that financial budget and resources from the government are limited and no longer able to rely on, they started to take the form of ‘non-governmental’ organizations to mobilize a variety of local financial resources (Guan, 2000). For instance, they have attempted to conduct profitable activities to provide local residents with finance community services, such as personal services for elderly people, the disabled, the poor and children, and even the general provision of public sanitation and public security. Furthermore, some non-governmental and non-profit welfare agencies have been founded to offer personal services, mainly for the elderly. At national and regional levels, some charity societies and non-governmental welfare agencies have developed to offer social services, such as poverty
relief, education, and medical care for poor people in both urban and rural areas. In addition, some international NGOs have also become to offer welfare services and financial aids for local socio-economic development in the poverty areas. The Chinese government indicates that the increasing number of SOs and NGNCEs demonstrates a significant change of Chinese civil society.

(4) Dysfunction of Danwei System: Urban Employment Units

Traditionally, Chinese government provided a set of welfare provisions through ‘danwei (work unit) system’ before the reform, which is a special type of organizations under the planned economy. In other words, work organizations, including enterprises, governmental departments and social organizations took responsibility not only for jobs and earnings but also offered a wide range of goods and services, as well as ideological and organizational incentives for employees and their families.

Since the reform, however, urban enterprises have attempted to reduce their welfare responsibilities. Such changing role of the enterprises has two reasons. First, a series of economic reforms cut off the financial connection between the government and the state enterprises so that all welfare expenditures have to be covered by the enterprises themselves. At the same time, the government has also prevented the enterprises from carrying out basic duty to provide welfare services for their employees.

Second, from the early 1980s the state enterprises were criticized for taking too many social functions along with their main business. Ironically, it is true that danwei system has encouraged dependency and laziness in the workplace. Numerous economists and social welfare researchers emphasize that enterprises should keep their main commercial business as the first priority, and transfer their welfare role into other social organizations to deal with economic efficiency issues. Consequently, the decision whether to offer welfare provisions became a responsibility of state enterprises themselves. Hence, a number of enterprises have diminished their roles in the provision of welfare and certain functions of danwei system have substantially been displaced by the market.

7. The Changing State-Society Relationship in China – A System of ‘Graduated Controls’

As have seen above, since the late 1970s, economic reforms have produced dramatic and extensive changes in Chinese society. The Chinese government has attempted to decentralize state management and reduce the tight control of state-owned enterprises. The state’s withdrawal from the economy has also brought about a great impact on social welfare and other fields. The governmental welfare provision has been reduced to a large extent, since it has no longer to operate a universal welfare system. Moreover, beneficiaries have been required to pay for their services in most fields from social insurance to health care services, housing and education.

At the same time, the development of a market economy and the decline of political control have generated favorable condition to non-governmental activities. Rapid economic growth and social transformations have resulted in a substantial relocation of workers and created new social needs and issues. For instance, tens of millions of rural people have migrated to large cities, creating a huge pressure on all kinds of social services. However, local governments lack the abilities to meet such urgent needs so that they have allowed social services into the market and private sector. The state has recognized the potential of society
and decided to utilize societal monetary and human resources in order to cope with emerging social needs. The voluntary organizations, private non-profit institutions and other social organizations are considered as a reliever to this new situation. As a result, the freedom of Chinese citizens has expanded, many social organizations emerged, and more importantly private spheres opened up. That is to say, the state is gradually withdrawing from many responsibilities toward society.

However, in spite of dramatic changes in economy and society, some researchers insist that the balance of power between state and society still remains the same. The reform did not absolutely change the dominant position of the government, as it was a top-down, ‘government-led reform’ (Ma, 2002). The government just organized the reform as it wished and strengthened its strategies of control over social organizations. Therefore, a system of ‘graduated controls’ is a proper expression to describe the government’s different strategies to different social organizations (Kang and Heng, 2008). Under this system of graduated controls since the 1990s, the state no longer has authority to interfere in every aspect of society. Since the government firmly controls the political and public spheres, social organizations are allowed neither to exist independently nor to challenge the power of the state. Instead, the state utilizes the capabilities of social organizations not only to meet new social needs but also to provide public goods (Kang and Heng, 2008). As a result, the past two decades have witnessed significant progress in non-governmental and non-profit sector in China.

It has been widely discussed that the Chinese government’s tight control against political organizations outside of the state has prohibited numerous voluntary and private institutions from engaging in political issues. Nevertheless, some of the important ideas of civil society have settled into Chinese NGOs, such as citizen participation, volunteerism, a sense of social responsibility and self-confidence. Those concepts have influenced to a new political and cultural atmosphere in China.

V. Discussion: The Differences and Similarities in Diversifying Welfare Responsibilities and Mobilizing the Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector

As have discussed so far, social welfare reforms over the past two decades in both China and Japan have obviously shifted towards the same direction: the reduction of the government’s responsibilities in social welfare; the encouragement of individuals’ role for their well-being; and decreasing public service in most welfare fields. More importantly, the Japanese welfare restructuring and Chinese economic reforms since the 1980s have together brought about the rise of voluntary organizations and changed the fundamental relationship between the state and the VNPO sector. However, it should be noted that the ways in which those organizations emerged are through different contexts and social backgrounds. Therefore, this section in turn focuses on socio-economic and political features that are contributing factors to the recent development of the VNPO sector by examining similarities and differences in characteristics and developments in each countries. A key argument is how the VNPO sector is constituted and located in different contexts of society and how it relates to the government.
1. The Similarities

It can be argued that there are certainly numerous similarities in the development process of the VNPO sector in China and Japan. First, a conceptual term in both countries is an ‘imported idea’ from Western societies. In fact, civil society is a concept alien to Asian. It refers to the self-organization of citizens in contrast to the state or government, and is rooted in the Western tradition and political culture. In western countries, VNPOs have invariably been seen as a barometer of societal health and as a ‘product’ of the existing of civil society (Putnam, 2000).

Second, both countries have experienced initiative rise of NGOs/NPOs in the same year: in 1998. Japan has seen ‘The Year of the Volunteer’ and the NPO Law has been established in 1998. This new NPO law aims to create a more enabling environment for Japanese NPOs and activate citizens’ participate in public services and community activities. On the other hand, it was also in 1998 that the first research center on NGOs in China; the NGORC was founded by Tsinghua University. Its mission is to provide training for senior managers in NGOs, to promote research on Chinese NGOs, to contribute to effective formulation of related public policy, and to help build the capacity in NGOs and civil society.

Third, the early history of mutual aid and the country’s strong central bureaucracy are associated with the growth of the sector in both China and Japan. More specifically, Buddhist and Confucian beliefs can be considered as the fundamental roots in which the voluntary sector have emerged and developed. It is assumed that the substantial tradition of ‘mutual assistant and support’ and ‘volunteering’ in China and Japan derives mainly from the Buddhist and Confucian concepts of community (Lohman, 1995).

Imada (2001) argues that it was indeed voluntary organizations that provided most social work and services in Japan before World War II, since social security offered by the Japanese government was partly limited. Even in the post-war era, a number of people engaged in volunteer activities. University students in Kyoto created volunteer groups in 1947 by referring to the BBS (Big Brothers and Sisters) from the United States as an example. In the early 1970s, local social welfare councils attempted to establish volunteer bureaus and volunteer centers, and at the same time the government were beginning to offer financial assistance to local volunteer centers (Imada 2001; 2006).

2. The Differences

The purpose of the paper is not to emphasize those similarities, but to analyze the significant differences in promoting the sector. The following elements are useful in explaining how the sectors have developed in different ways in China and Japan. One of the most prominent differences lies in the scope and in the approach. First, different levels of social expectation should be highlighted. Social expectation is defined as ‘an internalized social norm for individuals and organizations, thus for society as a whole, about what people should do’ (Hasegawa et al., 2007; 180). In fact, since the 1990s a growing social expectation for the important role of NPOs has been formulated in the Japanese society. Hence, some researchers argue that a special ‘social expectation’ towards voluntarism and motives for volunteering among the public played a primary role in generating a number of non-profit organizational activities and establishing the NPO Law in Japan. Contrary to the case of Japan, it was limited elite groups that directed voluntary activities in China without any impact of social expectation on volunteerism. Moreover, there was neither the dramatic
emergence of associational activities nor citizen-based collaborations among activists, NPOs and media during the 1990s. Only after 2000 did some amount of discussion regarding NGOs displayed through the media and education in the Chinese society.

Second, the activists and leaders who introduced the concept of NPO in Japan were those experienced voluntary and civil activities. In China, however, it was elite groups and charismatic leaders without having experienced of any social activities that involve in the emergence of NGO movements. Since the mid-1990s, citizens have been working on the establishment of local NPO support centers in Japan. The primary goal of such institutions is to provide an effective operating condition for neighborhood NPOs which are rooted in the community to meet local needs. Other missions of local NPO support centers include helping to build partnerships between NGOs, citizens’ groups, businesses, local governments, academia and the media. Japan NPO Center (JNPOC) was established in November 1996 and officially incorporated in June 1998, with an intention of providing infrastructure and support for a number of VNPOs. JNPOC is regarded as a leader in the development of non-profit organizations and civil society in Japan, attempting to support civic activities, to expand the VNPO sector and to help create partnerships between the sector and government. Yoshinori Yamaoka, a founder and managing director of the JNPOC, has experience of working as a volunteering program planner for Toyota Foundation. He is also well-known as the author of a number of publications on Japanese foundations, public non-profit activities. It is important to emphasize that this center was founded by the initiative of leaders of voluntary organizations. With the cooperation and support by Keidanren and the Economic Planning Agency (present-day Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), a mission of the center was to formulate a civil society. Nowadays, a growing number of such infrastructure organizations are established all over Japan.

On the other hand, The term NGO was introduced to China in 1995, when the 4th World Conference on Women of United Nations took place in Beijing. Since then, the words NPO (fei yingli zuzhi) and NGO (fei zhengfu zuzhi) have been commonly used terms among Chinese scholars and media, referring to organizations that are free of the government’ controls and managements (Zhao, 1998). China’s first research institution for these voluntary organizations was founded in 1998, named NGOs Research Center (Tsinghua University). However, different from the case of Japanese NPOs, Chinese NGOs are mostly organized and run entirely by charismatic leaders. For example, Liang Congjie, founder of Friends of Nature (FON), and Liao Xiaoyi, founder of Global Village of Beijing are both remarkable researchers and professors, but have no experiences or any involvement of civil and social activities.

Third, both societies have introduced new concepts with different intentions and aims. In developing and promoting civil organizations and voluntary organizations, the idea of Japanese NPO was adopted as an effective tool to maintain a sustainable action and independence of organizations. In doing so, NPO Law played a significant role in creating an ideal infrastructure for the growth and development of NPOs in Japan. On the other hand, the primary intention of Chinese NGO representatives was neither to make organizations more sustainable nor stable, but to use the concept in order to address serious social problems and provide innovative solutions to them.

Fourth, one can also see the significant
differences in the scale, activity fields and organizational structures. Compared to Chinese NGOs, organizations in Japan have much smaller number of employees and work in compact scale. In addition, in most cases NGOs operating in China have relatively larger incomes and financial resources mainly given by grants of international NGOs, personal savings of founders and small contributions from members. On the other hand, the insufficiency of resources has always been considered as the serious issue of NPOs management in Japan. At present, most of the Japanese groups operate with limited budgets provided by their membership fees and much smaller grants from the public sector and private donations (Tanaka, 2008).

It should be also highlighted that organizations in both societies are specialized for different fields of voluntary activities. In recent years, Japanese NPO activities have gradually expanded the scope of services especially in the field of social welfare services. According to the annual report by the Japanese Cabinet Office, Minister’s Secretariat Volunteering Support Policy Division (2010), at present, more than 40 % of NPOs are engaged in the field of social welfare, health and elderly care services. Therefore, it can be argued that welfare non-profit activities are already at the center of the voluntary sector in Japan. However, different from the situation of Japan, only a few specialized non-governmental welfare organizations have been offering personal and social services, focusing on the issues such as gender, public health, poverty and education (Guan, 2000). Instead, the environmental NGOs, in particular international NGOs have rapidly developed in China and recently expanded their connections with civil society (Tang and Zhan, 2008).

Lastly, both countries vary in the relationships between the state and the voluntary sector, namely; the ways in which the government control and monitor VNPOs. In China, the party-state has attempted to strengthen the government’s control over the state-society relationship. Ma (2011) points out that a number of officially registered non-governmental organizations, foundations and professional associations in China are in fact government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). Indeed, whether such organization should be regarded as NGOs has been a key question among some Chinese scholars of social and public policy. Fisher (1998) concludes that only a handful of Chinese NGOs can be defined as self-supported, self-governed and self-organized organizations, according to Western conceptions of NGOs. In practice, the Chinese current regulatory policy and situation differ from those of Western countries. Therefore, following the government’s rhetorical slogan of ‘small state, big society’, the state has announced that the primary role of NGOs is to reduce the government’s burdens, to help the government carry out all necessary social services, and to bridge the gap between the government and society. Instead of offering large amounts of founding, the government insists that reduction in funds to organizations could encourage them to be autonomous and more motivated (Ma, 2011).

In contrast to the complex and strict regulations for NGOs in China, Japanese NPOs has attempted to gain its own financial sustainability and legitimacy, and to work in partnership with the government. In other words, most NPOs in Japan exist independently of the state and are formed with little government’s control. Many Japanese scholars believe that NPOs need to be active in playing a role in responding to social demands, rather than expecting the government’s help. However, this does not mean that they are enjoying unlimited freedom from the government intervention (Imada, 2006). In this respect, Kawashima (1999) emphasizes that the governmental supervision
needs to play a significant role in avoiding abuse of tax-exempt scheme without lacking organizational flexibility and autonomy. Moreover, the new legislation, NPO Law has substantially contributed to redefine the incorporation process for VNPOs. Applications do not need to require the conventional ‘approval’ (ninka) from the government agency or agencies any more, but just appeal to the prefectural government where the organization operates. This simplified process has substantially reduced the influence of central government agencies to control the activities of organizations.

VI. Concluding Remarks

This paper has outlined the development of the VNPO sector in China and Japan. The different processes and institutional structures within which the VNPO sectors emerged and developed have been described. From the discussion here, it is obvious that the non-profit sector is a significant presence in the two countries. For both societies with changing family structures and aging populations, the development of VNPOs can be regarded as a bridge to fulfill the role of missing family or welfare care of elderly and children.

Furthermore, the two countries have undertaken social policy reforms and institutional reforms to achieve a smaller government. Hence, the path of the reform and development in both societies have resulted in the policy choice to societalize or privatize welfare services and the changing roles of non-governmental and non-profit actors and changing structures of responsibility in providing welfare services. In other words, although to different extents, the two governments have been downsizing and transferring many economic and social responsibilities to a variety of social groups. Evidently, both governments are demonstrating the same goals of promoting the voluntary sectors, but are at the different stages of development.

However, there are significant differences between Japan and China in the governments’ responses to the increasing demands for voluntary activities. For instance, in the ways in which both countries mobilize non-governmental actors and social resources in the field of social welfare. Furthermore, the structure of welfare responsibilities between state-society in contemporary Japan and China is different. The contexts and backgrounds through which VNPOs has emerged are also different. In addition to such differences, each country has adopted a diversity policy of using voluntary and non-profit providers of public services based on their unique characteristics of state-society relations.

This paper concludes that the most significant features contributing to the development of the VNPO sector in China and Japan are the following factors. In the case of Japan, pure volunteerism existed in the sectors’ origins and generated a number of volunteering activities and other community and voluntary organizations. In fact, Japanese NPOs are often derived from grassroots networks: from the bottom-up. As have seen above, the number of registered Japanese NPOs providing local welfare services has been increasing rapidly after the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake which made the Japanese people realize the significance of voluntarism and civil society. Moreover, the 1998 NPO Law and the 2000 Long Term Care Insurance Law have strengthened the infrastructure and offered possibilities of stable funding for VNPOs.

In China, on the other hand, it was the rapid
reform of marketization that promoted the recent development of the VNPO sector. The transition from planned to market economy has created the paradigm shift in social service provision: pluralism and integration of service delivery. As a result, the Chinese government by the 1980s started to recognize the non-governmental efforts as an indispensable part of China’s economic and social development. It acknowledged that the engagement of social organizations through civil society could generate social resources to cover its limited capacity for welfare provisions. Therefore, there was not a mature involvement of civil and social activities at the beginning of the emerging process of VNPOs in China. It was an integrated governmental strategy that promoted non-governmental organizations and other civil organizations with an intention of being able to control and monitor them.

Therefore, it can be concluded that Chinese social policy has been moving away from the traditional state welfare model towards a private welfare model. Instead of adopting a privatization approach, as in some other countries like Japan, the Chinese government prefers a societalization approach to social welfare reform. More and more tight interactions between the state and the sector have taken place in some parts of the country. However, the new policy orientation officially publicized by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 2000 contradicts Chinese traditional social policy, which was basically characterized by its socialist economic system and socialist ideology. In spite of the positive outcomes of the societalization of the welfare system, Chen (2003) suggests that there are still problems regarding the expansion of the voluntary sector in China, such as the poor capacity of management, unsound laws and policies, and ineffective supervision. Under the current situation, the VNPO sector is still very weak and lacks the institutional infrastructure and financial resources. The government encourages non-governmental actors to involve in traditional welfare activities because financial burdens will thus be shared.

More importantly, the fundamental principal of Chinese social policy remains unchanged. That is to say, policy-making in the Chinese government is still mainly dominated by the goals of economic efficiency and political stability, rather than the aims of social welfare (Guan, 2003: 81). Additionally, the Chinese government does not recognize the distinction between private and voluntary services and the role of the voluntary sector (Chen, 2003). The private sector has acquired a dominating role for the public, but has also been criticised for the weak quality of services. This suggests that there are a number of issues which need to be addressed in further development of the VNPO sector in China.

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Notes

1 This paper is based partially on my presentation made at the Sakura Seminar, Tohoku University, April 12, 2012, with some later additions.
2 The ‘Compact’ is an official agreement between the Government and the voluntary sector made in November 1988, signed by the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair.
3 This study is based on the theoretical argument that domestic political institutions are important factors affecting social welfare policy choices. In other words, the institutional structures or policy-making arrangements within governments are especially significant in determining policy developments and state reforms.
4 The idea that state intervention is the best choice to ensure continuous economic development and full employment.
5 This paper uses the terms ‘voluntary sector’ and ‘non-profit sector’ interchangeably.
6 For further elaboration of these features, see Salamon and Anheier (1997).
7 Refer to Li (2008, 11-13).
8 The government agency in charge of registering social organizations.
9 NPO Research Forum was called ‘NPO Promotion Forum’ at that time.
10 For the more details, refer to; Vision and Mission of NPO Support Center http://www.npo-sc.org/content/
11 While the English word NPO has been adopted among scholars and the government particularly for the voluntary sector, terms such as ‘local’ movement and ‘citizens’ group are more well-known in public conversation.
12 Kobe Earthquake took place on 17 January 1995. Its magnitude was 7.2 and more than 6,430 people were killed and over 100,000 houses and buildings were destroyed. Formal denomination of the Earthquake is ‘Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake’.
13 There were only about 6,000 social organizations in China at that time.
14 By the end of 2007, the number of registered NGOs had reached 387,000.
15 Probably, the most famous non-governmental voluntary project is the ‘Hope Project’ (xiwang gongcheng), which began in the 1990s. The goal of this project is supporting young drop-outs and promoting the development of basic education in poverty-stricken areas.
16 One of the first regional NPO centers founded by citizens’ groups was the Osaka NPO Center in November 1996.
17 He is also professor in the Faculty of Social Policy and Administration at Hosei University.
18 Or the Economic Planning Agency, in the case of organizations operating in more than one prefecture.
Part III  Dissertation Summaries

BETWEEN BRAZIL AND JAPAN:
Identities out of Place
Pauline CHERRIER

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL FOR YOUNG MARX’S CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY
CHEN Hao

TRANSFORMATION OF TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY IN MODERN EAST ASIA:
A Typical Case of Political-Academic Interaction in Modern E.S.
LIU Chao

RESEARCH ON ETHNIC NATIONALISM OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
YU Fujian

WOMEN’S IDENTITY FORMATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN:
A Gendered Approach to Faith-Based Volunteering
Paola CAVALERE

JAPAN’S RECALIBRATION OF RISK:
The Framing of North Korea
Ra Mason

GOING TO THE PHILIPPINES IS LIKE COMING HOME:
Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Meiji Era to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
Sven MATTHIESSEN

PLAYING THE SOVEREIGNTY GAME:
Understanding Japan’s Territorial Disputes
Paul O’SHEA

THE POLITICS OF WAR MEMORY IN JAPAN 1990-2010:
Progressive Civil Society Groups and Contestation of Memory of the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945)
Kamila SZCZEPAŃSKA

THE CLUSTER POLICY IN JAPAN AND THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CENTRAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES
HATTORI Akira
I. Introduction

Japan and Brazil are bound together by multiple migration waves: the Japanese first left for Brazil in 1908 and from the 1990s onwards Brazilians have been migrating to Japan, now forming the third largest foreigners’ community of the country (210,032 Brazilians registered in 2012; Ministry of Justice). Indeed, the revision of Japanese immigration law in 1990, allowing foreigners of Japanese origin, also called nikkeijin to work in Japan, triggered off what would also be known in Portuguese as the “dekasegi phenomenon”.

As shown by migrants who carry along their own culture but also reinvent new ones in their host society, cultures are constantly re-defined: this study consists of an analysis of the cultural encounter prompted by migrations between the two countries. Our study of plural identities through places, social practices, modes of expressions, cultural mediations, hopes to unveil the mechanisms at work in identity making processes. We hope to disclose the way both Brazilian national identity was shaped by Japanese immigrants and the way the reverse migration influenced Japanese society and perception of identity.

Our theoretical framing borrows from different fields such as, psychoanalysis of a Lacanian orientation, semiotics and political science, all of them putting forward the paramount importance of language as a political tool of communication. This emphasis on the premise that language lies at the core of any human and social activity, will lead us to pay a special attention to words, naming and designations of the migration and migrants themselves in Brazilian and Japanese public spaces. Our fieldwork embraces discourses circulating in the public space in its traditional acceptation defined by media (newspapers, radio, television) and in the virtual space of Internet (blogs, You Tube, web journalism). Our work will mainly consist in analyzing discourses without trying to evaluate their real influence: we chose to rather focus on their meanings and significations, although knowing that they may only represent a limited portion of migrants’ opinion.

We will first contextualize each migratory movement within its geographical space and history (Part 1) before moving on to the analysis of myths, utopias, clichés and stereotypes of
migrants and what they reveal of Brazilian and Japanese collective imaginaries (Part 2). Our study of representations will be completed by the examination of migrants’ official and institutional representation in political institutions and in the media, Brazilian ethnic media in Japan standing for Brazilians’ main representative and political expression tool (Part 3). Our study will hopefully enable us to attest the political dimension of discourses on identity and culture (or multiculturalism), expressing the tensions existing between what a nation really is and its ideal, what this nation wishes to be, or to become.

II. Historical and Geographical Context of the Japanese-Brazilian Migration

At the beginning of the 20th century, Japan and Brazil were concurrently crafting their political identities on completely opposed concepts. Whereas Japan was relying on an ethnic and cultural homogeneity, Brazil was relying on multi-ethnicity and plurality. A sort of inferiority complex shadowed both Brazilian and Japanese national identities. Brazil’s advocacy for miscegenation was a way to phase out Brazilians’ black and indigenous origins, considered shameful, and Japan’s obsession in legitimating its uniqueness had to do with its complex towards China, Korea and then the West. At the same time in history, both countries turned to Europe, the ‘West’, to look for new models for a modernized political identity. While Japan claimed its homogeneity to prevent foreigners to ever become Japanese, Brazil’s professed miscegenation would allow any foreigner to become Brazilian.

Japanese immigrants who carried with them Japanese nationalism from the Meiji era had to find their own space in a modernizing Brazil, which was also in search of its own collective identity. A century later, Japanese-Brazilians will bring their Brazil to Japan, forcing the latter to experience multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism.

The Meiji era was a period of great changes for Japanese economy mainly prioritizing industrial development, excluding most farmers to benefit from economic growth. Rural exodus, limited opportunities in the job market as well as rapid population growth incited the government to actively promote emigration as a means to relieve the economic crisis of the farming sector.

At the end of the 19th century, Japanese emigration was first directed to Hawaii, the West coast of the United States and then to Canada. In 1908, as a result of American hostility against Japanese immigrants, California’s gentleman’s agreement banned further Japanese immigration to the United States. Later on, international depression of the 1920s combined with Japanese military conquests in Asia prompted fears against Japan, seen as the Yellow peril. In 1924 the Quota Immigration Act definitively banned Japanese emigration to the United States, redirecting emigration flows entirely towards Brazil. Japan would then try to guarantee a successful integration of Japanese emigrants, imposing new conditions for emigration (family migration) and aiming at migrants’ permanent settlement. Although Japanese immigrants were brought to Brazil to work in coffee plantations in order to replace former slaves, they were lured into believing that Brazil was a “golden land” where they could achieve rapid success and wealth.

Nonetheless, hostility against them would soon rise in Brazil as well where Getulio Vargas overthrew the ruling elite by a military coup in
1930. Throughout the 1930s, Getulio Vargas would progressively transform Brazil into a dictatorship. Ethnic miscegenation was by then a means to a political end to achieve a “racial democracy”. Brazilian modern national identity was theorized by Gilberto Freyre as the result of miscegenation between white Portuguese colonizers, black African slaves and indigenous Indians. Brazilian white ruling elite favored ethnic miscegenation with white people, thought of as an element of modernization. Brazilian authorities also imposed assimilationist policies on ethnic minorities: as Japanese immigrants were believed to resist both ethnic and cultural assimilation to Brazil, their immigration was restricted in 1934 and in 1937.

When Brazil officially took part in World War II in 1942 on the side of the Allied forces, the Japanese were seen as political threats suspected of plotting against Brazilians. Submitted to violent assimilationist pressures (Japanese schools were shut down, Japanese newspapers and language forbidden), radical Japanese immigrants actually enrolled in nationalist armed groups, the most famous of which was Shindô Renmei. When Japan lost the war, Kachigumi Japanese tried to persuade other immigrants that Japan had in reality won the war. Makegumi Japanese who had resigned themselves to endorse Japan’s actual defeat, also giving up on their ideal of ever coming back to Japan, were the victims of Shindô Renmei’s attacks, accused by them of betraying Japanese nation and emperor.

Caught between Japanese and Brazilian nationalisms, Japanese prewar emigrants eventually remained in Brazil. Their contribution in the agricultural field and their rapid upward social mobility in São Paulo city (in the 1970s a great number of nisei enrolled in top ranking University of São Paulo) helped them to be positively seen as a “model minority”. Japan’s investments and opening of joint ventures in Brazil in the 1970s as well as its rise as the second biggest economic power worldwide also served their good reputation. Overall, the Japanese social and economic integration in Brazil helped them altering the prejudices they suffered from during the war. Mainly working as highly qualified workers and white collars in Brazil, rampant inflation and economic crisis throughout the 1980s led Japanese-Brazilians to massively leave for Japan to work in factories. 1990’s revision of Japanese immigration law aimed at resolving Japanese labor force shortage while preserving ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Contrary to Japanese authorities’ expectations, Nikkei-Brazilians experienced cultural shocks at their arrival in Japan, compelling them to identify as Brazilians and no longer as Japanese.

The majority of Nikkei-Brazilians came from an urban and multiethnic background, leaving the city of São Paulo for Japanese remote industrial areas. Therefore dekasegi migrants in Japan had to adapt to a new professional factory environment and to new spatial bearings.

São Paulo is indeed known as the economic capital of Latin America and as one of the most dangerous and violent cities in the world. Grinding poverty of the many coexists with the wealth of the few creating an atmosphere of permanent violence and insecurity. Brazilians’ perception and experience of public space were filled with fear and insecurity reflecting the inherent division of Brazilian society.

In Japan, Brazilians’ settlements generally follow factories’ economic needs. As they make up a flexible thus mobile workforce, they are likely to be found wherever and whenever their labor is needed. Most of the first dekasegi migrants were mainly single men intending to save money before returning to Brazil hired in car assembly and electronic factories in the Kantô region (Gunma, Nagano, Kanagawa, Saitama and Ibaraki...
prefectures). From 1993 to 1997 subcontractors running small businesses hired them in remote areas far from the Aichi-Shizuoka-Gunma axis, such as Nagano prefecture.

From 1998 onwards, Brazilians moved to the Southwestern part of the country: Aichi, Gifu, Mie, Shiga and Shizuoka prefectures. Dekasegi migrants’ difficulty to re integrate Brazilian labor market combined with the latent possibility to work in Japan for better wages often caused them be caught in a migrating vicious circle. As family migration began replacing single men’s migration, Nikkei-Brazilian communities emerged and brokers’ agencies (hiring companies) no longer rented collective dorms but rather individual housing. In public housing complexes (kôdan-ken’ei jûtaku), which access is available for low-wage workers, cohabitation problems between Japanese and Brazilians often occurred. Complains about Brazilians’ lack of respect of common rules such as selective sorting of waste, noise, and car parking were recurrent. Cultural contentions also emerged from Brazilians’ social and cultural recreational practices: while Japanese are used to socialize in bars and izakaya, Brazilians are accustomed to have friends over in their apartment. Reproaching Brazilians with being too loud, not only in public space, but also in their own private spaces, may derive from their actual need to (re) create social ties in Japan. While such behaviors may be interpreted as communitarian, they also testify Brazilians’ integration to the country.

In cities with a strong presence of Brazilians, such as Hamamatsu (Aichi prefecture), Brazilian ethnic businesses and facilities developed to such an extent that Brazilians could almost live with no ties to Japanese society. While Nikkei- Brazilians were expected to be physically and culturally Japanese, their display of cultural Brazilian-ness caused the disruption of Japan’s harmonious public space. In remote and rural areas, cultural discrimination may have encouraged the strengthening of Nikkei-Brazilian communities. Yet again some communitarian behaviors may derive from Brazilian social practices. In Brazil, their higher social status is a reason to feel threatened when in public space, they tend to gather in closed places (like shopping centers). In Japan, these closed places serve to recreate a space protecting them from their loss of social status within mainstream society.

Whereas dekasegi migration was initially thought of as temporary, Nikkei Brazilians actually settled down in Japan over the past 20 years. In 2008, one third of Brazilians had changed their temporary visa (teijûsha) for a permanent resident visa (eijûsha). Yet in 2009, post-Lehman shock’s economic crisis caused the majority of Brazilians to lose their jobs, also leading some of them to return to Brazil.

### III. Cultural and Aesthetical Dimensions of the Migration

How migrants identify themselves and are identified in political discourses reveal the evolution of their status in their society of origin and in their host society. Indeed, Japanese prewar emigrants saw themselves as ‘dekasegi imin’, temporary migrants in Brazil. However, Japan sent them to colonies, shokumin-chi, offering facilities (schools, associations, banks, etc.) in order to encourage their permanent and successful settlement, ijid, in Brazil. Such emigration policy was then qualified of, kimin seisaku, dumping policy, uncovering migrants’ feelings.

According to the Brazilian myth of origin, Brazilians are divided between ethnic categories,
Blacks, Whites, Indians and mixed blood Brazilians. There are Brazilian words for mixed-blood Brazilians of white and black descent, of white and indigenous descent and of black and indigenous descent, yet there is none for Brazilians of Japanese origin. The Japanese in Brazil are basically called “Japanese” in Portuguese. This lack of naming reveals both Brazilian reluctances to ethnically embrace the Japanese as Brazilians and Japanese reluctances to marry with Brazilians (endogamy prevailed among first and second generation immigrants, issei and nissei).

Identified as Japanese in Brazil, Nikkei-Brazilians discovered their cultural Brazilian-ness in Japan. Newly identified as Brazilians in Japan, they suffered from the image of Brazil as a third world country. As factory workers they were socially looked down upon. And eventually as Nikkei who did not culturally behave like the Japanese, they were put aside.

Yet Brazilians in Japan form a compound category made of a minority of non-Nikkei Brazilians and a majority of Nikkei Brazilians among which we find “pure” (ethnically Japanese) Nikkei and mixed-blood Nikkei-Brazilians. Mixed-blood Nikkei-Brazilians, like other mixed-blood Japanese, commonly called ha-fu (from the English ‘half’), are more easily subject to identity category switching. Thanks to the valorization of ha-fu images in Japanese media from the 1960s onwards, mixed-blood Nikkei-Brazilians now often work as models in Japan. In Brazil, they are more likely to identify as fully Brazilian than “pure” Nikkei Brazilians with Japanese physical traits. In Japan, they also have access to careers as models as opposed to “pure” Nikkei Brazilians who just look like the Japanese. Yet those Nikkei-Brazilian models are mainly hired in Japan because they are cheaper than other foreign models (they already live in Japan and some of them speak Japanese), therefore remaining, like their dekasegi families, defined by their economic function. Brazilians’ identity in Japan is mainly shaped by their working experience as unqualified dekasegi workers hired for temporary contracts: their social position overpowers their ethnic origin.

In contrast, Japanese-Brazilians already seen as successful by other Brazilians, were considered as privileged emigrants, lucky to have access to the first world’s wealth. Brazil, like most emigration countries, fostered a myth of emigrants’ success abroad. Nikkei-Brazilians’ migration to Japan inscribed them into a mythical fate of success providing them with a transcendent interpretation of their reality.

The rhetoric of Brazilians’ success is used in advertising campaigns of Brazilian banks specialized in international transfers. Thanks to their savings earned in Japan, Brazilian companies incite dekasegi migrants to become successful entrepreneurs in Brazil. The promotion of the entrepreneur figure, whether in Brazil or Japan, enhances the concern of migrants’ potential loss of control over their lives. Myths of success hardly conceal migrants’ disillusionments and failures: deceived expectations coincide with every stages of migrants’ ordeal. For Nikkei-Brazilians, deception is a two way process. As much as they were lured into imagining Japan as a welcoming motherland, the Japanese deluded themselves with the idea that they would be culturally similar to them, as confirms ex-ministry of Justice Kono Taro when he assessed that Nikkei Brazilians’ migration w as a failure.

Severed from their country of origin, migrants create fantasized images no longer matching their country’s reality. When in Japan, dekasegi migrants experience saudade, nostalgia for a sublimated Brazil, and undergo the ‘head in two worlds syndrome’, torn between Japan and Brazil. Their experience of saudade led them to establish Brazilian communities. As facilities and ethnic
shops provide them with everything they could find in Brazil, they may eventually stay longer in Japan, postponing their coveted return to Brazil, meanwhile strengthening their bonds in Japan.

Nikkei-Brazilians carry the weigh of (un)success yet only the ones whose experience in Japan led them to succeed in Brazil positively reintegrate the Brazilian myth of Japanese immigrants’ success. The rest of them will either be seen as unsuccessful Nikkei-Brazilians in Brazil or become Brazilian emigrants in Japan, leaving their home country behind them. Migrants are confronted with experiences of displacement, nostalgia, regain or loss of control, success and failure. Their discourses testify of their attempt to seize power over their new identity. Indeed, Nikkei-Brazilian artists, whether in Japan or in Brazil, show attempts to escape from the stereotypes society confines them in. In Brazil, most of Nikkei-Brazilian artists’ attempts to escape from Japanese exotic stereotypes seem to fall through. Whether they play Brazilian pagode or other Afro-Brazilian types of music, they are always reminded of their Japanese origin by non-Nikkei Brazilians, hence their hyphenated identification as Nikkei-Brazilians rather than Brazilians (Lesser; 2003). Nikkei-Brazilian artists assuming their double identity, mostly fall into the category of “community artists” as karaoke singers whose audience is mainly composed of other Nikkei-Brazilians.

In Japan, mainstream representations of Brazilian culture in Tokyo are devoid of immigrants’ influences. Music, bossa nova, samba, Nikkei Brazilian models, etc. epitomize Tokyo’s exotic images of Brazil disconnected from Brazilians’ reality in Japan. Asakusa samba carnival became one of Tokyo’s most touristic attractions although its participants and organizers are mainly Japanese. On the one hand, Brazilian immigrants’ culture is excluded from displays of Brazilian-ness in Tokyo, but on the other, the official representation of Brazilians’ culture in local areas (Oizumi carnival) is also framed by Japan’s multicultural policy.

Since 2006, Japanese Ministry of Communication and Internal Affairs launched the promotion of multicultural coexistence, tabunka kyōsei, as a national objective. Japanese multiculturalism came into effect for the translation in different languages of administrative documents and emergency natural catastrophes and for the organization of multicultural festivals at local levels. While displays of foreigners’ typical cultures are supposed to create a better understanding of their cultural differences, they may also fuel the myth of Japanese ethnic and cultural homogeneity: confronted to foreigners’ differences, the Japanese may eventually be reassured about their own cultural integrity.

Tokyo’s demand for exoticism and Japan’s official multicultural framework in local areas are both restraining the representation of Brazilian culture. Therefore, unfiltered Brazilian migrants’ culture is only visible in Brazilian community spaces supported by Brazilian ethnic media. Hip-hop, as a cultural movement created by under-represented minorities to raise their voice and political claims, provides Nikkei-Brazilian artists with consistent tools of expression, enabling them to gain public representation.

IV. Political and Institutional Dimensions of the Migration

Nowadays, most Nikkei-Brazilians in Japan feel they are neither represented in Brazil nor in Japan. As opposed to oldcomers whose fight for better political representation derives from their
feeling of belonging to Japan, Nikkei-Brazilians’ illusion of pending return to Brazil long kept them away from any political commitment. However Brazilians’ actual settlement in Japan called for a better political representation especially in localities where they form important communities. Lacking of national guidelines for their treatment and integration in Japan, local authorities had to find solutions by themselves. Since 2001, the Congress of Major cities with high concentrations of foreign residents (gaikokujin shuju toshi kaigi) strives to gain more attention from national authorities regarding newcomers’ related issues such as education, social security, alien registration problems. Indeed, one of newcomers’ major problems is the education of Brazilian children. Adaptation troubles faced by Brazilian newcomer children in Japanese schools (language, ijime, etc.) coupled with the lack of obligation of education for foreign children in Japan caused many of them to drop out of school. Most of Brazilian private schools do not permit their students to pursue higher education in Japanese universities, and sometimes not even in Brazilian universities. Caught between limited future perspective for studies and precarious studying conditions, some Brazilian teenagers give up school at an early age to start working in factories. Others may even, in some extreme cases, fall into delinquency.

The Brazilian question in Japan took a radical turn when 2008’s economic crisis caused Brazilians to massively lose their jobs and emphasized the need for a better organization and representation of the community. Communitarian Brazilian leaders formed in February 2009 the NNBJ, National network for Brazilians in Japan, as an attempt to put an end to Brazilians’ disorganization and to transfer Brazilians’ claims to Japanese authorities. Although criticized, NNBJ remains the first national attempt to structure Brazilian communities of Japan. Until then, Brazilian ethnic media mainly guaranteed their representation.

At the turn of the 21st century, Brazilian media in Japan merely consisted in two weekly newspapers International Press and Jornal Tudo Bem and of Brazilian cable television. During the first years of Brazilian emigration to Japan, ethnic media played a structuring role providing dekasegi workers with practical information for daily life in Japan, such as job offers, and conveyed information about Brazil for emigrants to stay connected with their home country’s reality. Along with the establishment of Brazilian communities, newspapers shifted their focus from Brazilian news to community-oriented topics.

Brazilian ethnic media in Japan developed its own practices, increasingly hiring ex-dekasegi workers (mostly factory workers) often without any prior experience in this field. This practice allows ethnic media to make greater financial benefits and guarantees Brazilian ethnic media to closely stay closely connected to migrants’ reality and to eventually represent them appropriately. Brazilian ethnic media endorses the role of Nikkei-Brazilians’ community spokesman, following and guiding the evolution and change of migrants’ status in their host society. Accordingly, when in 2008 Japan’s economic crisis made it necessary for Brazilians to master Japanese in order to integrate new sectors of the job market, International Press started publishing articles in Japanese with lexical support.

The advent of Internet contributed transforming media contents as well as journalism practices. Brazilians growing connection to Internet in Japan granted them with powerful tools of self-expression, sometimes acting on the web as self-taught journalists. Their cyber activity through You Tube channels, blogs or social networks may incite them to think of themselves as global citizens virtually participating in the creation of a borderless world and to identify as citizens.
of the world. Yet, Internet users actually reterritorialize the web by creating their own community spaces. Brazilians in Japan gather in social network “Orkut” communities dedicated to life in Japanese cities (for example “Brazilians in Hamamatsu”), using the Internet to reinforce their links with their community rather than filling in communication bridges with the Japanese. The Internet fuels Brazilians’ identity redefinition in Japan, endowing them with a virtual refuge for a potentially repressed cordiality, since they may not have completely achieved their integration in their Japanese social environment.

When 2008 officially became the year of Japan-Brazil exchange; Brazil and Japan jointly celebrated the centenary of Japanese immigration to Brazil and Nikkei-Brazilians gained unprecedented attention in Brazilian mass media. In Brazil, Japanese immigration was even celebrated in Brazilian carnival, a key event in the formation of Brazilian national identity, indicating its incorporation into Brazil’s national history and mythology. Nonetheless, Japanese-Brazilians, up the sixth generation, are still identified as Japanese: according to some media reports it would be more “natural” for them to enjoy the practice of judo, as a Japanese traditional martial art, than liking soccer, Brazil’s national sport. Although culturally integrated, Nikkei-Brazilians seem to have not yet been included within the boundaries of Brazilian ethnic identity. However, since the Japanese are positively perceived, this exclusion is not discriminatory.

Nikkei-Brazilians living in Japan were rather excluded from 2008’s commemorations. The celebrations of the centenary mainly put the emphasis on Japanese immigration to Brazil, putting aside the representation of Brazilian emigration to Japan. Immigrants-oriented celebrations for the centenary only took place in cities with high concentrations of Brazilians, but were absent from Tokyo. Only the Japanese emperor, as he stated Japan’s need to welcome Brazilians as much as the Japanese were welcomed in Brazil a century ago, actually paid them an official tribute, symbolically including them within 2008’s festivities. Brazilians of Japan rather gained media attention at the end of 2008, when the economic crisis stroke Japan (Lehman shock). When Japanese exportations decreased of 40% in one year especially in the electronic and car manufacturing sectors, Brazilian workers massively lost their jobs. Since a great number of Brazilians were living in apartments provided by their brokers’ agencies and also did not automatically benefit from unemployment insurance, losing their job led them to lose any kind of income and become homeless.

Sudden rise of precariousness among Brazilians was greatly covered by Japanese and Brazilian media. The disclosure on Brazilian television of Nikkei-Brazilians’ hardships in Japan debunked the myth of their success, especially in the eyes of non-Nikkei Brazilians. However in Japan, Nikkei-Brazilians’ portrait during the crisis actually matched previous prejudices towards both Japanese emigrants and Nikkei-Brazilian immigrants essentially depicted as unfortunate victims. Yet Brazilian workers, far from remaining passive during the crisis, demonstrated for the first time in December 2008 in Hamamatsu city to protest against their unfair treatment calling on Japanese authorities to take political steps. Brazilians’ protests spread in major cities as well as in industrial areas where unemployment among Brazilians sometimes attained 70%, and even reached Tokyo. Brazilians’ demonstration in Tokyo, thoroughly covered by main Japanese media, turned their crisis into a national issue no longer relegated to the background.

Japanese authorities were prompt to react and Japanese Ministry of education (MEXT) took
emergency measures in the field of education as soon as in January 2009. MEXT’s emergency plan supported Japanese schools to accept more Brazilian students and provided some Brazilian schools with financial help to prevent them from shutting down. As far as work was concerned, Japanese Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare (MHLW) recommended Japanese companies to train Brazilian workers thanks to Japanese language and professional qualification courses. Such training courses were offered and implemented by local Hello Work agencies where additional bilingual staff was sent for the occasion. This first set of measures constituted one of Japan’s first national demonstrations of will to actually integrate Brazilians, helping them to change their social position through work and education. While Brazilians’ withdrawal in ethnic communities had been tolerated during two decades, Japan now insisted that they should fully integrate Japanese society.

In contrast, the kikokushien jigyô, a controversial financial help for return, officially encouraged Brazilians to go back home. Starting from April 2009, unemployed Brazilians and their families were granted respectively 300,000 yen and 200,000 yen to cover air transportation fees to Brazil, on condition that they would not return to Japan before three years (April 2012). This “return plan” was interpreted as a cancellation of Nikkei’s visa “privilege” in Japan, and as a way to “get rid” of them. In only one year Brazilian population in Japan decreased of 14.4%: 312,582 Brazilians were registered in 2008 against 267,456 in 2009 (MOJ; 2010). However, only 20,000 of the approximately 45,000 Brazilians who returned home actually did so with Japan’s financial help.

Japan’s help for Nikkei-Brazilians’ return actually disclosed the country’s uncertainties as far as immigration is concerned. It also confirmed that in a context of economic turmoil, identity protectionist reflexes come first and command Japanese immigration policy still guided by a utilitarian and short-term vision. Brazilians had always been considered as means to an economic end, and their presence in Japan was only tolerated as long as they could serve national economy. In 2009, Brazilians were summoned to either rapidly integrate into Japanese society or leave the country, causing most of them to feel rejected and used.

V. Conclusion

Nikkei-Brazilians may have discovered their Brazilian-ness in Japan, but they have created over years a new identity maybe not yet Japanese but surely no longer entirely Brazilian. Their encounter with the Japanese gave way to new identities shaking and challenging common acceptations of Japanese national myths. Often subjected to reality’s economic or historical constraints, migrants embody the real dimension of the political field: they compel nations to face their obligations. Immigrants also confront nations with their ideals, offering them a new image of themselves that they may accept or refuse to acknowledge. Ethnic or cultural tensions arise when nations show reluctances to accept their new real face, thus denying immigrants’ contribution to the renewal of their identity.

Multiculturalism will only become real if Japan accepts to fully acknowledge foreigners: their culture as well as their social rights and contribution for the future of the nation. To do so, Japan would have to think of foreigners as
potential forces, not only in the restricted domains of economy or fashion, and implement social policies to relieve them from bearing the burden of integrating Japanese society only by their own means.

Japan is changing. As witnesses 2009’s historic change of government, Murata Renho’s nomination in Kan Naoto’s Cabinet in June 2010 provided hopes for a better consideration of plural identities. Since immigrants’ presence in their host society is not seen as given, they must strive to conquer their position and space. If welcomed by their host societies, when they achieve social integration, immigrants may, as Roberto Da Matta used to say about ethnographers, turn the exotic images they carry along into more familiar ones, and maybe one day into national ones.
This essay is about the philosophical foundation of Marx’s civil society theory. Its aim is to reveal the significance of the concept of the individual for Young Marx’s distinctive civil society theory. Concerning the relation between society and the individual, for a long time we have accepted the conclusion that Marx pays his main attention to the concept of society not to that of the individual. In other words, the very element which distinguishes Marx from his processors and lays the foundation for Marx’s civil society theory is his discovery and emphasis on the concept of society, rather than the concept of the individual. In young Marx’s view, serves as the foundation of his civil society theory.

In concrete terms, this essay consists of the following three theoretical points:

1. Different from the previous studies which take materialism and communism as the two landmarks of Marx’s social theory, this essay lays its emphasis on the concept of civil society, and considers that Hegel’s distinctive civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) theory, which draws its main inspiration both from Hobbes’s political civil society theory and Smith’s economic civil society theory, is the direct start-point of Young Marx’s thought. But the point is, originally Hegel’s understanding of civil society theory incorporates two main contrast principles, the principle of individuality (or the principle of particularity, which means each individual is his own end and takes others as means owing to the opposition and conflict among individuals in civil society) and the principle of sociality (or the principle of universality, which means each individual can only achieve his own end by satisfying others’ needs through the communication and unity among individuals). Due to the limitation of economic knowledge and Feuerbach’s great influence, at first Marx fails to comprehend and inherit the both principles of Hegel’s civil society theory, instead merely partly accepts the principle of individuality and considers his own civil society as a private sphere filling with opposition and conflict among particular individuals only. Therefore, we could say, when relying on Hegel’s great theoretical heritage to conceive his civil society theory, Marx drives himself on a tortuous way.

2. However, to some extent, such a tortuous
way should not be regarded as an obstacle but a necessary help for Marx to develop his own civil society theory. In other words, it is through such a tortuous way that Marx has found and accepted the positive aspect of the principle of individuality, namely the subjectivity in philosophy, private ownership in economy and individual rights in politics, based on which Marx further in *Paris Notebooks* discovers the principle of sociality contained in Hegel’s civil society theory. Marx thereby conceives his unique civil society as a social communication formation where the indirect communication relationships among different individuals’ personalities show themselves in the direct exchange relationships of commodity to commodity based on private ownership and division of labor. In other words, in contrast with traditional research’s concentration on the separation and conflict among different classes in capitalist society, this essay focuses on the communication among particular individuals in civil society.

Moreover, Young Marx’s civil society theory belongs to a tripartite social formation theory consisted of traditional society, civil society and future society according to the distinction of “community” (*Gemeinschaft*) and “society” (*Gesellschaft*). In a word, according to their respective relations about the individual and its society, Marx’s three social formations can be clarified as follow: in traditional society the individual has to subordinate to the external substantive social relations and cannot get its independence from the society; in civil society the social relations are the products of different individuals’ communication activities and become the manifestations of individuals’ concrete communication relations, the individual thereby gets its independence from the society in appearance; in future society the separated individuals re-associate with each other to re-control their common social relations by inheriting their developed skills and mutual relations created in civil society, and finally get their real independence from the society. Considering Marx’s account of the relationship between the individual and society, civil society and future society belong to the same type, where social relations are created by different separated individuals and could be re-controlled by associated individuals; traditional society is a type of its own, where community as a naturally formed social formation has absolute authority and priority to individuals, meanwhile, individuals in traditional society has neither will nor ability to question the rationality and legality of such natural social relations. For Marx, the social formation he affirms is evidently future society, which shares many elements in common with the traditional, yet it bases on civil society which differs from it almost in every aspect in appearance. However, civil society has kept its consistence with future society at one most important point, asserting the priority of the individual to its social relations.

Given for a long time, the concept of civil society in Marx has been equated with his another famous concept of capitalist society, and has not received its deserved attention, before passing to it, this essay will give a brief description of the two concepts, without which this essay’s point would be unintelligible.

About the concept of civil society in Marx this essay mainly profits from the excellent studies of Japanese scholars. It is Japanese scholars who first distinguish civil society from capitalist society and pay their special attentions to the former. The initial pioneer is Utida Yoshihiko, the Japanese Smith studies expert, who comes to the important conclusion that the concept of civil society means a certain social formation different from capitalist society on the one hand, the general economic foundation of different social
formations on the other. (Utida Yoshihiko, 1953)

As enlightened by Utida, the economist Hirata Kiyokaki further explores the concept of civil society in Marx, who considers capitalist society as a certain developing phase of civil society by reemphasizing the significance of several key concepts in Marx, such as “ownership”, “division of labor” and “communication”, etc. To be specific, Hirata primarily defines “civil society” as a social communication formation among different individuals based on the private ownership, labor and division. For Hirata, the capitalist society is only a variant and distortion of civil society, where capitalist ownership replaces the private ownership of civil society and meanwhile wage labor replaces the individual labor. However, even in this “variant” form (capitalist society) which should be fiercely criticized, it is the personality “communication” relationship constructed by civil society that functions as its theory background and operation axis. Therefore, Hirata attempts to divert his research core from the criticism of “capitalist society” to the investigation of “civil society”. (Hirata Kiyokaki, 1969)

Following Hirata’s pioneering studies on civil society, a series of Japanese scholars including Mochizuki Seiji and Utida Hiroshi etc. continue to study on the works of Young Marx, especially Paris Manuscripts and The German Ideology, so as to further reconstruct Marx’s civil society theory in his early years. Thanks to these researches, the applicability and explanation power of civil society theory created by Hirata has been successfully extended to Marx’s all other works. In brief, If we could say that Hirata devotes his researches to defend “private ownership” (Privateigentum) of civil society, which is the premise of “individual ownership” (individuelles Eigentum) in future society by dint of emphasizing the significance of “ownership and exchange” in Marx’s Grundrisse, then as supplementary, Mochizuki’s study is to demonstrate the importance of civil society with “estrangement and division of labor” as the core concept, mainly based on Paris Manuscripts (especially Comments on James Mill and Third Manuscript) of Marx in early years. Considering the importance of Japanese scholars’ studies on Marx’s civil society theory, for the sake of showing this essay’s characteristics, it would be a wise strategy to give a short introduction to Japanese scholars’ contributions and meanwhile point out their limitations.

Firstly, Japanese scholars trace the theoretical origin of Marx’s civil society to Hegel by emphasizing the affinity between Hegel’s civil society theory and classical economics. We all know according to Hegel, the individual freedom or will is presented in three different forms corresponding to three different spheres, the family, civil society and the state. Among which the family is the direct presentation of the principle of universality or sociality, while civil society is the expression of the principle of individuality or particularity. And the state is the real sphere embodying the both principles. However, acting as the medium between the family and the state, to some extent civil society also contains the two principles. In concrete terms, being out of the disintegration of the family that presented the principle of direct intercommunity and sociality, civil society firstly shows itself as the ethical separated status, i.e. atomic isolated individuals or the battlefield for private interests, where all people oppose against all people and each individual regards other individuals as means to his own ends. Therefore, on the one hand civil society is a territory featured with particularity and individuality. On the other hand, for Hegel it is also an economic society in Smith’s sense, which indirectly integrates isolated individuals with each other based on the system of demands and division of labor and exchange, so for Hegel civil
society also embodies the principle of universality or sociality. However, Hegel does not trust in the universality or sociality presented by civil society based on classical economics, so he moreover sets some external elements of universality or sociality such as the administration of justice, the police and the cooperation to lead and coordinate the operation of civil society. This behavior results in the previous Hegelian study paying too much attention to the influence of quasi-political elements such as the “corporations” on the civil society, while much less to the universality or sociality principle based on the classical economics. To the contrary, Japanese scholars (Mochizuki Seiji and Yamanouchi Yasushi) especially emphasize the universality or sociality of this economic “system of needs” included in Hegel’s civil society and explores its affinity with classical economics. In virtue of criticizing Hegel’s philosophy of right, Marx gets his own problem awareness of civil society. Originally, since containing both of the principles, Hegel’s civil society theory could be the best starting point for Marx to conceive his own theory of civil society, but unfortunately, Marx fails to inherit the two principles of civil society from Hegel, but only observes the principle of particularity or individuality simply.

Secondly, Japanese scholars pay their special attentions to the role of Paris Manuscripts (especially Comments on James Mill) in the transformation of Marx’s civil society theory. As mentioned above, though Hegel’s civil society theory has already included the two aspects (individuality in the principle of particularity and sociality in the principle of universality) that Marx needed, unfortunately Marx at first only notices the particularity aspect and fails to inherit the universality aspect due to several causes when writing his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Therefore, for Marx his civil society theory has experienced a complicated development process. Japanese scholars (Mochizuki Kiyoshi and Yamanouchi Yasushi) are disposed to define this period from Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right to Paris Manuscripts. In other words, they consider civil society as the research focus of Marx when writing Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, but Marx at that time understood Hegel in a totally conservative way owing to the practical political campaign and the influence of Feuerbach, which makes Marx just observe the particularity or individuality principle of Hegel’s civil society, i.e. the separated and opposing individuals, but ignore the universality or sociality elements included in civil society, i.e. the new social integration formation which connects different individuals together based on labor, demand, division of labor and exchange. It is not until Paris Manuscripts Marx discovers and inherits the universality or sociality aspect of civil society upon his own study on the classical economics, and since then develops his grand critical theory against civil society.

The above two points are the contributions Japanese scholars have made to Marx’s civil society theory studies. But they also have their limitations. Firstly, when reconstructing Marx’s civil society theory, Japanese scholars’ over-stress on the principle of universality or sociality results in their comparatively overlook of the principle of particularity or individuality. As we know, Japanese scholars (Mochizuki Seiji and Yamanouchi Yasushi) have no doubt kept a positive attitude to the universality or sociality aspect and take it as the foundation of Marx’s civil society theory. However, it is also the fact that they ignore the importance and significance of the particularity or individuality aspect. Generally speaking, Japanese scholars merely acknowledge the particularity or individuality aspect of Marx’s civil society in a limited sense, namely consider that in virtue of it
Marx has reversed the determining relationship between civil society and the state set by Hegel and taken civil society as the economic base of the state. Moreover, according to them, it is the too much attention Marx has paid to the very particularity or individuality aspect in the name of materialism influenced by the estrangement theory that prevents Marx from inheriting the principle of universality or sociality of civil society from Hegel when writing *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. As a result, Marx has to postpone the discovery and inheritance until his direct study on the economics in 1844. (Yamanouchi Yasushi, 2011) According to Mochizuki, if we regard the thoughts development of Marx in early years as the process of understanding of the two principles of civil society, i.e. from the initial understanding of the particularity or individuality aspect to the final understanding of the universality or sociality aspect, then we could say that the particularity or individuality aspect helps Marx reverse the determining relationship of civil society and the state, but meanwhile prevents Marx from understanding the indirect universality or negative elements in social communications among different individuals. Marx in his late years has mentioned the reification of communications and the direct personality communications hidden under commodities exchange in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, and Mochizuki and other scholars view the particularity or individuality aspect of the civil society based on the “indirect” and “hidden” sense. In other words, it is because Marx has not discovered the hidden universality or sociality aspect under the individuality and particularity that he does not understand the sociality or universality aspect of civil society.

On the contrary, this essay considers that it is hard to understand Marx’s civil society theory properly without understanding the principle of individuality or particularity both in its negative and positive sense, and believes that the principle of individuality is not only the presentation of so-called ethical separation that shall be criticized in the theory of civil society, but also the reflection of the autonomy and independence of individuals established by modern enlightenment, which is the most important feature distinguishing civil society from traditional community and shall be promoted. In contrast with the thought that the principle of individuality or particularity prevents Marx from understanding and inheriting of the principle of universality or sociality from Hegel’s civil society theory, this essay believes that it is the acknowledgement of the particularity principle that separates Marx’s theory of civil society from other Young Hegelians and “real socialists” exactly. In other words, it is upon the acknowledgement and establishment of the principle of individuality or particularity — including the consciousness subjectivity in philosophy (labor is the subjective essence of private property), private ownership in economics (private property) and individual rights in politics (principle of free and equal exchange) — that the principle of universality or sociality in Hegel’s civil society could enter Marx’s theoretical perspective. Since then, the unique concept of civil society could become the basis for the individual breaking away from traditional society on the one hand, and meanwhile achieving the leap to future society on the other.

To be specific, for Marx the positive significance of the principle of individuality or particularity of civil society includes at least two aspects. Firstly, the concept of the individual presented in *The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* is not only referred to the subject in Feuerbach’s materialism sense, but also referred to the individual asking for individual rights in political sense and private ownership in economic sense. Secondly, in the “First Manuscript” of *Paris Manuscripts* Marx defines the concept of individual as subjectivity
in philosophy by regarding private property as the objectification of “estranged labor”, based on which Marx then asserts the significance of “estranged communication” in *Comments on James Mill*. In brief, we could conclude that the principle of particularity or individuality consists of three concepts of the individual — the individual asking for political rights, pursuing private ownership in economics, and expressing subjectivity in philosophy — in terms of its positive sense. This essay then has its enough reason to state that the communication and unity of individuals, namely the principle of universality or sociality is possible only when the three concepts of the individual come into being. And this is the very positive sense of the principle of particularity or individuality of civil society for Marx. Therefore, the first point for this essay to distinguish itself from Japanese civil society scholars is its confirming of the particularity principle of civil society, i.e. the significance of the concept of the individual for Young Marx.

Secondly, due to their overlook of the importance of the principle of individuality to Young Marx, Japanese scholars have failed to notice the theory of three-stage social formations conceived by Young Marx according to three different types of relations between the individual and its society. Affected by the traditional understanding mode, Mochizuki Seiji and Yamanouchi Yasushi still assert that until *Paris Manuscripts* Marx is a humanist with no conception of social formation. On the contrary, this essay believes that though Marx has not clarified the theory of five-stage social formation theory clearly as in *The German Ideology*, influenced by Hegel’s divisions among “the family, civil society and the state” on the one hand, benefited from his unique understanding of civil society on the other, Young Marx has already set a tripartite developing mode for the social information of “traditional society — modern society — future society”. So the concept of “civil society” in this essay does not refer to an abstract social formation that runs consistently through the whole history development process, but a concrete social formation belonging to a “sandwich” structure, with the other two social formations of “traditional society” and “future society”. To be specific:

In the stage of (1) traditional society, individuals are completely immersed in social relations and constitutions (tribes, languages, blood relationship or classes) set by their community, and there is no form of private ownership independent of the community. The economic relations are not the leading social element but subordinate to other political, religious social relations. Under these operation regulations and external social relations, individuals have no chance or ability to question or break away from their community, let alone to control them. So in this stage, the individual belongs to its society. This is the traditional society at the bottom of the “sandwich” structure. On the contrast, at the top of the “sandwich” structure is (2) future society, in which individuals’ abilities and their mutual social relations have been greatly developed to a new stage when could be re-controlled by associated individuals. Because individuals and society have been completely integrated and civilized, there is no separation and conflicts among them. The middle layer of the “sandwich” structure is (3) civil society, in which individuals have broken away from traditional society with the help of the establishment of private ownership and created new economic and social relations through the division of labor and exchange. But on the other hand, these social relations among individuals cannot be presented as the direct communication among different personalities, but can only be
shown as the indirect exchange relation which for a long time cannot be controlled by associated individuals owing to their limited abilities and incomprehensive mutual relations. However, the social relations in this stage are no longer the external things totally irrelevant to individuals, but are the economic communication relations created by and among individuals through division of labor and exchange, with the premise of individual freedom and equality in politics and establishment of private ownership in economics. Since this kind of social relations is created by individuals, it is possible to be controlled by individuals again. In short, individuals are prior to social relations in the stage of civil society. To locate Marx’s civil society theory in his three formations society theory based on the distinguishing of “community” and “society” is the other difference between this essay and Japanese scholars.

In conclusion, if we define the main contributions of Japanese scholars as the creative renaissance of Marx’s civil society theory, then we could say, their advantage is to correct the previous overstress on class antagonism in capitalist society, and highlight the cooperation and communication among individuals in civil society based on division of labor and private ownership, which have been neglected for a long time. Therefore, they especially emphasize the principle of universality or sociality of Marx’s civil society theory. However, in consideration of the real development process of Marx’s civil society theory and the relation between individuals and society, this essay attempts to lay its stress on the ignored positive significance of the principle of individuality or particularity, to be specific, the significance of the concept of the individual to Marx’ civil society theory, which is set in the background of the theory of three-stage social formation. In short, this essay tries to reverse the conclusion that the social relation is prior to the individual proposed in the “Article VI” of Theses on Feuerbach, and reveal the importance of the concept of the individual, then confirm Marx as the son of enlightenment, who inherits the principle of individuality and subjectivity advocated by Enlightenment Project.

Notes
* Dissertation original title: Research on Young Marx in terms of the Relation between Individual and Society

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Tsinghua University is now a national leading university in China. It has been regarded as a polytechnic university for a long time. However, in the early 20th century, Tsinghua was famous as a comprehensive university.

I. Luo Jialun vs. the Nationalization of Tsinghua

Compared with the earlier–established prestigious university Peking University (Beida), Tsinghua School (the predecessor of Tsinghua University) was built a little later. In 1911, it was established in Beijing. By 1920, there were only 3 National Universities, namely, Peking University, Peiyang University and Shanxi University, All of which were located in Northern China, the heartland of Peiyang Government, while more than 20 mission schools were dispersed all over China. Generally speaking, most of the faculty were unqualified. Tsinghua School was nothing but a replica of American middle school. From 1911 to 1925, all the examinees had to pass a rigorous matriculation and only less than 5% of them (usually less than 150 students) were lucky enough to be recruited by this school. Thereby almost all of them were very intelligent. Once recruited they would have to get trained even more rigorously in the next 8 years. The training was so challenging that almost half of the students were knocked out of the school.

In Tsinghua, all of the courses were language-centered, and English learning was the dominating one, including listening, speaking, reading, writing and translation. Moreover, Christianity Youth Union, which was absolutely prohibited in the National Universities, was quite active in Tsinghua. According to the rules, every student must write home once a month. This copies some of American middle schools’ rule. As a matter of fact, the school modeled itself on Saint John’s University in Southern China (Shanghai), which was praised as “Harvard of China”. To be honest, the famous school repined of its inferior level and of being regarded as a mission university. It wanted to be closer in style to the Saint John’s University.

In 1920, Rusell, the guru of UK academic circle, visited Tsinghua School, after giving a series of lectures in National Peking University. Then he described Tsinghua as “a large school migrating
from America to China”. Tagore (India) and John Dewey (US) also gave the same appraisal. In 1923, Liang Shiqiu, a graduate of Tsinghua, visited National Southeast University and was fascinated by the profound learning of Prof. Wu Mi. He criticized the inferiority of Tsinghua’s academic atmosphere. Tsinghua responded to these criticisms and promoted itself to a junior college 2 years later.

Meanwhile, the social environment was changing. In the summer of 1928, Northern Expedition Army took Beijing and the Commander in Chief Chiang Kai-Shek entered the capital of Peiyang Administration. In his speech, he emphasized the significance of ideology and insinuated that the new government was bound to get involved in thought control which was always neglected by Peiyang Administration. Consequently party-oriented education was doomed to be in conflict with liberal education.

After a fierce competition, Luo Jialun, the former secretary of Chiang Kai-Shek, was appointed as the new president of Tsinghua. Luo, an outstanding student of Peking University, was an innovationist and was resolute in action. He updated Tsinghua from a Senior College to a National University and decidedly regrouped the teaching-research team. Thirty-eight unqualified professors were dismissed while twenty-eight excellent new professors were hired. The new teaching-research team was proficient in their specialties, partly because the team’s quality has improved, and partly because its structure has been transformed radically. Luo, as a promising graduate of Berlin University and Princeton University, was familiar with the essence of university. He knew how a mainstream cosmopolitan academy works. He was keen to seek after men of worth and ability. He was much interested in those young scholars who were well educated abroad----in a word, the young men who were aggressive, ambitious and with great potentialities---- rather than the aged run-of-mill celebrities. He did all these to create a prominent university and train numerous topnotch talents to serve the Kuomintang-ruled China (党国).

Luo’s reform affected many people’s interests, but he didn’t care. He responded avowedly: ‘So what, who cares? To be honest, I don't know the so-called denominationalism. What I know is that nothing is more important than talents. In a university, academic activity is the nucleus of all, and research surpasses everything.’ In his inauguration he pledged: ‘the primary historical mission is research, and the vocation of NEW TSINGHUA is to gain academic independence for China.’ Tsinghua, as a top university of the nation, undertook the mission of a nation-state’s invigoration in the future.

Thus Luo established a university with new patterns, a research-oriented university. It drew on the experiences of the first-rate occidental universities and sprang up as a high-quality university. At the same time the rival universities also emphasized the importance of research. For instance, both Imperial University of Tokyo and Imperial University Tohoku, claimed: ‘Research is the foundation of all.’ ‘Nothing is superior to research.’ At that time, this is a brand-new threshold to Chinese university circle.

Hence a new system of academic evaluation criteria emerged. All the faculty were encouraged to do research and to publish their fruits freely home and abroad. He Lian, an illustrious economist and a professor of Nankai University, detected: ‘in the 1920s the situation of China’s higher education in social sciences was rather bleak. Almost all the textbooks, most of which were the duplicates of occidental texts, were disjointed with China’s national conditions. Moreover, almost all the teachers were compelled to shuttle back and forth for part-time jobs among several colleges. Overall, their handouts were nothing but their notes when
they were studying for a degree abroad, and gradually they abandoned their research. What is worse, their academic minds were decaying day by day: the longer they teach, the worse they become.” Luckily, Tsinghua was a rare exception. Such a new evaluation criteria tended to give rise to a superior academic environment, which can effectively attract many brilliant scholars, and advance their researches. For example, Dr. Wu Youxun (吳有訓) who graduated from Univ. of Chicago with excellent academic records returned to his alma mater – National Southeast University (National Central University, Nanking), which was the best university in Southern China. But he could not continue his research there. Then he went to Nanchang to establish a new university in order to realize his dream of “Save the Nation by Science”. He failed just 5 months later. The reality tended to ruin this especially creative scientist. At that moment, Prof. Ye Qisun, dean of Physics Department of Tsinghua, learned about Wu’s dilemma, and he sincerely invited Wu to Tsinghua. Tempted by the academic atmosphere of Tsinghua, Wu accepted the invitation. In Tsinghua he made great achievements and became a world-famous nuclear physicist. What’s more, he trained dozens of outstanding talents in this university, many of whom became the founding fathers in the development and launching of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and manmade satellite, laying a solid foundation for China’s national defense system.

Governance structure is another important change in the transition. Before Luo Jialun Era, staff were more vigorous than the faculty, but the latter’s voice was always ignored in decision-making. After the reform Professorate became the dominant group. Generally speaking, such a pattern was distinct from that in other universities (e.g. Peking University, Central University which were governed by their presidents). The university was ‘governed by professors’, which meant the faculty became the leading position in the university. They could use the school equipment freely to serve their researches and gave full play to their independence, and creativity in the university’s fundamental policy decisions. In such a superexcellent environment, they can concentrate on their researches.

In addition, Luo changed the administrative relationship of the university. Historically Tsinghua was under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peiyang Administration. After the Northward Expedition, it was governed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nanjing Kuomintang Administration. This ministry was notorious for its corruption, which would definitely imperilled the sound development of Tsinghua. Luo, taking advantage of his exceptional status (pre-secretary of Chiang Kai Shek, Kuomintang member of Central Committee) defeated the Minister Wang Zhengting (a noted Party Politician) by cooperating with Dai Jitao, Chen Guofu and some other dignitaries. Finally the jurisdiction was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Education Ministry. Then Tsinghua entrusted its fund to Sino-British Foundation Committee, an independent organization (NGO) which provided it a sound economic base.

To sum up, under Luo’s leadership, Tsinghua was transformed from a junior college into a relatively self-contained university.
II．Chaos and the Development of Tsinghua

In the summer of 1930, Luo Jialun was accused of spying by Yan Xishan (a powerful warlord of Taiyuan in Shanxi province). Almost at the same time campus upheaval erupted. He was denounced by hundreds of students, and none of the faculty supported him. Nearly all the personages in professoriate kept away from him. Being so isolated, he had no other choices but to leave Tsinghua. He tried seeking help from Chiang Kai Shek, his former boss, but was rejected because Chiang himself could not predominate the intricate complexion in North China.

Then Yan Xishan occupied North China, and interfered with the intellectual community of Peiping. He nominated a new president of Tsinghua. The new president, M.A. Qiao Wanxuan, was a politician from Shanxi province rather than an alumnus of Tsinghua. Compared with savants, Qiao was a mere nobody, an ignorant madcap man. Undoubtedly he was banished by Tsinghua students. The military-political situation was transient. Soon Chiang Kai shek reigned over North China and he appointed a young man as Tsinghua’s new President. The newcomer was Wu Nanxuan. Wu, former vice dean of Central Political College (Nanjing), was recommended by Chen Guofu and Luo Jialun. He was a loyal disciple of Three Principles of the People (三民主义) and a dutiful underling of Chiang Kai shek. Wu was also expelled by Tsinghua. Chiang flew into a rage, but he couldn’t change the facts. Tsinghua endured every kind of trail and kept steady and intact. In such chaos, the system of “governance by professor” got firmer and firmer. The university was improved in its academic concern. It was noteworthy that its graduate school was founded in that interval, with about 50 students, and soon it became the best one of Chinese graduate schools. By then, Tsinghua had established a relatively complete system that cultivated talents. The first batch of Masters was trained by this graduate school. For example, Chen Xingshen, the first master of mathematics trained by mainland China, graduated from Tsinghua in 1933, and ascended into the uppermost mathematicians in the world. In addition, Fei Xiaotong, graduating from Tsinghua in the same year, made the leap into a worldwide renowned sociologist. As the outstanding graduates they also received further training abroad (in occidental well-known universities), funded by Tsinghua graduate school. Chen and Fei, graduates from Nankai University and Yanching University respectively, all entered Tsinghua subsequently. Actually Tsinghua had appealed all kinds of talents from some other well-known universities across China because of its charms. And the enrollment of these talents further lifted its academic level.

III．Mei Yiqi vs. the Breakthroughs of Tsinghua

On the day of Sep 18, 1931, some young officers launched the aggressive war in Shenyang, Southeast China. Chinese people had to fight against aggression.

During this social upheaval, Prof. Mei Yiqi (currently in the US) was appointed as the new president of Tsinghua. He was famous for his logion which embodied his education idea: “大学者, 有大师之谓也, 非有大楼之谓也.” “大学者, 有大师之谓也, 非有大楼之谓也.” While he threw
most of his energy into the development of School of Technology and consequently this discipline strode ahead in a few years. In Tsinghua University, the School of Technology was established in 1932 while it boomed quickly and became the top one all over the country. In 1935, one of its students commented in his article: ‘there is no doubt that Tsinghua’s technology discipline has now become one of the best disciplines among peers, if not the best one.’

Since 1933, this school has been most popular in the freshmen in Tsinghua. In the fall of that year, 350 freshmen were enrolled and 1/3 of them chose the School of Technology. Immediately students in the Science & Technology school were much more than those in liberal arts school and law school, and this university became well-known particularly for its School of Technology.

Department of Physics, the elite of Tsinghua’s School of Science, was a paradigm of Chinese academia. Most of the faculty was the graduates from University of Chicago and California Institute of Technology. The statistical data showed that in the 1920s, lots of doctoral graduates from Department of Physics in these universities came from former Tsinghua School and subsequently returned to Tsinghua University as teachers.

According to the documents concerned, the first Chinese physics doctor (experimental physics) was Li Fuji (李复几), who got his degree in 1907 in Germany. Most of the senior physicists graduated from USA. The first group of them graduated in 1918 (Li Yaobang 李耀邦, Yan Renguang 颜任光, Univ. of Chicago; Hu Gangfu 胡刚复, Harvard). While the first Chinese doctorate owner from USA emerged much later (Wang Shoujing 王守竞, 1927, Columbia University). The second owner appeared in the next year – Zhou Peiyuan, who got his doctorate and served Tsinghua since 1929, as the youngest professor in Tsinghua. He was famous for his research in Generalized Relativism and Turbulent Flow Theory.

Such a department was of significance in Chinese science academia. It was leading the Chinese physics community, with its faculty leading other professionals in this profession.. Among them Prof. Wu Youxun was a paradigm. In the 15th anniversary of Tsinghua Science Society established by Ye Qisun in early 1929, Wu alleged: “In China today, only 3 universities are first-rate: the National Peiking University, National Central University and National Tsinghua University, and the last is the best. Tsinghua is the most promising among them.” Surely, Wu had published a quantity of high-quality papers in Nature and Science since 1930. In mainland China, he was the first physicist who published his fruits in world-top journal and the first Chinese scientist who was elected to be academician of foreign countries (Wu became the academician of Germany in 1935). In such dept., Prof Wu Youxun and Zhao Zhongyao, were graduates of nobel prize winners A. H. Compton and E. Rutherford respectively. Although they had accomplished so much, unfortunately they narrowly missed the Nobel Prize for various reasons, which was a great pity for them. (Coincidentally, Prof. Wu was the graduate from Univ. of Chicago, while Zhao was the graduate from CIT. But both of them were promoted to professor at the age of 29; Wu was regarded as“the most eximious student” of Prof. Compton). Anyway, this department developed continuously. And its academic achievement was stupendously upgraded in few years. Under the leadership of Wu Youxun, China’s first modern physics laboratory was established in Tsinghua in 1935, which reached the world level then. By the middle 1930s, its graduate education was nearly gain upon some world-class notable universities. For instance, Wang Ganchang, Peng Huanwu, Wang Dahang, soon became world’s leading
physicists, parallel some Nobel Prize winners. In 1940, Prof. Zhou Peiyuan and Fu Chengyi, went to CIT as visiting scholars. Then and there, Qian Xuesen, Qian Weichang, Lin Jiaqiao and Guo Yonghuai, four young scholars, followers of Prof. Kārmān,Theodore von as doctoral candidates. Each of them performed perfect, astounding Prof Kārmān,Theodore von with their prominent creativity. The professor was deeply impressed by the research status and achievement of the Department of Physics in Tsinghua. Suddenly he realized that he had made a mistake: he let slip to visit Dept. of Physics of Tsinghua when he visited the university in the summer of 1937, eve of Sino-Japan war. In the early 1940s, National Southwest Associated University (which embodied Tsinghua, Peida and Nankai) could provide high-quality curriculum. Dr. Chengning-Yang, a graduate from National Southwest University and future Nobel Prize winner, asserted boldly: “what I learned in this university can compete with that in the famous universities in USA.” “Prof. Zhou Peiyuan and Wu Dayou had launched world-class courses. For example, the Field Theory, which I learned in Southwest Associated University, was much more profound than that I learned in the University of Chicago.”

As early as the winter of 1932, a group from League of Nations visited China and surveyed the situation of China academy and education. One of the scholars in this deputation was Langevin, Paul, a world-class famous physicist from France. He inquired about the status of China’s higher education, and in the end he gave a suggestion that in order to impel the development of academy Chinese scholars should establish a physics academy as soon as possible. Organization is an essential impetus to academic development. At that time, there were 108 universities or colleges in China, 20 of which established department of physics, with less than 300 physics teachers altogether. In 1932, with the endeavor of Chinese scholars, Chinese Academy of Physics was established and the founding meeting was held in Tsinghua, led by Science School of Tsinghua University. Its Department of Physics was the General Trustee of Chinese Academy of Physics. While the initial president was Li Shuhua (Peiping University), most of the council members were from Tsinghua. Although there were only 5 professors and 3 lecturers in the Department of Physics of Tsinghua, they were the leaders of the physics circle because of their outstanding academic achievement.

As we know, Tsinghua attracted the earliest theoretical physics researchers, and its Department of Physics offered the earliest curriculum in this concern. Consequently, the earliest talents came from this department. Some of them became key personnel of the research group in China. According to some statistics, from 1931 to 1949 Chinese scientists had published 50 treatises in Nature and Science, 28 of which were finished by Tsinghua. What’s more, 13 physics treatises were all finished by this group from Dept. of Physics of Tsinghua.

In 1932 the Second Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Committee was held by Kuomintang, and a series of bills were enacted, quite a few of them concerning higher education. Thereafter China’s academia was obviously improved. Then education expenditure increased, amounting to about 4% of the master budget, reaching the acme in modern China.

Simultaneously, in this Session, Luo Jialuo (president of National Central University) and Zhu Jiahua (Minister of Education and former president of National Central University) denounced the phenomenon of advocating liberal education while boycotting the education embracing the Three Principles of the People, especially that some magnates did so. Obviously such a judgment
made allusion to Cai Yuanpei, who had been Luo’s mentor in Beida.

However, Mei Yiqi disagreed with his predecessor on this point. He resisted party-oriented education with liberal education. He yearned to academic independence. In fact, Tsinghua was the model of general liberal education, deserving praises from various aspects.

IV. Interaction between Academy and Social-politics

Japan rose up in Meiji Renovation, and soon the barycenter of East Asia transferred from China to Japan. Under the impact of economic crisis, Japan speeded up its invasion to China. North China clam down transitorily after the China’s Civil War in 1930. However, in 1931, Ishiwara Kanji (石原莞尔) and his troop encroached Shenyang. In the next year, Shanghai was attacked by Japanese troop. In 1933, Japanese army invaded the Great Wall and Peiping was imperiled. In north China, the roof was caving in. Moreover, Japan’s universities (such as Imperial University of Tokyo, Imperial University of Kyoto and so on) rose to research-oriented universities, they stepped up Aeronautical Engineering research and development. Hereby, Japan was strong in air force and assaulted the vast region of China from airspace. Nanjing Government had to develop aeronautics to defend its basic safety. As a famous comprehensive university, Tsinghua was dictated to advance aeronautics discipline as soon as possible. In 1934, Tsinghua, located in Peiping and menaced by Japanese troop, initiated new researches and soon became one of the 4 centers of Aeronautics Engineering research across China. In the spring of 1934, when it displaced research devices, it transferred some of them to Tientsin and Shanghai, and without notice established several institutes in Changsha, which became the base of Changsha Temporary Associated University. What’s more, it cooperated with the authorities in this concern and established an Aviation Academy in Nanchang. The first Wind Tunnel was developed shortly after, the biggest one in East Asia, half larger than that of Japan.

Such situation enforced Tsinghua’s transition. More and more resources were transferred to these disciplines and converged in these departments. While liberal arts became more and more marginal. This was in accord with the purpose of the education authorities (especially Chen Lifu, Zhu Jiahua). But Prof. Chiang Ten-fu griped: “such a deed is without vision.” That was right. This was a latent disaster for Chinese intelligentsia. These problems flared up and corroded the whole education system in the post-war era. Luckily, Tsinghua, the top university of China, had boomed up as a comprehensive university by the middle of 1930s. In the middle and later periods of 20th century, East Asia will be changed to a certain extent.

Notes
* Dissertation original title: On the Growth Mechanism of Tsinghua University: From the Angle of the Interaction between Politics and Learning
From the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 to the Indian Movement over Latin America, from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia to China’s “3 • 14” and “7 • 5” events, the ethnic nationalist movements in developing countries has become one of the most notable international problems since the Drastic Changes of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Ethnic nationalism is a kind of ideology and social movement, based on ethnic identity, primarily from the cultural level (especially with the ethnic-related traditions, customs, language, etc.) to define themselves. This paper reviews the context of the development of nationalism theories, and put forward a classification map of the nationalism researches. Based on those theoretical analyses, this paper proposes a structured annalistic framework to explain the ethnic nationalism incidents emerged in developing countries since the 1990s. First, the paper argues that globalization is the structural determinants that promote the occurrence of ethnic nationalism in developing countries, especially the technological progress represented by the Internet provide the most convenient means of communication for them. Secondly, this paper argues that the rushing ahead democratic reforms in developing countries after the Drastic Changes of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is one of the institutional causes of the ethnic nationalism incidents emerged in developing countries. Finally, the paper argues that a large number of international regimes related to minority groups is another important institutional cause of the ethnic nationalism incidents emerged in developing countries.

First, this paper takes the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as an example to illustrate the logical relations between democratic reforms under poor conditions and ethnic nationalist movements. Second, this paper takes Indian Movements in Mexico, Peru, Chile and Bolivia as cases study to explain the logical relations between international regimes and ethnic nationalism.
Finally, this paper also analyzes the ethnic issues in our country by the structured annalistic framework of the ethnic nationalism. The causes of ethnic problems in China are analyzed from history, reality and current backgrounds based on distinguishing the two types of ethnic issues, and some reflections have been made on the Regional Autonomy System for Ethnic Minorities.
I. What is the Dissertation About?

This dissertation examines women’s engagement in contemporary Japanese faith-based volunteer groups delivering services and care to their local communities. A growing body of literature highlights the positive role that community-based initiatives can play in eliciting social change, including the power to promote gender equality by influencing people’s awareness, such as gender-stereotyped perceptions, and changing gendered behaviours. This dissertation examines the extent to which women’s everyday interaction and agency in faith-based volunteering helps in cultivating social stewardship and articulating new trajectories of self in Japanese society at large. The research draws upon a survey conducted in Japan from 2009 to 2010 on five faith-based volunteer groups: two Shinnyōen-sponsored groups; two Risshō Kōseikai-sponsored groups; and one Catholic group. By reporting the life-stories of women engaged in faith-based volunteering, this dissertation aims to provide examples of the kind of trajectories and empowering or disempowering practices generated in the cultural context of the Japanese faith-based volunteer group.

II. What are the Main Themes and Objectives?

In order to provide a comprehensive picture of both women’s sources and trajectories, and the settings where they can venture into newer narratives, the research contained in this dissertation aims to disentangle and explain how women take action while complying with and resisting the discourses and conditions that shape their lives, and interrogates women’s capacity for action and its consequences. This work attempts to locate women in the Japanese cultural context of the faith-based volunteer groups as autonomous agents and, by doing so, elucidate in detail, according to their own accounts, how and to what extent their active participation exercises influence on their social identity. In order to do so, this study explores how they locate themselves between...
religious organizations and civil society; how they negotiate religious identity and social identities; and how their struggles and debates between individuals, religious organization and state discourses may open new ways of formulating relationships among citizens. It is argued in this dissertation that an analysis of women volunteering in community-based religious social work is a viewpoint we can adopt in understanding changes and transformations that are occurring in Japanese society today.

As such, the argument of this dissertation straddles three main areas of disciplinary interest in the social sciences: religion, gender, and civil society. Sociology of religion and gender studies have largely explored the relationship between women and religion. They have mainly highlighted the structures of power and knowledge inherent in both the construction of gender and the roles of women in religion as an enactment of structural conditions of society. On the other hand, the literature on volunteering regards religion and gender as two important components positively related to civic engagement, which in turn is deemed to foster citizenship and democratization. Thus far, studies produced in the sociology of religion and those discussing the relationship between religion, gender and volunteering, have been oblivious of their interrelated core investigations: they have largely ignored the important presence of women in faith-based volunteering and the social significance of their active participation, especially in view of their empowered role in Japanese society at large.

This dissertation as a whole challenges such consolidated disciplinary divisions by exploring grassroots faith-based volunteering as a cultural context enabling women with opportunities to become active civic agents in the social contract, and explore alternative trajectories of social self. The purpose is to make an empirical contribution in order to fill existing gaps in the literature by looking at two Japanese new religious movements and one Christian denomination in Japan. It aims at developing the discussion of women’s faith-based volunteering at a theoretical level by testing the hypothesis that religious volunteering works as a gateway for women’s expanded social participation, thus encouraging empowerment and democratization.

Firstly, it tests to what extent belonging to a religious group may be accounted for as the core driving force channelling women’s social commitment. Specifically, it questions whether and to what extent religious membership may become a resource for exploring broader meaningful images of self, rather than a passive embodiment of normative and structural constraints as claimed by most extant studies on women’s religiosity (Hardacre 1984; Ōgoshi 1997; Ozorak 1996; Jones 2002; Woodhead 2007).

Secondly, and related to the above empirical examination, the development of a methodological framework concerning women’s religious volunteering will be discussed. This consideration will highlight how focusing on actors tracing the interactions among the plurality involved may help in identifying and describing what common knowledge is shared that guarantees their coordination with their situated world. This consists of framing the actors in their shifts, trials and changes while describing what competing agencies (e.g. working woman; religious believer; volunteer; mother) and what margins of interpretation can be possible during interaction, negotiation and discussion (e.g. mother vis-à-vis volunteer; working woman vis-à-vis religious believer). The micro-sociological analysis suggested here is conducted drawing upon “practice theories” (Giddens 1984 and 1991a; Bourdieu 1977 and [1980] 1990; Butler 1990 and 1993) and the recently developed Actor Network Theory (Law...
and Hassard 1999; Latour 2005), which has thus far not found application in the field of religious volunteering.

III. What is the Originality of the Dissertation?

A few studies have explored the role of Japanese religious organizations in civil society and none of them focuses on women engaging in faith-based volunteer groups. Extant research focuses mainly on the structural conditions combined with ideological influence and the socio-cultural circumstances that the religious context and gender socialization bring about in motivating women to engage in social work. No extant work is devoted to understanding the intersection between the two fields, that is, women’s engagement in faith-based volunteer groups. This dissertation can be said to offer the first qualitative examination of the associations between women and faith-based volunteering, and its impact in terms of identity formation and social change to have been carried out. The study is, therefore, innovative in terms of developing the discussion of women’s faith-based volunteering at a theoretical level. Methodologically, it also takes a different approach favouring a practice-centred stance, which helps going beyond the secular versus religious polarizations and the sectorialised approach of disciplines (such as sociology of religion, gender studies, civil society studies) and fields (private versus public; religion versus politics). This includes an original theoretical framework, which makes an eclectic use of “practice theories” mentioned above, while borrowing a number of concepts from Actor Network Theory – and as yet unassimilated qualitative empirical data.

IV. Synopsis and Chapter Headings

1. Introduction

The introductory chapter locates the work in terms of content and methodology by addressing the salient characteristics of Japanese grassroots faith-based volunteer groups where women are engaging and the levels of analysis. It outlines the social role of Japanese religions and the position of faith-based volunteering within Japanese civil society. It then provides an analytical overview of the cultural ideals and social models that are implicitly and explicitly relevant in informing women’s interpretation of their lives vis-à-vis volunteering in contemporary Japan. However, rather than following the established paradigms of resistance to internalized social norms or responses to externalized constraints, this study approaches women’s volunteering as a social practice, which helps downplaying the normative role of belief and gender socialization in order to emphasize the binding role of practice. This innovative methodological approach offers a functional model within which empirical findings can be unpacked and analysed in order to give a comprehensive understanding of women’s agency in religious civil society. The last section of the chapter presents the structure of the dissertation.
Chapter 1. Women and Faith-Based Volunteering in Contemporary Japan: The State of Research

The first chapter reviews the extant literature relevant to the discussion of the intermingled themes of the dissertation: religion, gender and civil society. While addressing the Japanese context, the chapter considers established paradigms of sociology of religion, such as the influence of religion as an institution and a cultural context posing doctrinal and behavioural predispositions toward volunteering. It examines the influence of gender on philanthropic behaviour and delineates the potentiality of faith-based volunteer groups, as a form of civil society, to be sites for reforming gendered perspectives, promoting gender equality and participatory citizenship. The discussion includes an examination of the tradition of maternalism, which political scientists account as a consolidated rationale behind Japanese women’s social engagement. It compares this perspective with more recent scholarship in political science exploring grassroots women’s movements and the characteristics of community-based movements in Japan. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the empowerment discourse in social work, which offers conceptual tools to understand the extent to which women’s agency in grassroots activities may empower them and have an impact on their society and politics.

Chapter 2. Researching Women’s Identity Formation in Faith-Based Volunteer Groups: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

Chapter 2 explores the theoretical stance, the qualitative methodological approach, and the principles of narrative and actor-network analysis adopted in this research project. In order to illustrate the micro-social constitutive normative and generative aspects through which women move toward different trajectories of self, this study draws upon an eclectic use of “practice theories”: the idea of the interdependence of structure and action developed by Giddens (1984 and 1991a); the logic of practice as theorized by Bourdieu (1977 and [1980] 1990); and the idea of performativity, emphasizing how the passing of time in combination with the repetitiveness of social practice can extend the opportunities for the exercise of agency (Butler 1990 and 1993). The analysis of women as both autonomous and relational actors is performed by applying some core concepts of Actor Network Theory (Law and Hassard 1999; Latour 2005). Moreover, by analyzing women’s narratives, this study explores how women engaged in faith-based volunteering conceive their actions and express their experiences, how the community interpret women’s practices, and how sometimes the process opens opportunities for newer trajectories of the social self.

Chapter 3. Profiles of Targeted Organizations and Volunteer Groups: Shinnyoen, Risshō Kōseikai and the Roman Catholic Church

The second chapter is structured into two parts. The first part offers an outline of targeted religious organizations: Risshō kōseikai, Shinnyoen and the Roman Catholic Church in Japan. Each targeted religious organizations is illustrated only in terms of those key doctrinal aspects, concepts and religious practices that are relevant to explain women’s attitudinal and behavioural expectations in relationship with their volunteer work. The second part of the chapter outlines the targeted faith-based volunteer groups: two
sponsored by Risshō kōseikai groups (‘Itabashi Church Social Welfare Association’ and ‘Kawagoe Church Volunteers’); two Shinnyoen groups (‘Shinnyoen Social Contribution Department - Youth Association’ and ‘Univers Volunteers Tokyo’); and one sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church in Japan (‘Yotsuya Onigiri Nakama’). The presentation provides information about the location, the structure, membership, the range of social activities and the detail of those surveyed in the present study.

Chapter 4. Women Volunteers in Faith-Based Groups: A Profile

Drawing upon questionnaire data, the sections in this chapter provide information on the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, perceptions and expectations in terms of religiosity, volunteer work and gender roles. The analysis attempts to explore the majority of the components informing women’s volunteer practices and the perceived effects of such activities in their daily life. By comparing overall findings of the questionnaire survey with extant literature on volunteering and other official data, this chapter highlights similarities and divergences with general patterns, thus attempting to locate informants within the larger context of Japanese society.

Chapter 5. Changing Identities Through Volunteering: Women’s Voices

Chapter 5 presents six life-stories of seven women volunteering in faith-based groups: a retired lady, a young mother, a working woman, a middle-age housewife, a mother and her PhD candidate daughter, and a non-religious student. Selected among the 46 interviews collected during the fieldwork as being representative of the socio-demographic characteristics of the overall sample, the narrations presented in the chapter bring up an interesting picture of contemporary Japanese women engaged in faith-based volunteer work. Interviewees describe their biographical experiences, the interaction inside and beyond the volunteer group, the relationships with the religious organization, the ties they build, and the trajectories they attempt while engaging in social activities. Their stories show the complexity and dynamism of their identities and how participating in faith-based volunteering affects on the identity formation. This chapter not only gives voice to the individual, but also articulates important insights of the constitutive normative and generative aspects through which women appropriate and create meanings for their identity and move beyond different modes of self.

Chapter 6. Exploring Women’s Trajectories of Self in Faith-Based Volunteer Groups

Chapter 5 evaluates the totality of findings by taking into consideration two complementary dimensions: the individual’s social identity and its symbolic boundaries; and the group’s dimension, with its customs and habits that may enable or constrain its members to develop the self and social reflexivity. It discusses the intrapersonal and interpersonal components resulting from participating to faith-based volunteering. It also examines the group’s customized practices informing the way members communicate and interact with external actors, thus informing their capacity to spiralling out creating newer meanings and attitudes. The chapter shows that while women volunteers of faith-based groups may complement mainstream discourses about the sort of volunteer work citizens should provide, they
tend to play institutionalized roles instrumentally to promote better services, thus exploring and playing new civic functions in the social contract. In conclusion, the empirical data presented in this dissertation help explaining how belonging to a religious organization may become a resource for broader meaningful images of the self, which is crucial for women’s larger engagement in society, empowerment and democratization.

V. Conclusion

The concluding sixth chapter evaluates the range of arguments that have been discussed throughout the dissertation. What emerges is that previous studies of women engaged in faith-based volunteering have tended to overlook their engagement for cultural, structural and socio-economic reasons. Scholarship has emphasized an exclusionary logic addressing gender and religious socialization, on the one hand, and socio-economic structural pressures, one the other, as deeply-rooted constraining conditions hindering women from becoming active agents of change in the field of faith-based volunteering. This dissertation argues that all those components matter, but suggests that they explain only the type and rate of participation, and not whether and to what extent participation affects women’s lives. The bottom-up practice-centred perspective adopted in this study offers a more comprehensive understanding of the normative and generative role that women’s inclusion in certain areas of practice is able to engender. In this respect, this study suggests it is worth challenging the paradox of linking empowerment and social change with religious settings that tend to be connoted by conservative gendered practices. The dissertation argues conclusively that women’s engagement in faith-based volunteering may be viewed as a vehicle for promoting gender equality and democratization to the same extent of many other community-based movements and civil society groups.
I. Introduction

The research outlined below is a study of how Japan has recalibrated risk through its framing of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) in the post-Cold War era. It is based upon the hypothesis that there has been a substantial recalibration of the risks that are perceived and portrayed to emanate from the entity conceptualized as North Korea (kitachōsen) by multiple actors – intersecting the state, market and society – in Japan. It is also hypothesized that this has occurred through a complex interactive process – reliant upon these actors’ inter-subjective identities and their disposition towards the adherence to a number of salient norms.

The core thesis discussed herein is, therefore, premised on two key theoretical positions: a constructivist conception of the socio-political world (as socially constructed), and the contention that a vast mass, perhaps all, of politically motivated ideas are in some aspects generated, developed and mediated in relation to considerations of risk – and its variable calibration. Japan's framing of North Korea provides a relevant case study through which significant empirical research can be guided by these theories.

A constructivist perspective is central, it is argued, to understanding the dynamic processes of interaction between states internationally, and the state, market and society domestically. Constructivism exposes how interdependent ideas (expressed and acted upon, primarily through discourse) are, in the final reckoning, the function of inter-subjective, socially constructed identities. Therein, it is only with reference to identity (including collective identity up to the level of the state) that politically-charged action and state responses can be fully understood. This is particularly significant in terms of extrapolating meaning and causality from analyses of national responses to external threats and uncertainties, which can be constructed in terms of crises, or crisis-equivalent situations, and mediated as the on-going source of indefinite and salient risks. A schematic diagram of how this process is manifest can be observed in Figure 1.1. The process is then tracked and analysed through a series of case study events – beginning with the Japan’s responses to the DPRK’s 1993 Nodong missile test launch.
II. The 1993 Nodong Missile Launch

Given the clear design of North Korea’s first Nodong test missile launch on 29 May 1993 as being geared toward a possible direct attack upon Japan, the related risks were, at least in the public sphere, interpreted in a relatively understated manner by the political elite in Tokyo, as well as across the vast majority of civil and market actors and stakeholders. This is something which is also reflected by the minimal media coverage, displayed in Figure 3.1, below, and is in total contrast to the massive impact and resulting rapid re-calibration of risk triggered by the 1998 Taepodong 1 launch, discussed later on. Additionally, it is striking that what language was used by politicians in the Diet following the test-launch of 1993 bore resemblance, albeit with a far less fervent tone, to that used to discuss the Taepodong launch of 1998, but was, at that stage, qualitatively less risk-oriented (or risk-obsessed) and more measured. The same kind of qualitative linguistic and voluminous quantitative gap can be observed in reactions within the media, as tackled in terms of comparative newspaper reactions. Indeed, there were as few as twenty entries listed on the National Diet database for comments of any kind made on the 1993 Nodong launch in the months immediately following it, and targeted searches bring up only three magazine articles throughout the whole of 1993 which cover the incident in itself. In fact, according to established academic data-bases, only nine recognized magazine and periodical publication articles covered North Korean missile issues in Japan during the entire period from 1993-7. The figure for 1998-9 reaches sixty four. Nonetheless, in terms of sowing the seeds of risk recalibration – which were metaphorically brought to fruition some five years later by the 1998 Taepodong test launch – by way of initializing the identification and framing of North Korea as a persistent source of multiple risks, NHK news reports from the same year pinpoint the policy community’s shift at this time. A news article of 30 July 1993 stated that,

Today’s Defence Agency white paper raises the problem of North Korea (DPRK)’s new-model missile development, stating the grave concern that ‘if this missile development is combined with the development of nuclear weapons it may present an extremely dangerous situation.
The above article goes on to express how the Defence Agency has specifically identified North Korea as a source of risks (given the new missile’s range, covering almost the entirety of Japan), in an otherwise improving East Asian security environment. In this way the above article directly presents how and when the state initiates its recalibration of security risks to Japan through the framing of North Korea.

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Figure 3.1 (a). Media Reaction to the May 1993 Missile Test Launch

![Graph showing media reaction to the May 1993 Missile Test Launch.](image)

Figure 3.1 (b). Diet and News Magazine Reaction to the May 1993 Missile Test Launch

![Graph showing diet and news magazine reaction to the May 1993 Missile Test Launch.](image)
III. 1998 Taepodong 1 Missile Launch

North Korea’s launching of the Taepodong 1 missile in August 1998, part of which flew over Japan and splashed into the Pacific, could not have come at a more apt time for Japan’s risk entrepreneurs. In June of the same year, the North Korean Red Cross had categorically confirmed that none of the suspected remains of abductees were those of Japanese citizens. This combination of perceived economy in revealing the truth about abduction cases and aggressive geo-military sabre-rattling prompted a fierce response from Japan and catapulted North Korea’s negative framing to a point of national fervour. The process by which this happened can once again be observed through examination of how Japan’s interactive policy community mediated the affectation of risk recalibration. The ensuing discourse from the Diet was representative by then, not just of a political issue influenced by civil society, but more obviously of a growing national phenomenon, which the Taepodong launch served to bring to fruition. The test firing galvanised the framing of North Korea as a pressing and salient threat in the public sphere, and as such recalibrated the risks associated with it. The resulting reaction from Japan’s political upper echelons was virtually instantaneous and far reaching, and was tangibly expressed by Japan’s imposition of sanctions and the suspension of signing for the cost-sharing agreement of the Agreed Framework’s Light Water Reactor (LWR) project, until November of 1998. In the months and years that post-dated the Taepodong launch, the risks assigned to the missile threat were repeatedly referred to when justifications were made to revise Japan’s security posture and apparatus. Indeed, in arrant contrast to the manifestos of 1996-98 highlighted above, the LDP’s first lower-house election manifesto following the Taepodong event contains an entirely new section entitled “dealing with new problem situations and the promotion of provisions for a crisis management framework” (arata na jitai e no taisho to kiki kanri taisei no seibi no suishin), which is unprecedented in its targeting of the DPRK.

The point of critical interest is that dialogue which discussed the risks posed by North Korea shifted dramatically following the Taepodong 1 incident. This reverberated not only as a direct response taken by the policy community in Japan, but as a growing phenomenon of risk recalibration and framing of North Korea across the entirety of its media and civil society. The full extent of this phenomenon can be observed not only in the qualitative shift in focus and language used in discourses within the public sphere, but also quantitatively in terms of media and civil society attention paid to issues concerning Pyongyang’s every move – as revealed by Figure 3.2, below.

This framing of North Korea, was observed also in the case of the abduction issue, for instance, which was no-longer an awkward stumbling block that acted as an impediment to normalization talks, but rather became almost unanimously referred to as the “abduction problem” (rachi mondai) and framed as an assault on national sovereignty (tōchiken no shingai). At the same time, the potential risks of a North Korean missile strike were recalibrated as an exigent military threat (gunjiteki kyōi) and the DPRK regime was framed as culpable for imposing military intimidation (gunjiteki dōkatsu). However, it is also important to note that in terms of personalizing the risks emanating from Pyongyang the process was far from complete. The full demonization of DPRK leader, Kim Jong-II, fulfilled this function, but was as yet in its early stages, and little direct mention was afforded to
him in the Diet sessions which took place in the aftermath of the Taepodong 1 test firing.

What is more, it is also significant that the political and social norms which have come to dominate the agency of how Japan’s North Korea relations are formed, most ostensibly in the negative framing of Pyongyang’s regime and recalibration of associated risks, appear even to have out-weighed the would-be prevailing economic market interests within Japan when it comes to dictating policy generation and counter-measures vis-à-vis the DPRK. Indeed, while it is an arduous task to accurately locate the cross-interaction between Japan’s political and economic elites, large-scale stakeholder enterprises would surely have little to gain from such a negative framing and political trajectory made in response to the North. However, as touched upon below, market influences upon Japan’s post-Cold War, and post-Taepodong, recalibrations of risk in response to North Korea are at once more complex and less capricious than they may appear at first glance.

Figure 3.2 (a). Media Reaction to the August 1998 Missile Test Launch

Figure 3.2 (b). Diet and News Magazine Reaction to the August 1998 Missile Test Launch
IV. Japan’s Escalating Recalibration of Risk in Response to North Korea

As seen from the discussion of Japan’s framing of the DPRK following the 1998 Taepodong launch, one of the clearest measures of how risks have been recalibrated by Japan’s policy makers can be viewed through their responses to North Korean missile tests. The events that unfolded during 2006, however, presented a second, additional element, with which risks framed in the context of the DPRK’s weapons programmes could be further compounded and recalibrated. In addition to the multiple rocket launches in July, which served to remind and re-confirm the risks framed against Kim Jong-Il’s provocative regime, the nuclear test in October of the same year elevated their calibration to a yet higher level. Once again this can be observed across a sphere that intersects the state, market and society – mediated to the citizen through a broad range of information sources; including mainstream newspapers, television and other electronic sources.

The key events of 2006 (nuclear and missile tests) are examined in the context of reactions within Japan to a series of preceding incidents and issues that continued to stimulate the recalibration of risk through the framing of North Korea in the period after the 1998 Taepodong launch. These include the “suspicious ship” and “spy boat” maritime incursion incidents of 1999 and 2001, and the furore surrounding the abduction issue. The latter is shown to have pivotally hinged on political party and media responses to former Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichirō’s, historic visit to Pyongyang and the ensuing admission by Kim Jong-Il that the DPRK had, indeed, abducted a number Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s. Exploration of how leading actors in Japan utilized these high-profile elements as a means by which to frame the North and recalibrate risks pertaining to it accordingly, elucidates a consistent process by which discourses in the public sphere prime a particular external object (Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea), making it highly susceptible to the justification and implementation of sudden and oft times reactionary measures in light of particularly conspicuous events. The amplified reaction and policy revisions shaped within Japan in the aftermath of the missile and nuclear tests performed by Pyongyang in 2006 can be seen as representative of this process, i.e., in terms of state-societal level justifications made on the premise of ameliorating highly (re)calibrated risks.

V. 2006 Missile and Nuclear Tests: The Risk Recalibration Process

When North Korea test fired seven ballistic missiles, including its longest-range missile, the Taepodong-2, over a two day period spanning the 4th and 5th of July, 2006 risks framed against Pyongyang in Japan were, as outlined above, already highly ratcheted-up. It is true that there had been a relative lull in the perceived risks of immediate military contingency stemming from the North in the period which followed the 2001 spy-boat sinking, but the abduction issue and suspicions over the DPRK’s nuclear development program ensured that progress at the Six Party...
Talks was sluggish and faltering, preventing any major downward recalibration of risk within Japan’s policy community. Moreover, the ensuing rise to power of Abe Shinzō, on the back of an election campaign which placed resolution of the abduction issue at its fore, meant the hawkish side of the political elite maintained its momentum of risk recalibration in a relatively consistent manner.

In the period immediately preceding the 2006 test-firings, Japan’s political elite, lead by vociferous Prime Minister, Koizumi, and Foreign Minister, Asō primed the following mediation of reactions by Tokyo through their emphasis on the potentiality of risks contained in the possible actions being planned by Pyongyang. After which, the materialization of North Korean sabre rattling in the form of technologically enhanced missiles fired eastward across the Japan Sea was all that was needed by proactive right-of-centre actors from the political elite in order to maximize the recalibration of risk, particularly in terms of identifying concrete external sources of harm and justifying military re-strengthening as a countermeasure. The apparent possibility of an actual military contingency in combination with the emotional impact, and outrage, of citizens being snatched from their own shores left little room for a softer line on North Korea, and pushed the policy community as a whole towards identifying all that was associated with the DPRK as hostile and alien assailant.

This suggests a trend of consensus, or at least convergence, among leading political figures as to the legitimacy and uniformity of recalibrating risks perceived to emanate from Pyongyang. The point is illustrated by remarks made in the International Terrorism Prevention Special Committee a month later, on 11th August 2006, by Nagashima Akihisa, representing the then leading opposition party, DPJ. Nagashima actually praised Asō and Abe for their swift, hard-hitting response to the North Korean threat, apparently representing a new form of Japanese diplomacy, which could be demonstrated to the world (atarashī nihon gaikō no arikata wo sekai ni shimesu). Moreover, Nagashima also pressed the Foreign Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary to explain how they would deal with a contingency where it would be necessary to use force against North Korea, an option which they did not rule out if unavoidable.

The discourses of emergency, counter-measure, and military provision (gunjiteki sochi) proliferated in discussions within the Diet during the months which followed the 2006 Taepodong-2 launch, demonstrating not only how Japan’s policy community had converged upon a marked recalibration of risk vis-à-vis the DPRK per se, but also how this process appeared to have been facilitated by a broad weakening of the pacifist norm. With both ruling and opposition parties discussing the possibility of military contingencies, and public anger and fear charged by the media’s constant coverage of all issues connected to North Korea, it was, therefore, an unproductive climate for resistance against the adoption of a more assertive defence policy – and continued recalibration of risks.

In addition, even closer adherence to the norm of bilateralism was once again stated and restated as a core, and absolutely necessary, means by which Japan could ameliorate the risks posed by North Korea. Indeed, the quantitative impact of the 2006 test launches, particularly in conjunction with North Korea’s first nuclear test, across these spheres is also evinced, once again, in terms of the types and volume of media coverage. Moreover, the momentum created by these events was sufficient to broadly maintain the established levels of heightened risk calibration up to and including reaction to subsequent actions initiated by Pyongyang in 2009.
VI. 2009 Missile and Nuclear Tests: Continuing Recalibration of Risks

As discussed above, in the aftermath of the 2006 missile and nuclear tests, the perceived risks associated with North Korea – galvanized within Japan’s political elite and mediated to the wider society (primarily through the mass media) – were enough to maintain Pyongyang’s negative framing in the immediate months and years that followed. The phenomenon of a conspicuous emphasis upon the recalibration of risks framed against the DPRK was also sustained through the lack of a satisfactory resolution to the abduction issue and continued speculation over the specifics of the nuclear programs in the Northern half of the peninsula. In the wake of further missile and nuclear tests during 2009, the process of risk-recalibration in response to North Korea largely maintained its momentum up to the aftermath of those events. Ultimately, however, the empirical evidence analysed, particularly with reference to Pyongyang’s further provocations in 2010, also points to the emergence of a phenomenon of saturation across political, media and societal spheres. This is witnessed in terms of the reaction from each of these sectors in response to the kitachōsen mondai in Japan – and appears to have manifest itself in the establishment of a new equilibrium with regards to how North Korea is now framed, and how risks associated with the DPRK are calibrated. Furthermore, to a certain extent, this has countered the continuing upward trend of risk-recalibration and resulting counter-measures and policies, made primarily against North Korea on the basis of ameliorating those risks. Once again, a complex interactive process, involving key political, market, and societal actors is evinced – and the salience of predominant norms, particularly the powerful influence of bilateralism, can be observed.

VII. Reaction to Recent Events: A New Equilibrium?

In likeness to the events identified with Japan’s framing of North Korea and the successive recalibration of risks, the extent, level and trajectory of such (re) calibrations can, to a certain extent, be quantified through comparisons of the volume of coverage – particularly in the Diet and across media sources – assigned to each incidence. Figure 6.3, below highlights the impact of three further examples that would, in light of the case-studies observed above (pertaining to events occurring between 1993 and 2009), be expected to accentuate the established process of risk recalibration within Japan in response to North Korea – and further compound its negative framing. However, in fact, while their impact does little to evince a significant reduction in the calibration of risks attached to the DPRK, taken as a combined effect, it is also problematic to make an empirically convincing case for these events having been utilized to further recalibrate risks to a significantly higher level. As such, what can be seen is the tentative emergence of a new equilibrium, in terms of the process of risk recalibration framed against North Korea having come to fruition – and having become established as a kind of proxy-norm within political, market and societal spheres in Japan.
VIII. Minimal Reaction to North Korea’s October 2009 Multiple Missile Test-Launch

Pyongyang’s resumption of multiple missile test launches in to the Sea of Japan on 12 October 2009, coming only three months after its July test-firings, might well have been expected to trigger a more raucous reaction from Japan’s policy community. This is particularly so given that it was interpreted in one sense by the GoJ as part of North Korea’s programme to refine its ballistic missile capabilities (Kitazawa, 13 November 2009, Diet Security Committee). However, the incident’s almost total omission from direct reference in the Diet sessions which followed, and extremely limited coverage in the main-stream press, highlights the apparent lack (without clear evidence of such a new capability) of motivation on the part of actors concerned to further recalibrate risks – which had already been extremely emphasized in the wake of missile and nuclear tests conducted earlier in the same year. The lack of public-political sphere interest in this incident is, indeed, also evinced by the short length of articles covering the event and the dearth of emotive language – previously employed for emphasis and persuasive effects when describing the North’s actions.

Therein, though it is not possible to draw comprehensive conclusions based on a single limited incident, a continuation of comparatively limited reactions to Pyongyang’s successive provocations (including missile launches previously seen as the trigger for recalibrating risks) during the latter months of 2009 and throughout 2010 does suggest that Japan’s recalibrated risks framed against the DPRK, while not substantially reduced in terms of sustaining calibration at existing levels, are moving towards some form of equilibrium. Within this process, the series of upward waves of recalibration discussed in the chapters above, and illustrated by Figure 6.3, have witnessed a levelling-off (or lack of sustained socio-political and market-driven momentum). This offers an explanation for why events such as the North’s October 2009 missile test-firing are perceived as being comparatively insignificant and were insufficient to spark an additional recalibration of risks. They have also, therefore, had little impact in terms of further extending the public sphere framing of risks vis-à-vis the DPRK.

IX. Consistent Levels of Risk-Calibration in Reaction to North Korea’s Suspected Sinking of the Cheonan Naval Vessel

Due to the initial (and continuing) uncertainty surrounding the circumstances regarding the sinking of the ROK’s Cheonan naval vessel on 26 March 2010 – despite suspicions of North Korean involvement being present from an early stage – reaction from Japan’s policy community and broader public sphere was understandably cautious and limited in scope and volume (e.g., Yomiuri Shimbun, 27 March 2010: 2; Asahi Shimbun, 27 March 2010: 1 (evening editions)). Nevertheless, given that 46 crew members died in the incident, there was little if any serious provocation evident from the ROK or elsewhere, and that Pyongyang’s military were suspected from the time of the event, it is notable that Japan’s reaction was relatively limited in scale.
and veracity. However, having established that Pyongyang was indeed responsible, the by then familiar discourse of contestation over willingness by leading political actors to recalibrate risks identified with such an incidence to a sufficient level, and adapt policies accordingly, was visible in the Diet.

However, there is little ostensible evidence of a further recalibration of risk – in terms of identifying a novel threat – manifest in the Cheonan sinking. In general, the emphasis of reaction to the incident remained only upon increasing military strengthening, maintained as a focus of central discourse relating to Pyongyang’s actions, and continued to frame North Korea as the source of salient risks. Such risks were, therein, once again utilized to justify out-bidding rival political parties and actors in order to take a consistently tough-line of policies, which could be revised as required to ameliorate them.

In quantitative terms, the Impact of the Cheonan’s sinking – given the incidence’s lack of clarity as a single isolated event – likewise demonstrates a consistent pattern. This resulted in the extensive, but not unprecedented, increase of coverage of North Korean affairs in the months that followed across Japan’s public sphere and an extension of the DPRK’s negative framing attached to a range of risks identified with Pyongyang’s provocations. It is noteworthy, however, that statistically the phenomenon of a receding pattern of waves (i.e., a new equilibrium), as opposed to the model exhibiting a rising series of peaks observed up to 2006, has been realized.

North Korea’s shelling of ROK administered Yeonpyeong island on 23 November 2010, killing four South Koreans (two civilians) and injuring 19 others, resulted in a far more extensive reaction from within Japan compared to that witnessed in response to the October 2009 missile launch or the sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel in the spring of 2010. Indeed, in one sense Japan’s policy community was quick to reinforce its demonized framing of the DPRK – not least as an aberrant aggressor willing to unapologetically kill civilians in neighbouring states. However, the associated risks expressed in central political and public sphere discourses bore more evidence of a maintenance of interpreted risk-levels (i.e. with that already established in response to North Korea’s provocations between 2006-09, examined above), in terms of how they were calibrated, rather than a full-scale recalibration of risks propelled to an unprecedentedly higher peak.

Moreover, reaction from within the Diet to the Yeonpyeong incident was comparatively limited in terms of scope, volume and intensity. Nevertheless, it should be re-emphasised here that the process of risk-recalibration outlined in the chapters above, resulting in debates between Japan’s political elite focussed primarily on contestation over the ability to respond with speed and exhibit strength in the face of an entity framed broadly as a belligerent aggressor (the DPRK), remained inherent to the manifestation of Diet discourse after the Yeonpyeong shelling. Within this, opposition parties were quick to criticise the ruling DPJ administration’s lack of response rapidity and apparent under-calibration of incumbent risks potentially posed to Japan by the North’s “outrageous violation” or bōkyo.

In this manner, while the established pattern
of competition over demonstrating an overtly strong response to North Korean actions, including the provision of counter-measures to counter the attributed risks, is evident, there is little qualitative evidence from Japan’s Diet chambers to show that the Yeonpyeong shelling was an event sufficient to sustain a more generic upward momentum of recalibrated risks – rather, serving only to maintain the existing levels of previously recalibrated risks and the perpetuation of North Korea’s negative framing within the political elite.

XI. Comparison of Quantitative Results: Decreasing Momentum in the Recalibration of Risk Across a Convergent Policy Community

The discussion above has, then, outlined how the interactive influences of state, market (including media) and societal actors have created a qualitative process of risk recalibration in response to North Korea’s actions throughout the post-Cold War period – identifiable in general convergence up to 2007, and to varying degrees across each sector up to 2009. This section demonstrates how that recalibration can also be traced in quantitative terms by cross-examining the patterns of response to each of the major case studies dealt with in the preceding sections. As confirmed by the random sampling and qualitative examples examined throughout, coverage in both the Diet and mass media relating to North Korea has been overwhelmingly negative. Therefore, while the qualitative analysis above is necessary in order to discern the specific form – particularly in terms of public-political sphere discourse – of Japan’s framing of the DPRK, the extended fluctuating quantity of coverage relating to North Korea is also highly illuminating. This is particularly so in terms of delineating the impact of specific events upon these core areas of the policy community’s recalibration of risk.

In this sense, comparison of Figure 6.3 (a) and Figure 6.3 (b), below, reveals a remarkable proportional similarity in terms of reactions to North Korea-related events in the period examined. This not only supports the qualitative evidence exposed above, suggestive of a close interaction and convergence of media and Diet spheres, but also reaffirms their significance in terms of being constitutive elements of a tangibly identifiable policy community which directs responses towards North Korea within Japan. Furthermore, while there is a significant difference in the volume of coverage assigned to each event (particularly the abduction revelations of 2002) across media sources, the indisputable conformity in the correlation between specific time periods and peaks of coverage observable in Figure 6.3 demonstrates the pertinence of addressing the media as a unitary actor in itself – i.e. as a predominantly convergent influence upon and amid the policy community.
Figure 6.3 (a). Short-term Media Reaction to DPRK-related Events (1993-2010)

Figure 6.3 (b). Short-term Diet and Neews Magazine Reaction to DPRK-related Events (1993-2010)

Put simply, the decrease in additional recalibrations of risks identified with North Korea since the summer of 2009 can probably be attributed broadly to many of the various key actors having

XII. Future Research Goals:
Tracking the Risk (Re)calibration Trajectory
achieved their policy goals – and maximized the market potential – contained in such a process as a function of Japan’s framing of North Korea. This includes Japan’s convergent right-of-centre policy community, which facilitated the process of risk recalibration in order to justify increased or sustained levels of military expenditure and investment, and the use of North Korea’s framing as a negative reference point from which to promote a positive image and national identity of Japan. In addition, individual politicians have been able to make use of North Korea issues to distract public sphere attention away from more domestically rooted woes – and garner populist support. Media actors have also converged towards such a position, and have been able to utilize risks associated with the DPRK to create a popular discourse which could be sold to the public. Additionally, furthermore, US foreign policy and business interests have been largely satisfied by the current levels of risk calibration assigned to Pyongyang’s actions – in terms of providing support for a rationale which allows the continued levels of US troop deployment and highly profitable BMD technology transfer to Japan.

However, future research into the formation of norms and identity – and their relation to risk (re)calibration – in this sphere may further be able to better explain this apparently symbiotic nature of state, societal and market actors which have broadly moved in convergence, as observed in Figure 6.3, facilitating the recalibration of risks framed against North Korea in Japan. Moreover, an extension of in-depth analysis – working within this framework – into contemporary events related to the above, can aspire to elucidate further how this process now appears to be reaching a new equilibrium. Therein, the findings of this study present a case-study which seeks to facilitate conceptually innovative literature relevant to understanding Japan’s regional and global international relations, and the domestic processes which are central to them. In addition, it also provides the rudiments of a theoretical and empirical tool that can hopefully be employed in the more extensive utilization of risk as a key concept within the fields of Political Science and IR, and applied directly to the creation and formation of policy. If this is realized, the day may come when risk is understood to shape the future of all.

Notes
1 I.e., in comparison to the Taepodong launch of 1998, despite the fact that in terms of design and range the Taepodong was clearly developed as a weapon capable (and ultimately made as such with the Taepodong 2) of striking US targets, whereas the Nodong only has the capacity to strike those within Japan or the ROK.
2 The timing of the missile launch, coming little more than two months after the North Korean Red Cross’ denial of the abduction cases, presented a particularly potent cocktail for framing the DPRK.
3 It is the process behind the extremity of how Japan reacts to a continuing sequence of North Korean actions which is of particular interest. Indeed, the significance of such is evinced by the “difference in temperature”, or ondosa between Japan and other stake-holder states in their responses to North Korea.
4 While much was made of the fact that North Korea had further developed its upgraded Taepodong missile, government-sponsored research institutes conceded that the primary threat posed to Japan by North Korea’s missiles lied in its deployment of over 100 Nodong units, and that even in such case as the Taepodong missile was further developed and its range extend, it would still be hard to consider that that in itself posed a particular risk to Japan.
GOING TO THE PHILIPPINES IS LIKE COMING HOME:
Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Meiji Era to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the perception of the Philippines in Japanese pan-Asianist thought from the Meiji era (1868-1912) until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Special focus will be given to the impact of pan-Asianist ideology on Japanese administrative policy in the archipelago during the Japanese occupation of the islands, from 1941 to 1945.

The Philippines is the only country in Southeast Asia with a mainly Christian population, and the impact of American rule in the country from 1898 to 1941 was extraordinarily strong. These two factors largely hindered the implementation of an ideology that propagated a return to “Asian values” in the islands. Philippine and Japanese literature on the Japanese occupation indicates that most Filipinos considered themselves not as Asians but as belonging to the Western hemisphere. This self-image of the Filipinos made the Philippines a special case among all those countries occupied by Japan throughout the Pacific War.

In my thesis, I will show how Japanese pan-Asianism developed over the years into an ideology that shaped the outline of Japanese foreign policy by the late 1930s. I will examine how the perception of the Philippines in this ideology changed, and how far pan-Asianism played a role in Japanese-Philippine relations. Furthermore, I will show that there were two concurrent factions within the Japanese pan-Asianist community: one an “exoteric” or traditionalist faction; the other an “esoteric” or realist faction. These factions had divergent views on the perspectives of the Philippines becoming part of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. While the “exoteric” faction was very optimistic that the Philippines could be easily integrated into the sphere, the “esoteric” faction regarded the cultural differences between the islands and Japan as a major obstacle to the admission of the Philippines into the sphere. I will show how eventually the “esoteric” faction had a stronger impact on Japanese occupation policy. However, the pro-Americanism of many Filipinos, along with a pressing war situation for Japan, made the success of pan-Asianism in the Philippines impossible. Despite the propaganda efforts of Japanese administrators and some Filipino intellectuals who promoted pan-Asianist ideals, pan-Asianism could never establish roots in the islands during the occupation period.
I. Research Questions

1. What role did the Philippines play in Japanese pan-Asianist thought before the war, and what role did Japanese pan-Asianists envision for the archipelago within the GEACPS?
2. Did pan-Asianism influence the Military Administration and the administration of the Second Philippine Republic?
3. Did any form of Philippine Asianism have a notable impact on Philippine society? Did this Philippine Asianism interact with its Japanese counterpart?

II. Summary Chapter 2

At the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, opposition against the national policy of the government emerged in Japan. This opposition firmly criticized the adoption of Western behaviour and culture in the course of Japan’s modernization. Unlike the ruling Meiji oligarchs, the opposition leaders saw the answer to Western encroachment not in copying the enemy but by propagating a re-orientation towards original (and “superior”) Asian values, and the creation of an Asian bloc. In its early stages, this rather romantic pan-Asianism was focused on the Sino-centric sphere of China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. On the other hand, Japanese nationalists, especially in the navy, advocated a southward expansion to secure Japan’s political and economic independence. However, these nationalists legitimated their agenda solely according to Japanese national interests and not with reference to the concept of cooperation between Japan and other Asian societies. Nationalists embraced imperialism while Asianists condemned it. For pan-Asianists throughout the Meiji period the idea of Japanese leadership within an Asian bloc became increasingly prominent, as they believed that only Japan would be economically and militarily capable of leading Asia towards unification and freedom. Throughout the Taishō era and early Shōwa period, the concept of a Greater East Asian Cooperative Body (GEACB) developed, and this was no longer limited to the Sino-centric area. Finally, nationalist concepts of southward expansion and the pan-Asianist idea of a GEACB melted into one and legitimizing Japanese expansionism under the slogan of “Liberating Asia” as the antipode to imperialism, which was associated with an aggressive and oppressive Western policy. At the same time two different streams of pan-Asianism evolved: the “exoteric” stream and the “esoteric” stream. This contradiction within the pan-Asianist community largely centered on the question of the Nan’yō, and the Philippines in particular, becoming part of Greater Asia. This is what we shall explore in the next chapter.

III. Summary Chapter 3

In the wake of the Pacific War, pan-Asianism had become the outline of Japanese foreign policy and the moral justification for the Japanese expansion into the South Seas. The establishment
of a GEACPS was the manifestation of the Japanese pan-Asianist vision for a New Order in the Far East and the world. However, there was a discourse within the pan-Asianist community on how the goal of the GEACPS could be achieved, mainly in regard to the integration of the Nan’yō into this sphere under Japanese leadership.

One “exoteric” or “culturalist faction” argued for a simple application of the same principles underlying the old concept of an East Asian Community consisting of Japan, China, Korea and Manchukuo in the South Seas since these regions also had natural geographic and ethnological ties with Japan. Therein, the peoples of these regions (like the Filipinos) would automatically come to appreciate participation in a Japanese-led regional system that aimed to emancipate and liberate the colonised people from their Western overlords.

The other “esoteric” or “realist faction”, foremost represented by Rōyama Masamichi (1895-1980) and the Shōwa Research Association, was far more critical towards an integration of Southeast Asia into the sphere. Even though they advocated for the same fundamental principle of *hakkō ichiu* as the culturalists, they were also aware of the cultural and historical specifics, which made an integration of the region into the sphere difficult. Following geopolitical principles, Rōyama was convinced that the realization of the GEACPS was impossible without a people’s movement in the various regions towards becoming part of the sphere. By the wake of the Pacific War, Rōyama stated that such a movement in form of a “historical dynamic” did not exist yet and that the ties between the core region of the sphere (Japan, Manchukuo and China) and the Southeast Asian countries (among them the Philippines) were not strong enough to meet the preconditions for the establishment of the GEACPS. Whereas Rōyama was mainly concerned with the difficulties of integrating the South Seas into the sphere, his colleague from the *Shōwa Kenkyūkai*, Yabe Teiji, who also was a member of the Navy Research Commission, warned of possible danger for Japan if it allowed close contact of its people with the people of other parts of the sphere, like the South Seas. Despite advocating the establishment of the GEACPS, he emphasized differences between the various peoples rather than commonalities and feared a loss of Japan’s own identity if the sphere became a multi-cultural entity like the Roman Empire. Just as Rōyama, Yabe did not share the culturalist idea of one Asian unity under Japanese leadership.

In the history of Japanese imperialism, the Philippines had played a major role in the so-called Southward Doctrine as a possible colony that could solve the population surplus problem in Japan. Japanese pan-Asianists, who were very eager not to be associated with any kind of imperialism, largely ignored the Philippines until the mid-1930s. Thereafter, it was the “exoteric”, traditionalist stream of pan-Asianism that advocated making the Philippines part of Greater Asia (and later the GEACPS) while the “esoteric,” realist faction argued against doing so. Which of these two pan-Asianist canons (if either) had the stronger impact on occupation policy, and what was the Filipino reaction? This is what I shall examine in the chapters on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Another question will be if the “esoteric” faction used the “exoteric” ideology to access the Philippine population in the same way that the ruling elite in Meiji Japan had manipulated the Japanese public.
The Japanese Navy’s planning of the GEACPS involved a discourse among the participating scholars in the Navy Research Commission. The faction of Yabe Teiji and Matsushita Masatoshi finally prevailed and the treatise published by the commission highlighted a stance in which a strong position would be assumed by Japan as the leading power in a Japanese-dominated regional bloc. Yabe Teiji envisioned for the Philippines the role of a semi-independent protectorate and strongly opposed the “exoteric” approach to define a common Oriental identity based on cultural or even racial affinities. Overall, the navy’s outline for the creation of the GEACPS was very pragmatic and followed Japanese war aims. In its focus on Japanese nationalistic interests, it resembled the Southward Doctrine (Nanshin-ron) that the Japanese navy had pursued since the early Meiji era.

On the other hand, the Japanese army put a strong emphasis on winning over the present Philippine government, as can be seen in the report of the First Department Research Section. The “Proposed Measures with Commentary Dealing with the Philippine Islands in the Event of War with the United States” reflect the hopes of the pan-Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai who were convinced that the Philippine government, as well as the Filipino people, would soon come to realize the substantial benefits that the Japanese policy had to offer. In this regard, the army’s planning stages for the Philippine occupation followed an overall “exoteric” pan-Asianist school of thought. Osamu Kuno described the Japanese military during the Meiji era as the only group “at the top of the power structure” that supported the “exoteric” ideology of unconditional emperor worship.

By the time of the invasion, it became apparent that the greater part of the Quezon administration, and President Quezon himself, would not change sides and cooperate with the Japanese as the “exoteric” pan-Asianists had predicted. Nevertheless, the army applying Kuno’s terminology to Japanese pan-Asianism regarding the Philippines, the army maintained its tradition of clinging to the traditionalist ideology. The army advocated an occupation policy that would convince the Filipinos of the benefits of the GEACPS. The “exoteric” approach would be the guidelines for the Japanese administrative policy in the Philippines and not simply be used as a façade to win over the masses.

Nevertheless, the army continued in its plans to rule the Philippines through the old Commonwealth elites. The fact that the Japanese government in Tokyo sent a Research Commission to the Philippines more than one year after the actual invasion took place shows that the overall planning of the administration policy followed a very strict timetable. Despite cultural and educational exchanges between Japan and the Philippines prior to the war and the research that had been conducted by Japanese scholars on the archipelago, there seems to have been an awareness within the Imperial Government that the Philippine case needed further examination, especially in regard to the implementation of pan-Asianist ideas. Assuming that Tokyo considered the possible difficulties in convincing the Western-orientated Filipinos of the concept of the GEACPS, a logical consequence seems to be that the “esoteric” pan-Asianist Rōyama Masamichi was sent to the Philippines. Rōyama had emphasized the obstacles to the establishment of the sphere imposed by cultural and historic specifics in Southeast Asia before the Pacific War broke out. His suggestions...
for a policy that would smooth the integration of the Philippines into the GEACPS demonstrate his conviction that Japanese pan-Asianism needed to adapt to Philippine circumstances. The report of the Research Commission reflects, to some degree, Rōyama’s caveats; at the same time, it provided a blueprint for the realization of Japanese “esoteric” pan-Asianism in the Philippines. In what form and to what extent did the Japanese administrators put this outline into action? The following sub-chapter will examine this question.

V. Summary Chapter 4.2.

In general, the outline of the Military Administration’s policy reflected the pan-Asianism of the realist, “esoteric” faction of the Shōwa Research Association. General Homma was completely aware of the difficulties in making the Philippines part of the GEACPS and demanded the development of a spiritual movement towards the establishment of the sphere among the Filipino people. In this way, he strongly resembled Rōyama Masamichi. The “culturalist”, “esoteric” faction of pan-Asianism represented by the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai had no real impact on the Japanese Military Administration’s occupation policy in the Philippines. In its announcements, the Military Administration emphasized the necessity of the Filipinos recovering their Oriental roots, as it was aware of the ongoing sympathy the population had for the Americans. In the planning for the occupation, the army and navy knew that the implementation of the idea of the GEACPS in the Philippines would not become a self-fulfilling prophecy as the “esoteric” pan-Asianists had predicted. Therefore, the military sought advice from the “esoteric” faction, and this “esoteric” stream of thought was indeed reflected in the policies adopted by the Military Administration during the first 20 months of the occupation (i.e., until the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic). The economic policy followed Japanese war needs but as the Empire officially waged the war to serve the purpose of liberating Asia and establishing a GEACPS, this meant no contradiction to the principle of kyōzon kyōei in the eyes of the Japanese rulers. The great purpose of creating an “Asia for the Asians” justified the temporarily exploitation of Philippine resources, as the country would benefit from a Japanese victory in the Greater East Asia War. The “esoteric” pan-Asianism showed only in the propaganda measures of the Military Administration. While the government in Tokyo and Japanese administrators in the Philippines became fully aware of Philippine hostility to the Japanese occupation, they used “esoteric” terminology to justify their cause and persuade the Filipinos. This system of a small, “esoteric” elite using this “esoteric” ideology to control and manipulate the masses is the same as that which Osamu Kuno described in his analysis of the Meiji state in Japan. In this way, J. Victor Koschmann’s application of Kuno’s terminology of Japanese pan-Asianism works perfectly for the Japanese occupation policy in the Philippines. “Exoteric” pan-Asianism had become a façade, as it was clear to the Japanese administrators that they would need to adapt this ideology to Philippine conditions.

The KALIBAPI was an instrument which implemented the concept of the GEACPS in Philippine society and an attempt to create a public movement towards the establishment of a “New Philippines” as part of the sphere. This was the kind of “historical dynamic” that Rōyama
Masamichi had demanded as a precondition for the integration of the Philippines into the GEACPS prior to the war. Educational policy followed the same idea. The main purpose of educational reforms conducted during the occupation was to foster Philippine nationalism via Filipinization and secularization of academic bodies. It was believed that this would create a base for the establishment of a new self-image amongst Filipinos, and make them gradually come to appreciate the concept of the GEACPS. Educational policy, as well as the handling of religious affairs by the Japanese Military Administration during the short-lived Second Philippine Republic, took into account the cultural and historical specifics of the Philippines while promoting the concept of the sphere. This adaptation of pan-Asianism to Philippine circumstances followed the “esoteric” stream propagated by Rōyama Masamichi and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai.

The Second Philippine Republic was, by the time of its inauguration and until its end after less than two years of existence, nothing more than a Japanese vassal state. As was the case with economic policy, its foreign policy followed Japanese war interests, and diplomatic relations were limited to the Axis powers and other members of the GEACPS. One can only speculate as to whether the status of the Second Republic would have changed should there have been a successful termination of the Pacific Campaign for Japan. Throughout the war, the Philippines was a country with the status of a “semi-autonomous protectorate” as Yabe Teiji had envisioned in 1941. The Second Philippine Republic as a “New Philippines” within the framework of the GEACPS was a country under construction and it remained an unfinished project until the end. The Japanese tried to govern the Philippines through the old elites during the Military Administration and relied on large parts of the old Philippine Commonwealth administration when it came to the establishment of the republic. The way in which the Japanese attempted to deal with Philippine Catholicism shows the pragmatism of their occupation policy. Tokyo had no illusions about how deeply rooted the Catholic Church was in Philippine society and therefore followed the recommendations of the Research Commission about cooperating with the church and gradually diminishing its influence by secularization of academic bodies. The Japanese considered Catholicism a product of Spanish rule, and despite its positive effects in terms of nation building in the Philippines, they saw it as a source of alienation for the Filipino people from their Oriental roots. Therefore, the Japanese regarded Spaniards with suspicion even though the Franco regime was politically close to the Axis Powers.

The Chinese living in the Philippines were not treated according to the principle of “one script, one race” as the Japanese suspected them to be supporters of the US and the Chiang Kai-shek regime in China. While the Japanese viewed Spaniards with suspicion because they considered Spanish rule to have been one of the reasons for the Westernization of the islands, they mistrusted the overseas Chinese because the latter had been “poisoned” by Western influence.

Despite the widespread sympathy for the US among Philippine society, there were certain Filipinos who actively promoted the idea of pan-Asianism in the islands. Their motives and the influence of Philippine Asianism on Philippine society in general will be examined in the next chapter.
VI. Summary Chapter 5

The Philippine independence movement and the inauguration of the First Philippine Republic (Malolos Republic) in the final years of the 19th century had coincided with Japan’s rise as an industrialized state and Great Power. Therefore, Filipino revolutionaries like Mariano Ponce, José Ramos, Vicente Sotto and Artemio Ricarte looked to Japan as a natural ally in their struggle to end the Western colonisation of their country. However, apart from some moral support from various Japanese pan-Asianist groups, they did not receive much assistance, as the official outline of Japanese foreign policy at that time was to avoid any possible conflict with the US over the Philippine independence issue. The revolutionaries themselves were Filipino nationalists who, in the first place, had no concept of the Philippines being a part of a Greater Asia under Japanese leadership. Japan served as a role model for the emancipation of an Oriental country from the West, but none of the above-mentioned revolutionaries envisioned a New Order for Asia and the world as the Japanese pan-Asianists did.

In the 1930s, Benigno Ramos and Pio Duran appeared on the Philippine political stage. In contrast to the earlier revolutionaries they clearly supported the idea of Japanese leadership in Asia and joined a Japanese pan-Asianist organization, the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. This organization also launched a branch in the Philippines to propagate pan-Asianism in that country and convince Filipinos that Japan did not intend to invade the islands after independence from the US. Since the “esoteric” pan-Asianists of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai were highly critical about the idea of making the Philippines a part of Greater Asia, only “exoteric” pan-Asianists attempted to strike roots in the archipelago. However, Japanese representatives like Imamura Chūsuke and Filipino Asianists such as Duran and Ramos underestimated the extent of pro-Americanism among the Philippine population. Their “exoteric” belief that the just motives of Japanese pan-Asianism would automatically instigate a grassroots movement in the islands completely failed. Even though Duran (and to a much lesser extent Ramos) were integrated into the administration of the Second Philippine Republic and parts of the Philippine intelligentsia cooperated by publishing pro-Japanese articles in the propaganda magazine Pillars, a popular base for Philippine Asianism could never be established. The president of the new republic, José P. Laurel, sympathized with Japanese culture, but like the revolutionaries of the late 19th and early 20th century, he was first and foremost a Filipino nationalist. He did not believe in the longevity of the GEACPS (the same might be true for scholars like Gregorio F. Zaide) and intended to use the occupation period to strengthen his own position for the time after the war.

Even though an “exoteric” pan-Asianist movement had existed in the Philippines since the mid-1930s, it never went beyond a rather small elite group of intellectuals who failed to correctly gauge the sentiments of the great majority of the Philippine population.

VII. Summary and Conclusion of the Thesis

In the introduction of this thesis, I raised three major research questions in connection with
Japanese pan-Asianism and the Philippines. The first question was about the role that the Philippines played in Japanese pan-Asianism before the war and the prospect of the archipelago becoming part of the GEACPS in the eyes of Japanese pan-Asianists. To answer this question, I examined the history and development of Japanese pan-Asianism. Pan-Asianism was never a monolithic ideology but constantly subject to change and diversified within itself. It went from an idea based on solidarity between Japan, China and Korea to a concept in which Japan had to take the leadership in the liberation of the whole continent, along with the creation of a new world order. By the mid-1930s, two main factions had developed within the pan-Asianist community, the “exoteric” faction (traditionalists or culturalists) and the “esoteric” faction (rationalists or realists). Their perception of Southeast Asia and their assessment of the chances for an integration of this region into the framework of Greater Asia differed remarkably. This was especially true for the Philippines, an archipelago that was culturally very specific in Southeast Asia. It was the only country in the region with a mainly Christian Catholic population. Furthermore, the impact of Spanish and American colonial rule in the islands was extraordinary strong. There is arguably no other country that could provide a more adequate example to highlight the diverging views within the Japanese pan-Asianist community regarding the establishment of the GEACPS. While the “exoteric” pan-Asianist faction in Japan was convinced that the Filipinos would come to appreciate the concept of the GEACPS automatically, as they were just misled Orientals waiting for liberation, the “esoteric” faction emphasized the cultural differences between the archipelago and Japan. In fact, the “esoteric” Shōwa Kenkyūkai opposed the integration of the South Seas region into the GEACPS because the conditions for such a step did not yet exist. Thus, by the time of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, there was no consensus among the Japanese pan-Asianist community on the question of Philippine membership in the GEACPS.

The second research question dealt with the impact of pan-Asianism on the Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines and the administration of the so-called Second Philippine Republic. First, I examined how both the Japanese army and navy planned the occupation of the Philippines and what role pan-Asianism played in these early stages of planning.

The Japanese navy and army conducted research on how to administer the regions in the South Seas prior to the war. The Treatise on the GEACPS that a group of intellectuals worked out for the navy did not reflect the “exoteric” pan-Asianist approach of a common cultural heritage and racial affinity between Japan and the Philippines. The treatise was rather shaped by the “esoteric” canon. There was a strong emphasis on Japan’s superior role in the GEACPS and a limited degree of independence for countries like the Philippines. The army, on the other hand, was more amicable to the “exoteric” approach during the planning stages of the occupation. Its first priority was to win over both the Philippine population and government. The Army General Staff even shared the hope of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai that Philippine President Manuel Quezon could be convinced to change sides and cooperate with the Japanese in the integration of his country into the GEACPS. As it during the first months of the occupation became apparent that the “exoteric” assumptions did not fulfil, the government in Tokyo sent a Research Commission headed by the influential Shōwa Kenkyūkai member Rōyama Masamichi, arguably the most prominent proponent of the “esoteric” pan-Asianist faction in Japan, to the Philippines. The Japanese administrators
enacted some of the suggestions of the Research Commission regarding reforms of the clergy and education but the Second Philippine Republic was too short-lived to show any change of attitude amongst Filipinos towards their self-perception as Orientals. In contrast with the occupied regions of the Sino-centric core of Asia, the Japanese did not try to assimilate the population, but simply to reawaken the Oriental spirit of the Filipinos and make them become aware again of their identity as Asians. The ways in which the Japanese administrators dealt with Philippine Catholicism provides a good example of this attempt to adapt Japanese pan-Asianism to Philippine circumstances. By removing clergy and personnel from teaching positions in private schools and by continuing the secularization of the administrative body that had already begun under American rule, the Japanese intended to weaken the influence of the Catholic Church on Philippine society. This was a long-term goal as it was obvious to the Japanese administrators that they could not remove Catholicism overnight. This very pragmatic approach is typical of the “esoteric” pan-Asianism of Rōyama Masamichi and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, and widely followed the recommendations of the Philippine Research Commission under Rōyama’s leadership. Tokyo sent the Research Commission to the Philippines while the occupation of the archipelago was in progress. Furthermore, most of the personnel in the propaganda corps possessed no deeper knowledge of the Philippines and relied on the expertise of the few Filipinos who took part in the propaganda efforts. The army and the navy executed their concrete planning for the occupation of the Philippines only a few months prior to the invasion. The short-termed preparation of the Japanese military is one possible explanation why in particular on the side of the army the degree of Filipino pro-Americanism (and lack of Orientalism) was underestimated. Even though it was the “exoteric” stream in Japanese pan-Asianism, that since the mid-1930s advocated for the Philippines to become part of Greater Asia, the overall conception for the administration of the Philippines and its integration into the GEACPS tended to follow “esoteric” pan-Asianist ideas, especially after it had become obvious that the “exoteric” predictions would not fulfill. Only the propaganda efforts of the Japanese, mainly those of the Department of Information, reflected the “exoteric” approach.

Furthermore, only a few months into the Japanese rule in the islands the tide of the war increasingly turned against Japan. The occupation policy followed Japanese war needs instead of ideological aspects (even though the exploitation of Philippine labour and resources was justified by the ideological purpose of waging the war for the goal of the establishment of the GEACPS). While the civilian officials in the Foreign Ministry and the Greater East Asia Ministry were the ones most convinced of the concept of the GEACPS, the field commanders of the army were most of all concerned about the welfare of their troops and their military mission. The concept of winning over the Philippine population by establishing friendly relations with the natives became more irrelevant to them the nearer the American reinvasion drew. This led to an increase in atrocities committed by Japanese military personnel against Filipino civilians and consequently, lowered the credibility of the Japanese and their concept of the GEACPS even further.

The third question related to Philippine Asianism, its influence on Philippine society and its relationship with Japanese pan-Asianism. Overall, there was never a popular base for any kind of Asianism in the Philippines. The long years of Western colonisation had left Filipinos with the self-image of an Occidental people, and those revolutionaries who opposed American rule in the
archipelago had a strict “Philippines first” mindset. Filipino intellectuals such as Pio Duran and Benigno Ramos, who joined the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai and proposed that the Philippines become part of a Greater Asia under Japanese leadership, completely underestimated their fellow citizens’ degree of Westernization and their unwillingness to reverse this process. Therein they resembled their Japanese “exoteric” pan-Asianist counterparts. The “exoteric” pan-Asianist organizations like the Firippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai never developed into mass movements, and the KALIBAPI as an institution designed to propagate Orientalism as a unifying feature among all Filipinos failed to turn the people of the Philippines into devoted citizens of the GEACPS.

In the postwar literature on the Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia and the occupation of the Philippines, one can distinguish four main approaches. The “façade theory”, propagated by the majority of Western, Filipino and Japanese historians who worked on the Pacific War, says that pan-Asianism simply functioned as a disguise for Japanese imperialism. A second theory claims that the Japanese army was never willing to implement pan-Asianism in Southeast Asia since it never had any ambitions in this region. Advocates of the “liberation theory” state that Japan indeed instigated the postwar independence movements in Southeast Asia and blame the incapable Japanese militarists in the occupation regimes for the failed implementation of pan-Asianism in the Nan’yō. Finally, proponents of the “postwar perspective theory” are convinced that Tokyo granted independence to countries like Burma and the Philippines only to prepare its own case for the time after defeat (which seemed inevitable to them from 1943 onwards).

The prewar conceptualization of the army’s occupation policy as well as the official outline of the Japanese Military Administration followed pan-Asianist ideas. Throughout the occupation period, administrators attempted to adapt the ideology to Philippine circumstances. Furthermore, the Japanese treated even allied nationals such as Spaniards and Germans in the Philippines as “Westerners”; they blamed especially the Spaniards for the decay of Oriental values in the archipelago. In this sense, pan-Asianism was more than a mere façade to hide Japanese imperialist ambitions in the islands. The Japanese militarists were not solely to blame for the failure of this concept in the Philippines. The tide of the war increasingly turned against Japan and ideological aspects became subsidiary to the war needs of the army. Towards the end of the occupation, pan-Asianism had become an issue of minor importance to the field commanders and common soldiers who interacted on a daily basis with the Philippine population.

It is also questionable as to whether or not Tokyo granted independence to the Philippines to prepare its own case for the time after defeat, as both the Japanese army and navy had already envisioned an independent Philippines in their respective pre-war plans for the archipelago. The inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic was no ad hoc decision by the government in Tokyo, but had been part of the official outline of Japanese foreign policy since at least 1941.

Finally, regarding the claim that Japan largely contributed to liberation movements in Southeast Asia, this does not ring true for the Philippines. Pre-war independence movements in the Philippines did indeed seek support from Japan, and some of the Filipino collaborators during the occupation were even “exoteric” pan-Asianists. However, the majority of the Philippine population was not opposed to American rule by the time of the Japanese invasion, and the archipelago was on the eve of independence. Therefore, the Japanese occupation period did not
trigger any additional independence movements, nor did it change the relationship between the Filipinos and the Americans. The US granted the Philippines independence on 4 July 1946, just as the Americans had promised to do prior to the war.

Rōyama Masamichi’s prewar assumption that the preconditions for the integration of Southeast Asia into the GEACPS did not yet exist held true for the Philippines. For the Japanese Imperial Army marching under the banner of pan-Asianism, going to the Philippines was never like coming home.
This dissertation employs a novel constructivist approach to sovereignty and the relationship between international politics and international law to shed new light on the nature and dynamics of Japan’s territorial disputes in the post-Cold War period. Previous research has either been too broad (large-N studies) or in some cases too specific (e.g. economic interdependency studies) to appreciate the complex and nuanced nature of these disputes. Instead the dissertation shows how understanding the manner in which the states involved use sovereignty as a means to furthering their position in the dispute – in the ‘sovereignty game’ – provides more compelling explanations of the dynamics of these disputes. In the past, states often resorted to force to occupy disputed territories, but this research shows that rather than directly using force, states in contemporary territorial disputes use the exercise of sovereignty to improve their position in the ‘sovereignty game’: they attempt to exercise sovereignty over the disputed territory and to prevent the other state from doing the same. The dissertation uses three case studies from the end of the Cold War until the present day: the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Dokdo) disputed by Japan and South Korea, the Pinnacle Islands (Senkaku/Diaoyu) disputed by Japan and China, and the Northern Territories (Hoppou Ryoudo/Kurils) disputed by Japan and Russia. The case studies differ in some features but share others, and all three are inter-related. This allows for fruitful comparisons between all three, and understanding each case study helps in understanding the others.

Ⅰ. Literature Review

Territorial disputes in general, while historically crucial to actual international relations, are not a fashionable subject in the discipline of International Relations these days. In fact, despite being responsible for so much conflict worldwide research on their nature and dynamics is scant and severely under-theorized. As shown in the first half of the literature review, an approach known as territoriality has enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the study of territorial disputes in the discipline of International Relations, although this school itself has been confined to the margins, with the research
overwhelmingly performed by a small number of dedicated researchers. Meanwhile the specific research which has been undertaken on Japan’s territorial disputes is mixed. There has been some excellent work carried out on these disputes, particularly on both their history and the role of nationalism. Other work has been confined by the theoretical framework utilised, where the theory provides the answer, resulting in mono-causality.

The territorality approach uses a hypothetico-deductive approach based on large-scale dyadic challenger/target aggregate data sets to ever further refine hypotheses regarding the relationship between territory and the escalation/de-escalation of conflict. It was borne out of a dissatisfaction with the realist approach to war and territory, specifically the fact that realists treated territorial disputes as “symptoms of conflict between states, whereas the struggle for power and security is the true cause” (Kocs 1995: 160, Vasquez 1993: 124). Thus, rather than focusing on the anarchic interstate system as the locus conflict in the world, it has been built around the empirical fact that states which have territorial disputes with their neighbours are more likely to go war with those neighbours than states which do not (Holsti 1991, Vasquez 1993, Hensel 1996, Senese and Vasquez 2003). As a purely rationalist approach it excludes normative factors in territorial disputes, especially norms governing state behaviour. Furthermore the approach is based entirely on conflict escalation/de-escalation despite the fact that most territorial disputes rarely feature large-scale escalation and conflict; the approach cannot help us understand the basic dynamics of territorial disputes. The dyadic nature of the approach requires the over-simplification of disputes which involve more than two states. The insights which the approach has generated are often contradictory and the approach has managed to convincingly demonstrate nothing more than that the existence of a territorial dispute increases the likelihood of conflict between two states. Fundamentally territorality is a flawed approach to territorial disputes, built on a simple and scientific methodology, lacking firm theoretical grounding, and failing to appreciate the massive variance in the nature of territorial disputes around the world.

The previous paragraph discussed territorality, a very broad approach to the study of territorial disputes. There is also a body of literature which focuses specifically on Japan’s territorial disputes. There are several historical accounts of the origins of the modern disputes, with Kimie Hara’s work providing authoritative and insightful studies (2001, 2007). She examines the drafting of the San Francisco Treaty and other archival evidence from that period, showing how the international structure led to each territorial dispute being left as a ‘wedge’ by the US in order to “retain some sources of discord between Japan and its neighbours .. in preparation for the possible fall of Korea” (2001: 373). There are of course many other notable studies which focus on Japan’s territorial disputes. Downs and Saunders (1998) and Deans (2003) assess the relationship between nationalism and legitimacy in conditioning China’s behaviour in the Pinnacle Islands dispute with Japan, while Koos (2005, 2009) uses economic interdependency theory and a methodology which is not dissimilar to the territorality approach to gauge de-escalation and escalation in territorial disputes in East Asia. Kimura and Welch’s study of the Northern Territories dispute rejects conventional notions of International Relations Theory, attempting to demonstrate instead that state interests in a given situation are “highly variable and inescapably idiosyncratic” (1998: 216). This literature and the many other studies have made a valuable contribution to the understanding of Japan’s territorial disputes, yet thus far no scholars have made sovereignty
The primary focus of their study, nor has anyone attempted to study the territorial disputes from a combined perspective of both international law and international politics. This dissertation takes up this challenge.

II. Approach

The basic assumption of sovereignty from the perspective of this dissertation is that it is socially constructed. Wendt describes the modern concept of sovereignty as providing the basis “social basis for the individuality and security of states” (1992: 412). The essence of the institution of sovereignty is the “mutual recognition of one another’s right to exercise political authority within territorial limits” (1992: 412). Sovereignty is self-perpetuating, since it is in every state’s interest that it be preserved; when a state violates another state’s sovereignty this is also perceived as a violation of the concept of sovereignty itself, and thus is a threat to all states. There are three main aspects of sovereignty as it exists in international relations: recognition, authority, and territoriality. Recognition of sovereignty by other states provides legitimacy, and legitimacy means that other states will act to confirm the actions of the sovereign state over its recognised territory. Sovereignty then is “is not an attribute of the state but it is attributed to the state (Thomson 1995: 219). However sovereignty is not complete with only recognition: authority is also needed. Authority is the ability to actually exercise power within the state’s boundaries. The final requirement for sovereignty is territoriality, which is the idea that “states mutually recognise exclusive authority over what is contained in that [bordered] space” (Thomson 1995: 227).

Recognition is a key aspect of sovereignty in international relations; in a territorial dispute, just as in the case of the existence of a state, recognition matters. Without international recognition of sovereignty over a given territory, the sovereignty remains incomplete. Thus gaining international recognition of a sovereignty claim over a territory is an important part of the sovereignty game. Yet, as we saw, recognition is only one constituent of sovereignty; the second is authority, or in the case of disputed territories perhaps better refered to as actual direct control. Enjoying the recognition of the majority of states a sovereignty claim does not actually mean that you enjoy full sovereignty over the disputed territory. Indeed, if the territory has been occupied by another state for a long period of time the international community may even gradually come to accept the fait accompli of the occupation, even if originally the occupation was unrecognised. That is not to say that international recognition is worthless – far from it – rather the implications of the lack of recognition can be difficult to ascertain and are context-dependent. The lack of international recognition makes that sovereignty incomplete, and so even if the immediate material costs of that incomplete sovereignty are not apparent, this does not diminish the state’s desire for complete sovereignty – international recognition – over all of its claimed sovereign territory.

Authority too is a crucial aspect of the sovereignty game. Even if a state enjoys full recognition of sovereignty over a disputed territory, this sovereignty is incomplete if it does not enjoy the actual direct application of sovereignty. Thus a major part of the sovereignty game is the ability to demonstrate sovereignty over the disputed territory, as well as the corollary of
this: the ability to prevent the other state (s) from doing so. So what is an exercise of sovereignty? The formal legal definition of an exercise of sovereignty is relatively narrow – for example in International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence maps cannot indicate territorial title unless they are attached to an official text of which they form an intrinsic part. As we have seen, the legal realm of territorial disputes – the sovereignty game – is constituted by both law and politics, therefore states act in ways which are not strictly ‘legal’ but which are informed by law.

The exercises of sovereignty which are of interest to this dissertation are specifically those which relate to disputed island territories. They include any state actions which refer to the disputed territory, and can, depending on the context, be effected not only by the state in the traditional sense (that is to say, not only be the central government), but also by substate actors, which can include citizens, private groups and regional governments. Ultimately, an exercise of sovereignty takes place when both sides recognise it as such, and thus a simple test as to whether a state or other body’s action is an exercise of sovereignty or not is whether the other state lodged a protest in response. Obviously not all exercises of sovereignty carry the same weight.

As noted in the previous section, one of the ways an exercise of sovereignty can be recognised is the response to it: does the state protest or acquiesce? In order to lodge a legal protest, a state merely has to lodge a formal protest. However, the extent of the political protest takes us to the critical issue of the effect of the exercise of sovereignty, and the ability of each state to exercise sovereignty and prevent the exercise of sovereignty by the other state; in other words, the relationship between the exercise of sovereignty, the protest and/or acquiescence, and the position of each state in the sovereignty game. When a state attempts to exercise sovereignty over a territory, the first question which must be asked is: is this exercise of sovereignty a break in precedent or is it in keeping with the status quo of the sovereignty in the dispute? If the exercise of sovereignty falls within the existing status quo then this does not affect the sovereignty status and thus there is no requirement for any major protest (unless the other state wishes to use this opportunity to alter or reverse the status quo, see below). If the exercise of sovereignty is unprecedented in the dispute – i.e. if the exercise does not fall within but instead alters the status quo – then the other state has two choices: protest or acquiesce. Protest in this instance is not legal protest, though it may include it – acquiescence can take place despite the state lodging a formal legal protest. Rather, protest in this case is political protest, which involves the state employing its resources – diplomatic, economic or military – to prevent the other state from carrying out the exercise of sovereignty. Once the state has acquiesced, the precedent is made, and once the precedent is made it becomes very difficult to reverse – more difficult than it would have been to protest and prevent the initial exercise of sovereignty itself.
The timing of the incorporation of the Liancourt Rocks into Shimane Prefecture – in 1905, the same year as Korea was made a Japanese protectorate – resulted in the highly emotional nature of the modern dispute in South Korea. In Japan the secret pact agreed in the negotiations in advance of the 1965 normalisation treaty meant that the rocks were largely forgotten about until 1996, the abrogation of the secret pact and the ratification of UNCLOS (Roh 2008). The reasons why the secret pact was abrogated suggested in this chapter focus on the relationship between Korean nationalism and democratisation, and more importantly (from the perspective of this dissertation) on the ratification of the UNCLOS and the resulting overlapping EEZs claims in the Sea of Japan. The latest phase of the territorial dispute then dates from 1996 rather than 1990.

Tokyo’s response to the construction of the wharf on the rocks follows the logic not of international law but of the sovereignty game. Such a powerful and direct exercise of sovereignty (construction of state infrastructure) had to be protested at a level much higher than the usual note verbale protesting South Korean occupation of the rocks, or else Tokyo’s political claim would seem weak. This led to Foreign Minister Ikeda’s protests. Yet the emotional nature of the dispute in South Korea created an anti-Japanese backlash against the protest. The result of the situation was that while Tokyo did protest South Korea’s new activity on the rocks, it also acquiesced politically to what was essentially a fait accompli: Seoul would never back down in response to a foreign minister’s protest, even if that was an unusually high-level protest in the recent history of the dispute. Of course the economic, diplomatic or military capital which Japan would have had to expend in order to prevent a fait accompli was prohibitive, rather, the level of protest was commensurate to ensuring that Tokyo’s interests in the dispute were maintained: preserving its negotiating position for the surrounding disputed maritime territory, maintaining the overall claim to the rocks from a legal perspective (and thus maintaining its precedential value with regard to the Pinnacle Islands).

The 1998 Fisheries Agreement was a temporary EEZ compromise as neither side could allow the rocks to be surrounded by the others’ sovereign maritime territory (i.e. their EEZ). The waters surrounding the rocks became a joint administration zone. Article 15 of the agreement was included to prevent the agreement having any effect on the territorial dispute itself. Despite the construction of the wharf, the increased size of the garrison on the rocks, and so on, South Korea enjoyed no gains on the maritime territory issue: the agreement was basically along the same lines as previous Korean-Japanese fisheries agreements. After the fishery agreement Tokyo maintained its low-level protest, thus preserving its position vis-à-vis the EEZ issue and the precedential aspect of the dispute. Despite coming under nationalist pressure to take a tougher line in 1996 and 1997, when various issues – such as the ‘Dokdo stamps’ – arose in the early 2000s the then Koizumi administration dealt with them quietly and carefully. These issues clearly show that Tokyo at this time would not let the dispute damage relations with South Korea. Foreign minister-level protest ensured that its EEZ claim would be intact and the precedential value – in this case both legal and political – of the territorial dispute in terms of the Pinnacle Islands would be preserved.

The fact that Tokyo did raise the stakes when it came to the maritime territorial dispute
in 2006 confirms this hypothesis. The Japanese
government was serious that, although again of no
real legal importance, Korean names of undersea
features in the disputed maritime zone would be
used to strengthen to Korean EEZ claims. The
brinkmanship the hydrographic research issue
led to, and the difficulties in resolving the tense
stand-off, left little doubt that it was the maritime
territory, not the rocks themselves, that Tokyo was
interested in. The role of international recognition
in the territorial dispute becomes apparent during
this crisis. Tokyo’s reaction was spurred on by
South Korea’s intention to have parts of disputed
EEZ named at an International Hydrographic
Organisation conference, giving the Korean names
international recognition. Such international
recognition would provide further legitimacy to
South Korea’s claim on the maritime territory and
therefore bolster its claim in a political sense.

Observing the territorial dispute over the
long-term, a change in Tokyo’s position can be
identified from the mid-2000s on. Takeshima Day,
initially played down by the central government
and ignored by Diet politicians, has gained
legitimacy and is now attended by both LDP and
DPJ diet members. The Liancourt Rocks dispute
is no longer the preserve of far-right groups or
academics as perhaps it was in the 1990s or early
2000s, but rather it is increasingly becoming part
of a mainstream nationalist discourse. In August
2011 three Diet politicians on a ‘fact-finding’ trip
to Ulleungdo were refused entry to South Korea.
A couple of months previously a Korean Air test
flight which flew to the rocks and back resulted
in Japanese officials being instructed to boycott
the airline. Tokyo’s position on the inclusion of
the rocks in education has stiffened too, from its
inclusion in the state-approved Saishin Nihonski
in 2002, to the Ministry of Education non-
binding supplementary guidelines for teachers and
textbook publishers issued in 2008 which, for the
first time included a reference to need to educate
children that “differences exist between claims
of our nation and South Korea over Takeshima”
(Japan Times 17/07/2008).

IV. Pinnacle Islands

The Pinnacle Islands dispute was awoken from its
dormant state in 1990 when it emerged that Tokyo
was considering recognition the lighthouse on
Uotsuri Island as an official beacon. At that time
post-Tiananmen China was dependent upon Japan
economically and politically and kept relatively
quiet. Still, events in Taiwan were enough for
the JCG to pass the issue on to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) who prioritised positive
bi-lateral relations over the territorial dispute –
this would remain the MOFA-driven policy for the
next decade. The action of refusing to recognise
the lighthouse in deference to other states set a
political precedent itself: Japan was not willing to
exercise sovereignty over the islands if this meant
damaging bilateral relations. The 1992 Chinese
territorial sea law was a precursor to come in
terms of the effects UNCLOS would have on
the dispute. Japan protested through the standard
diplomatic channels calling for a repeal of the
law, but it did not attempt to use the considerable
economic leverage it had at the time to force China
to withdraw the reference. This indicates a form
of political acquiescence to China’s claim, and
counter-intuitive result was that Japan switched
to its “no dispute exists” position. At this stage
Japan’s Pinnacle Islands policy was driven by
MOFA who did not consider the Pinnacles a major
issue; certainly it was rated highly enough to expend political or diplomatic capital over.

The sovereignty game got well underway with the ratification of UNCLOS in 1996. Both sides claimed the islands and used different methods – backed up by different international legal principles – to generate their respective EEZs and continental shelves. This resulted in substantial overlapping claims, with the Pinnacle Islands lying on China’s claimed continental shelf in the disputed zone. The ratification of UNCLOS and related events in the Liancourt Rocks dispute led to Seinensha to reigniting the dispute, once more using the construction and recognition of lighthouses. While again Taiwan (and Hong Kong) erupted, Beijing prevented similar civilian protests on the mainland – but it did protest in a far more serious tone, and issued threats on the consequences of recognition. Once again Tokyo decided against a state exercise of sovereignty over the islands, with both Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minster Ikeda explicitly linking the reactions of the other parties and the need for good relations with the decision to drop the lighthouse recognition question.

The domestic fall-out from the 1996 incident led to a growing awareness and interest in the dispute among politicians in both the LDP and opposition parties. At the turn of the century the research vessel issue pushed the internal LDP opposition to the apparent weak stance of the government to breaking point when an internal LDP committee suspended the ODA loans to China. Although gaining ground in the sovereignty game, China was at this stage still vulnerable to Japan’s economic leverage and agreed to a prior notification system (PNS). In a sense the disputed waters were still somehow more ‘Japanese’. However, China continued its push for sovereignty over the waters and by 2004 not only was the system effectively defunct but China began to protest Japanese operations in the disputed maritime zone. By this stage the disputed waters were no longer considered Japanese, rather they were very much disputed, and China was operating there almost at will. All this led both the media and politicians in Japan to talk openly about a Chinese fait accompli.

Under the Koizumi administration Japan’s stance on the territorial and associated maritime dispute altered dramatically. The change began with the leasing of the islands in 2002, which was in effect a clear demonstration of state sovereignty over the islands. The 2005 recognition of the lighthouse demonstrates even more clearly the policy-change, particularly given that as recently as 1997 Foreign Minister Kajiyama planned to have the lighthouse removed. As Japan had backed down on the issue twice before the sudden announcement caught China by surprise, and was in itself presented as a fait accompli, a move which prevented China from issuing the usual warnings or threats about the consequences should recognition go ahead. It should be noted that the Koizumi administration, unlike previous administrations in the 1990s, showed little interest in maintaining good relations with China, and although the recognition did contribute to the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations, there was enough anti-Japanese sentiment generated by other issues that the recognition would not have made much difference.

Despite Japan’s tougher line on the dispute, China continued to push its sovereignty claim. The first state-backed Chinese protesters since 1998 attempted to land in 2004. The Koizumi administration saw this as an opportunity to set a precedent by seeking to/allowing the protesters to be prosecuted under domestic Japanese law for alleged crimes committed while on the disputed islands. This was a major break with standard practice and the status quo and would have had a
dramatic effect on the sovereignty game. Beijing weighed in heavily to warn of the “serious consequences” of such an action. Within a couple of days Tokyo made a u-turn, but it did so fast enough and with a ready-made excuse so that neither side lost face in the incident.

The same could not be said of the 2010 collision incident. Unlike in 2004, the DPJ-led government allowed the arrest and prosecution to advance much further, keeping the captain of the Chinese fishing boat for over three weeks. In the meantime, Beijing made it clear that its threats were not empty, responding with diplomatic ‘shock and awe’, and eventually forcing Tokyo to back down and release the captain. As in 2004, China was unwilling to allow Japan to exercise jurisdictional sovereignty – over a Chinese national – on or near the disputed islands, as such an exercise would have severely prejudiced China’s position in the sovereignty game. But unlike in 2004, there was no safe ‘out’ for the DPJ once they began proceedings, and the result of the incident was an ignominious climb-down which worked to reinforce the territorial status quo rather than revise it: Japan had demonstrated to the whole world that it was incapable of prosecuting Chinese nationals suspected of committing a crime on or near the Pinnacle Islands, and therefore that it clearly did not enjoy unfettered sovereignty over the islands or their waters. This fact made the reiteration of the ‘no dispute exists’ line sound hollow.

V. Northern Territories

The years immediately after the end of the Cold War saw both up and downs in Japan’s quest for sovereignty over the Northern Territories. The 1991 Kaifu-Gorbachev summit was a disappointment on many levels, yet it did yield the visa-nashi programme, which blurred the boundaries of the sovereignty issue. If Japanese – and only Japanese – could visit the islands without a visa yet not enter any other part of Russia without a visa, then clearly Russian sovereignty over the islands was not perfect, and it also meant that Russia recognised Japan as having some form of special sovereignty rights to the islands. Further, it helped prevent violations of the 1989 cabinet agreement, since journalists and some citizens could now visit and thus would not be tempted to obtain a Russian visa in order to travel.

Meanwhile, Japan spent the early 1990s trying to internationalise the dispute, to gain recognition of its sovereignty over the islands and perhaps more importantly pressure Russia into handing them over. The international community, and the more specifically the G7, was more interested in stabilising the Russian colossus and helping the nascent democracy to get off the ground, and instead it was Japan who eventually gave into international pressure, agreeing to the G7 economic aid package. This also closed the door, for the time being at least, on attempts by Japan to link the territorial issue with economic cooperation. The 1993 meeting of Hosokawa and Yeltsin resulted in the Tokyo Declaration, a document which would become a key part of Japan’s negotiation strategy in later years. The document specifically named all four islands, and in Japanese, recognised the 1956 Moscow Declaration, and called for “an early conclusion of a peace treaty .. based on the principles of law and justice” (Tokyo Declaration Art.2).

Despite the rhetoric of the Tokyo Declaration, the following years saw the little movement, as instead of negotiating based on the declaration,
Russia sought to take a hard-line on the sovereignty issue. Yet all Moscow’s plans to develop the islands failed, as the reality was that at this point Russia itself was too weak to do much with these remote islands, and no third party was willing to risk relations with Japan for the sake of developing far-flung islands in the Russian Far-East. The 1997 Krasnoyarsk summit breathed new life into attempts to resolve the Northern Territories dispute and sign a peace treaty, but the 1996-2002 negotiations ultimately failed as neither side was willing to compromise on the most important thing: sovereignty. By the time of the Irkutsk summit between Mori and Putin it was apparent that the best Japan could hope for was a two-island deal with some possibility of negotiations for the other two, but no guarantees. The joint statement from Irkutsk described the 1956 Moscow Declaration as the “basic legal document”; the document, which specifies the handing over of Habomai and Shikotan and the signing of a peace treaty. This, rather than the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, would be the basis of Putin’s diplomacy from then on.

The two-plus alpha approach – separating the islands into two batches for negotiating purposes – was highly controversial in Japan. The Koizumi administration which took power in 2001 was against the two-plus-alpha approach, and Foreign Minister Tanaka made this clear within a month of taking her post. The MOFA Russian division purge which followed was taken by Russia to mean that Japan was no longer interested in compromise, and thus that negotiations were a waste of time. There was no bilateral summit between Putin and Koizumi until early 2003. The Peace Boat’s voyage in late 2002, after the negotiations had come to a stand-still, was a sign of things to come. As relations deteriorated and the prospects of the “early return” of the islands grew dimmer, such violations of the cabinet agreement would increase. After the Koizumi administration moved back to the more hardline stance of returning all four islands in exchange for a peace treaty, negotiations between the two sides broke down. Relations between Japan and Russia had changed dramatically in the ten years since Hashimoto and Yeltsin first had their informal Krasnoyarsk summit – Russia was no longer the economically and politically unstable state looking for Japanese aid. It had grown economically strong through its energy exports, and import-dependent Japan had become one of its good customers. Moreover, as Russia grew stronger it began to consolidate its sovereignty over the islands themselves, investing billions of rubles to develop modern infrastructure on the islands, create new jobs and increase the population, as well as revamping the military installations such that by the end of the 2000s there was even talk of a “military build-up” on the islands.

Meanwhile Japan’s own sovereignty claims were under threat. Independent Japanese travellers to the islands threatened to undercut its own position on the visa situation, and with developed infrastructure came international investment interest, as reports came out of Chinese and South Korean businesses partnering up with local Russian firms. But perhaps nothing demonstrated the weakness of Japan’s position more clearly than events after September 2010, when Medvedev visited the islands and teamed up with China to show Japan a united front their respective territorial issues. As Russia announced increases to the budget of the development plan for the islands, and minister after minister flew out to inspect the infrastructural projects, Kan and Maehara could do nothing but blow hot air (e.g. Kan’s “unforgivable outrage” remark). Despite Russia consolidating its sovereignty and Japan fighting a rear-guard action on both its own and Russia claims of sovereignty, there was no indication Japan would
back down. Editorials from many of the major newspapers called for a patient but strict approach to the Northern Territories dispute – even if it took hundreds of years, Japan should not back down on the sovereignty issue.

VI. Conclusion

The three case studies show that the states involved in Japan’s territorial disputes have used the exercise of sovereignty – and the prevention of the exercise of sovereignty – in order to further their position in each of the respective disputes. The extent to which the state will go to use or prevent these exercises depends on what the states goals in the dispute are: for example in the Liancourt Rocks dispute Japan focuses on the maritime and precedential aspects of the dispute rather than direct sovereignty over the rocks themselves (not to say it would not take the rocks if South Korea offered them!), and thus adjusts its position in terms of the sovereignty game accordingly. It took Japan several years after the ratification of UNCLOS in 1996 to realise that both South Korea and China were eroding its position in the sovereignty game in both the Liancourt Rocks and the Pinnacle Islands disputes respectively. But from around 2005 Tokyo started to take a stronger line in both disputes, using various forms of exercises of sovereignty to push its case. In the case of the Pinnacle Islands, the new DPJ regime went one step too far in 2010, attempting an exercise of sovereignty (the prosecution of the trawler captain) which China, using economic and political resources, managed to prevent.

The sovereignty game in the Northern Territories differs more from the Liancourt Rocks and the Pinnacle Islands than those two do from each other, though it still shares many similarities. Unlike the other two, the Northern Territories dispute was not energised by the 1996 ratification of UNCLOS; it was already the dominant factor in Japan-Russia relations. In the 1990s Japan attempted to use its economic clout to gradual loosen Russia’s grip of sovereignty over the disputed islands, but with the rise of Putin and the return of an energy-rich Russia and relatively stable to the world stage, a stagnating Japan was left with no cards left to play. Yet Tokyo will not compromise on the fundamental issue of sovereignty, and it is clear that it will not compromise on the sovereignty of the other disputes either. To compromise with Seoul over the Liancourt Rocks would risk a loss of legitimacy to its claim to the Pinnacle Islands, given their (very) similar histories, while given the current state of Sino-Japanese relations, a compromise over the Pinnacle Islands would suggest weakness – and besides, it seems unlikely that Beijing will accept anything apart from complete sovereignty: Beijing appears to be biding its time and gradually improving its position in the sovereignty game.

By using the sovereignty game to assess how the states involved in these disputes use exercises of sovereignty (and the prevention of same) this dissertation casts new light on Japan’s territorial disputes. The sovereignty game is intricate and nuanced, and involves not only the islands themselves but the maritime territory surrounding them as well as garnering international recognition of sovereignty over the territory. By acting with an understanding of international law – though not acting in an entirely legal manner – states can gradually improve their ability to exercise sovereignty over a territory without resorting to the use of force. Thus while the use of force
remains a factor in the international relations of territorial disputes today, this dissertation has shown that most of the time it is the ability to exercise sovereignty over disputed territory – not the ability to conquer it – which really matters.
I . Introduction

This dissertation engages with the topic of the involvement of progressive civil society actors in the struggle over remembering and addressing the wartime past that occurred during the last two decades (1990-2010) in Japan. The term ‘progressive’ is ascribed to individuals and groups that share a particular view on the country’s imperial past that is based on the condemnation of colonialism and militarism as well as support for the postwar peace state. They also endorse a greater recognition of Japan’s responsibility for suffering inflicted on the neighbouring countries on the official level and popularising knowledge of Japan’s imperial past among the public.

This dissertation explores the subject of how five selected progressive actors participated and contributed to the contestation of memory of the Asia-Pacific War in Japan between 1990 and 2010. On the basis of findings, the thesis seeks to identify what kind of roles the chosen progressive civil society groups played, and how they mattered (if at all) in this process. To this end, the dissertation investigates the following set of questions:

- What is the structure and membership of the chosen groups?
- What are the narratives and aims of the groups?
- What is the scope of activities of the groups?
- How did the groups relate (if at all) to the wider public and power-wielders in the society and to what ends?
- How (if at all) did the groups engage in activism across borders and to what ends?

In other words, this dissertation explores how the selected groups advocated their views and tried to attain their goals.

The progressive actors that were selected for the purpose of this study are:

- Center of Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility (JWRC) (Nihon no sensō sekinin shiryō sentā)
- Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 (CTJN21) (Kodomo to kyōkasho zenkoku netto 21)
- Violence Against Women in War Network Japan (VAWW NET Japan) together with
The reasons for choosing these groups are based on the following four considerations. Firstly, the three first groups have, from the early (JWRC) to the late 1990s (CTJN21 and VAωW NET; WAM (2005)), been actively involved in the struggle over how to remember, commemorate and address Japan’s wartime past and its legacies. Secondly, they have managed to organise large scale events and/or unearth evidence that has driven wider attention to outstanding problems stemming from the legacies of Japan’s wartime past. Thirdly, the groups are involved in activism pertaining to issues which up to the present moment remain largely unresolved, or perhaps more accurately, are perceived as unresolved; namely, the matters of history textbooks, ‘comfort women’ and related problems of compensation and apology. Lastly, even though POWRNJ is much smaller and was created later than JWRC, CTJN21 and VAωW NET, it is similarly concerned with a problem area — namely, Allied POW in Japan and their forced labour — that has been largely neglected and side-lined in the discussions over the country’s wartime past.

The larger reason for conducting research on the chosen topic is that the progressive war memory activists deserve the attention of academic community as their existence is an important sign that the apologia by conservative politicians and grass-root nationalistic rhetoric cannot be treated as being representative of the majority of public opinion. The remarks made by policy-makers that deny or minimise Japan’s responsibility for its wartime past and the grass-root historical revisionist movement have created a distorted image of Japan as a country that cannot come to terms with the difficult legacy of the Asia-Pacific War.

II. The Politics of (War) Memory and Methods of Articulation: How ‘Politics of (War) Memory’ is Performed?

The main theoretical concept around which the thesis is built is the ‘politics of war memory (and commemoration)’ (Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, 2000: 16) and the approach is to examine how memory agents advocate their causes by using a range of methods. The ‘politics of war memory (and commemoration)’ is defined as a ‘struggle of different groups to give public articulation to, and hence gain recognition for, certain memories and the narratives within which they are structured’.

The authors propose distinguishing between three interrelated aspects of this articulation process; namely, agencies, narratives and arenas. In their opinion, this approach to analysing war memory helps to ‘clarify its politics, by specifying which social groups, via what agencies, are the promoters of a particular narrative addressed to which arenas’ (Ashplant et al. 2000: 17).

However, as the three original levels of analysis proposed by Ashplant et al. (2000) in their conceptualisation of the ‘politics of war memory (and commemoration)’ are not sufficient to account for how actors operate in the memory production and contestation processes, an additional analytical level is introduced in this dissertation: ‘the methods of articulation’. This was created around
the notion of advocacy, which captures the essence of the action undertaken with a view to pursuing a particular cause. The dissertation defines advocacy as:

(1) ‘the act of pleading for or against a cause, as well as supporting or recommending a position’ (Hopkins, 1992, 32 quoted in Jenkins, 2003, 308)

(2) which involves addressing various audiences, including policy-makers, public opinion (or particular institutions in society), the mass media and actors in the international community (3) in an effort to either secure recognition and support for a given cause, or to undermine and prevent actions or ideas that are perceived as harmful or unacceptable to that cause.

The rationale behind introducing advocacy to a discussion on the politics of (war) memory rests on the conviction that this measure enables us to devote sufficient attention to how various memory agents promote their respective causes. Illuminating this particular issue is, in turn, perceived as instrumental in fully understanding the position and role played by actors in contestation of the past. In other words, addressing such methods helps us to systematically investigate how memory agents act on behalf of their convictions. Lastly, researching engagement in advocacy activities is a starting point to understanding and evaluating the outcomes or gains of the actors’ efforts. Recapitulating, incorporating an analysis of advocacy into the project allows us to deepen our understanding of ‘politics’ in the politics of (war) memory and to capture the strategic elements involved in memory contestation.

III. The Actors

The purpose of this part is to introduce the chosen civil society actors. This dissertation shows that the groups differ significantly from each other in terms of membership numbers (both type and numbers), organisational structure and available resources. Whereas CTJN21 has several thousand members across the country, POWRNJ has just 50. Regarding the internal structure, the groups range from well-organised collaborations of committed activists with a clear political agenda (e.g. VAWW NET) to a group consisting largely of concerned citizens/shimin researchers (POWRNJ). The financial and human resources that the groups have at their disposal are limited.

Secondly, the dissertation demonstrates that the groups emerged in a different socio-political climate. JWRC was created in the early 1990s when the re-appearance of long-neglected episodes of the Asia-Pacific War, such as the ‘comfort women’ issue, sparked a further re-examination of Japan’s perceptions on the country’s wartime past, and resulted in a number of apologies by the Japanese government. CTJN21 and VAWW NET, in turn, were established in the midst of the historical revisionists’ offensive against the ‘masochistic view of history’. Additionally, the growth of a transnational movement on women’s rights was an important factor facilitating the creation of VAWW NET.

Thirdly, this dissertation demonstrates that these groups operate within a wider narrative framework that underlines Japan’s role in the Asia-Pacific War as victimizer and puts emphasis on the suffering experienced by Asian and Western nationals during the conflict. It is also shown that the progressive discourse on the ‘comfort women’ issue has become a powerful sectional narrative in Japan. In turn, the narrative on the
wartime experiences of Allied POW is less known, although the recent (2009-2010) official apologies to the American POW contributed to a revival of interest in this particular episode of the war. The aims of the actors include the securing of an apology and redress for the elderly victims, promoting reconciliation, and ensuring that knowledge and awareness of the victimization inflicted by imperial Japan on other nations will be passed on to society and the younger generations.

IV. How Do You Make Your Voice Heard? Clarifying Historical Record and Reaching out to the Public

This part of dissertation explores the measures and channels through which the targeted groups transmitted information and their views to the wider public. Additionally, the efforts to uncover historical evidence pertaining to Japan’s wartime past conducted by all groups with the exception of CTJN21 are presented in detail. Without questioning the overall positive contribution of their research activities and their broadening of the scope of knowledge on the country’s colonisation and war in Asia-Pacific, the dissertation draws attention to the problem of the ‘politicisation’ of the history controversies. In short, it is argued that the political core of the conflicts over the past, such as the ‘comfort women’ issue, to an extent undermines the significance and potential of documentary evidence to settle disputes. Moreover, the lack of political will to pass a law that would grant access to classified documents further inhibits efforts to clarify historical record.

The dissertation also presents the publishing and educational activities conducted by these actors with a view to both spreading information among their members and familiarizing the public with the issue of the ‘comfort women’, history textbooks and POW. The educational events carried out ranged from large-scale undertakings, such as the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2000) and campaigns against the Tsukurukai schoolbooks (2001, 2005, 2009), to small-scale seminars and lectures concerning the forced labour of Allied soldiers.

As the relationship between civil society actors and their audiences is not only shaped by the efforts of the former, but also the perceptions and beliefs of the latter, the views of the Japanese public regarding the country’s wartime record are examined to see what promises and limitations the people’s history consciousness holds for progressive war memory activists. Public attitudes show diminishing support for revision of the compensation/apology policies, although the prevailing progressive-leaning outlook on the Asia-Pacific War ensures that revisionist views of Japan’s wartime past still remain in a minority. While the potential to garner public support for the redress movement is limited, the arguments of progressive actors opposing the nationalist discourses justifying colonisation and aggression against Asia will continue to resonate with the majority of the public.

Due to the importance of the mass media as a channel for communicating information to wider audiences, the relationship between Japanese news outlets and the groups under investigation is examined in some detail. The dissertation argues that interactions (or lack thereof) between the actors and the media were influenced by ideological divisions between the latter along the nationalist/conservative/liberal spectrum, the continuous existence of the taboo surrounding reporting on the imperial family, as well as other
institutional characteristics relating to the role of the media in political processes and news gathering routines. Whereas divisions among the news outlets determine which major newspapers may be accessible to the actors and (at least in theory) what kind of coverage may be expected (sympathetic to or delegitimizing a particular subject), the sensitivity of a given issue (e.g. war responsibility of Hirohito) or involvement of senior political figures (e.g. the NHK (2001/2005) and Asō Mining affairs (2006/2008)) may either preclude reporting or hush it up, thus preventing information from being passed on to the wider public.

Overall, while the groups undertook efforts to engage the attention of the media (or even used them, as in placing paid advertisements in major newspapers during the textbook campaigns by CTJN21) and at times succeeded, difficulties with reaching the mainstream media as well as diminishing or lack of interest on the side of journalists was also evident.

**V. How Do You Make Your Voice Heard? Targeting National and Local Government**

This part of dissertation focuses on the examination of how (if at all) the groups under investigation have engaged the ‘wielders of power’ over the problem of addressing Japan’s wartime past. The main aim is to elucidate how the groups have sought to make their voices heard in the political process of war memory production.

Firstly, the dissertation demonstrates that the groups presented differing levels of engagement in political advocacy, with JWRC, CTJN21 and VAWW NET being more involved in contestation/cooperation with policy-makers than POWRNJ, where the main focus area remains research. Secondly, the groups used a combination of indirect and direct measures to address policy-makers. The differences between the groups and LDP in the understanding of war-related issues meant that the former occupied the position of ‘competitor’ in relation to the government. From this position JWRC, VAWW NET/WAM and CTJN21 undertook efforts to counter the conservative discourse on war-related issues through ‘outsider’ measures. However, in the case of the Center and ‘comfort women’ activists there were significant instances of attempts to establish a more positive relationship with concerned policy-makers to whom they could gain access. Thirdly, the groups engaged in advocacy activities on both national and local levels. Whereas in the domestic arena the focus of JWRC and VAWW NET was mostly on the national level of decision making, CTJN21 tried to counter the consequences of the governmental decisions at the local level through encouraging grass-root advocacy.

Despite the limitations of the different forms of political engagement adopted by the groups, the dissertation’s findings suggest that JWRC, CTJN21 and VAWW NET Japan through their activism positioned themselves, to the limits of their abilities and perceptions, among the political actors involved in the process of the contestation of war memory in Japan. Nevertheless, it is also pointed out that, despite years of efforts by both activists and concerned policy-makers, there has been no substantial change either in reference to the redress for former ‘comfort women’ or fact-finding legislation, even though drafts of the appropriate laws were submitted regularly for deliberations during the last decade (Senji seiteki kyōsei higaisha mondai no kaiketsu no sokushin ni kan suru
Significantly, the change of government and elevation of DPJ to power (2009), as for now, do not seem to have changed the existing state of affairs, although the new administration did express remorse for the colonization of Korea and delivered an apology to former U.S. POW. In sum, this dissertation suggests that the inability of these groups to muster sufficient support among wider sectors of policy-makers has been one of factors that prevented the bills from becoming a reality. Conversely, as demonstrated by the campaigns against the Tsukurukai textbooks, grass-root efforts targeting institutions at the level of the local government contributed to the overall success of the revisionist teaching material. At the same time, however, the dissertation raises questions about the viability of the approach in situations where solutions to a given issue ultimately require action by the Diet or/and national government. Additionally, building pressure on the central administration from below requires ‘universal appeal’ around which a broader movement can coalesce.

VI. How Do You Make Your Voice Heard? Transnational Networking and Cooperation with International Institutions

This dissertation also demonstrates that, as well as pursuing their respective causes on the domestic scene, the groups under investigation engaged in transnational activism by building international networks and cooperating with the UN bodies.

Transnational networking created spaces for information exchange and enabled the carrying out of large scale initiatives, the outcomes of which were used by activists in the domestic sphere. Furthermore, in case of the ‘comfort women’ movement, members of a transnational network (the Asian Solidarity Conference on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery) provided assistance to the Japanese groups in building support for the redress legislation. The activism at the UN forum contributed to the securing of support for the former ‘comfort women’ by an important international institution. As a consequence, recommendations made by the UN bodies became a source of pressure from above on the Japanese government. However, the dissertation also argues that extent to which transnational advocacy contributed to the advancement of the respective agendas of the groups is not a straightforward matter.

It is pointed out that, in spite of the UN support for the ‘comfort women’ cause, the lack of leverage against the Japanese government has enabled the latter to largely disregard the pressure. Additionally, the general unwillingness of the governments to support individual compensation claims against the states, has helped to buttress the standpoint of the Japanese government. This, coupled with the difficulty of mustering sufficient support among Japanese policy-makers to pass the existing ‘comfort women’ bill seriously limits the prospects of securing an apology and compensation for survivors. At the same time, this dissertation argues that one should not forget that transnational ‘comfort women’ activism contributed to building an awareness of the issue globally and preserving (particular) memory of the system through the efforts to establish museums.

Furthermore, this dissertation presents activities...
of the Forum for Historical Consciousness and Peace in East Asia, which brings together civil society actors from the People’s Republic of China, South Korea and Japan. In regards to the work of the Forum, *History that Opens the Future* (a trilateral supplementary teaching material for schools) is discussed as an instrument in the struggle to fight neo-nationalist tendencies in education in Japan and promote reconciliation with the country’s neighbours. However, due to the book’s sales rates and limited presence in the classroom, it is argued that the main importance of the trilateral study material may rest in its ‘symbolic’ rather than ‘practical’ value. Furthermore, the dissertation discusses both opportunities and downsides connected with the presence of non-governmental actors in the history dialogue. Despite the fact that non-governmental history projects have a capacity to become (relatively) de-politicized spaces for debate and sources of ideas for policy-makers as well as wider society, they are not free from pitfalls and need to overcome significant obstacles to establish themselves as credible alternatives.

**VII. Conclusion: What Roles the Groups Played and How They Mattered in the Contestation of War Memory in Japan?**

In the concluding section, this dissertation categorises and systematises knowledge on activities by introducing and ascribing particular ‘roles’ to specific methods used by the progressive actors. In this manner it creates a classification of multiplicity of functions that civil society actors may take upon themselves in the process of war memory production and contestation. Significantly, the dissertation demonstrates that during the chosen time frame of the thesis, some of the selected actors expanded their roles, whereas others scaled down their range of activities.

The dissertation identifies the following roles fulfilled by the researched groups during the designated time frame of the project:

- researcher of historical evidence
- information provider to the public
- challenger to the government
- information provider to the legislators
- policy-sponsor
- facilitator of grass-root political involvement
- mediator of transnational action
- (co-) orchestrator of international pressure
- facilitator of (grass-root) reconciliation

The role of ‘researcher of historical evidence’ is concerned with unearthing documentary materials and gathering testimonies pertaining to the past events. The ‘information provider to the public’ is understood to be an actor who undertakes efforts to disseminate particular findings or discourses in the society through self-generated channels (publications, organisation of knowledge sharing/study events, exhibitions etc.) and/or the mass media. The role of ‘challenger to the government’ involves contesting war memory and responsibility-related claims presented by the LDP-led administrations. In turn, the category of ‘information provider to policy-makers’ highlights the cooperative dimension of the relationship between the selected actors and legislators, where the former supply evidence in order to shape the perceptions of the latter on particular matters. The ‘policy-sponsor’ role involves deliberate efforts to bring legislative change through measures such as information provision and alliance building (at the level of the Diet). The function of the ‘facilitator of
grass-root political engagement’ is the promotion of civic participation in political processes at the local level. The role of ‘mediator of transnational action’ involves, firstly, efforts to adapt to the domestic environment practices or outcomes that emerge as a result of a transnational campaign, and secondly, carrying out in the national setting tasks that stem from the international networking initiatives. The ‘(co-) orchestrator of international pressure’ acts to obtain the support of international institutions (or foreign governments) for a particular issue, the backing for which subsequently becomes a source of pressure on other party, e.g. domestic authorities. The ‘facilitator of (grass-root) reconciliation’ engages in the activities that contribute to the development of a dialogue between the citizens of the countries that were in conflict in the past. Such actions are aimed to promote mutual understanding and build a peaceful co-existence.

This dissertation concludes that JWRC acted as a researcher of historical evidence as well as information provider to both the public and policymakers. Furthermore, it was a challenger to the government, while at the same time co-operating with legislators to bring about policy solutions; and lastly, it aided efforts to build pressure on the Japanese government from the supra-national level (in the 1990s). CTJN21 in turn focused on information provision to the public and facilitating grass-root political involvement, challenging governmental claims on the textbook issue, and mediating the introduction into the Japanese domestic environment the outcome of its co-operation with Chinese and South Korean partners, e.g. the supplementary teaching material titled History that Opens the Future. Lastly, the group’s involvement in the work of the Forum for History Consciousness and Peace in East Asia designates it as the facilitator of (grass-root) reconciliation. The work of the ‘comfort women’ activists from VAWW NET and WAM covered the widest spectrum of engagement with these roles; namely, as researcher of historical evidence, information provider to the public and legislators, challenger to the government and policy-sponsor, as well as ‘co-orchestrator of international pressure’ (2000s) and mediator of the transnational campaign in Japan. Finally, POWRNJ acted mainly as a researcher of historical evidence, information provider to public, and facilitator of (grass-root) reconciliation. Only on one occasion did the group communicate information directly to the policy-makers.

The findings concerning the relationship between the chosen groups and policy-makers add insights to the scholarly debates on civil society in Japan. Some of the recent studies on Japanese civil society argue that the latter suffers from the lack of ‘advocates’ (Pekkanen, 2006) and warn that civic activism is becoming increasingly depoliticised (Ogawa, 2009). The findings of this dissertation problematize these arguments, however, as they show a vibrant section of civil society that is engaged in a highly politicised process of contesting the memory of the country’s wartime past. Furthermore, through analysis of the methods used by the selected groups and the roles that they perform, the thesis also shows – in line with the publication of Chan (2008) – that it is indeed possible to speak about ‘advocacy’ in the setting of contemporary Japanese civil society. Overall, the thesis calls attention to the presence of groups in civil society that developed and have operated outside of the reach of the Japanese ‘activist’ state and independently of its efforts to shape the depoliticised shimin consciousness. As such, it complicates the notion of Japanese civil society as ‘a largely apolitical communitarian space populated by disciplined and self-responsible shimin’ (Avenell, 2010, 257). While it may be true that, in recent years, this particular form of engagement has come to dominate the landscape.
of civic activism, the contestation of war memory in Japan constitutes an example of contentious politics marked by the strong involvement of civil society groups on both sides of the struggle that should not be overlooked.

Lastly, the dissertation clarifies how the groups mattered to the contestation of war memory in Japan over the designated timeframe. In summary, they were the defenders of the slowly changing (deteriorating) status quo in the field of acknowledging and addressing the legacies stemming from the country’s imperial past. They made efforts to protect the achievements of the early 1990s and worked to counter the historical revisionist discourse, originating both from the level of national politics and the grass-roots. After the watershed events of the early and mid-1990s – which included the official inquiries into the ‘comfort women’ issue, the governmental admissions of culpability and the apologies for the wartime past, as well as increased recognition of the necessity to address the legacies of the war among the general public – there was a vigorous backlash against these changes. Under these circumstances, the selected groups found themselves on the defensive, acting against these developments. Despite the range of measures deployed to counter these changes, and the groups’ contribution to fostering awareness of the unresolved war-related issues in the timeframe of the study, they were unable to succeed in bringing back some of the attainments that were lost (e.g. reinstitution of ‘comfort women’ into textbooks) or to achieve a transformation of the redress policies. This lack of absolute gains in some areas should not, however, divert our attention from their significance that could be more readily acknowledged if the following question is considered: what would have happened in the absence of these groups? (paraphrasing Kolb, 2007, 275).

This dissertation argues that approaching from this perspective the question of how the groups mattered enables us to more fully recognise their contribution to broadening and popularising knowledge of Japan’s wartime past among the domestic and international public; containing the advance of historical revisionism into the classroom; preserving the memories of particular historical events from being forgotten; and sustaining the war-related matters on the agenda of certain sectors of policy-makers.

References

Notes
1 The definition is partly based on the one presented by Yoshida Takashi (2007, 52) in his distinction between ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ camps: progressives have joined in strong support of Japan’s so-called Peace Constitution and are united in their rejection of the values of Japan’s wartime militarism and colonialism. In contrast, conservatives have advocated revision of the Constitution and defended Japanese wartime colonial and military experiences.
The development of a knowledge-based economy in the context of globalization has caused innovation to become the primary driver of growth and competitiveness. Hence an innovation policy boom has recently occurred all over the world. The importance of innovation in economic development is of course not a new issue but due to increased competition from emerging economies, the pace of innovation has to be accelerated and the former linear model of innovation reconsidered. At a time of “Mega-Competition of Knowledge”, involving the USA, Europe and Japan, but also other advanced Asian countries like South Korea, or developing giants like China, networking appears as the ‘one best way’ to innovate, whether to develop new industries, to revitalize declining industrial regions, or to upgrade technologies and industries as for example in the emerging countries. Following Michael Porter’s competition model, with Silicon Valley as an illustration, the priority given to the constitution of robust networking between all actors of a specified territory or regional area, has led to the implementation of cluster initiatives worldwide. Linkages between firms, research institutions and academics, government agencies, or the Triple Helix (San-Gaku-Kan in Japan) are now at the core of all projects aiming to strengthen the interconnection between process and product innovation and interactions between research, development and production without forgetting related functions such as financing, marketing etc. Indeed, while the common objective of all countries is to increase competitiveness, most of the measures taken in the 1990s and 2000s aim to put clusters at the core of their national innovation system.

Due to both the impact of the post-bubble crisis and the effect of globalization, Japanese international competitiveness has largely eroded in the past decade. It pushed the government to address directly the innovation issue by enhancing laws and initiating programs as early as the 1990s. The efforts were further reinforced in the 2000s, with the implementation of two clusters plans from METI and MEXT, which led to the creation of two types of clusters. However this initiative cannot be considered as a universal solution for increasing Japanese competitiveness and multiple factors influence this process. The most important element to implement this cluster policy all over the territory is probably the capacity of the Central government to supervise the networking and coordination among all the actors to create
a competitive structure. But the clusters policy is mainly based on the ability of the regions\textsuperscript{3} to take initiative to develop its own industry, and thus, Central government has to delegate a part of competence to the lower administration levels in order to maximize the effect of clustering. To explain in another way, this means that the Japanese government policy system, which is built on a strict top-down scheme, has to change its governance to let a larger action field to the local bodies. And to realize this change, the country’s structure has to be reviewed and switch or adapt to a system in accord with the actual globalized innovation era. Decentralization can be a solution for a further evolution but the Japanese government is not ready yet for a radical modification of a State structure that has been established with difficulties after the Second World War. Then a paradox opposition is created between the reluctance of the Central government to restructure the administration and its willingness to implement more industrial policies that need a State restructuration in order to revitalize the economy. It is difficult to evaluate which of those two principles is privileged by the Japanese government, nevertheless the natural evolution of the world economy forced to implement some world-oriented innovation policies and the Central government had to adapt to this trend. Therefore a subjective State’s administrative restructuration is occurring with, as a consequence, an evolution of the power balance between Central government and local governments.

The objective of this study is to show how the innovation policies, and mainly the clusters policies implemented by the Japanese State is transforming the Japanese governance and is creating a new relationship between Central government and local governments. By now the central power was based in Tokyo and peripheral powers were reduced to simple executants. With the implementation of the clusters policies that require a strong initiative power from regions to maximize the human, industrial and material resources, the Central government has no choice but to delegate some initiative powers to the lower levels. The governance scheme is changed in spite of the Central government’s will to keep powers.

I. Evolution of Innovation concept: From a linear to interaction model

Innovation is nowadays the locomotive of a state’s economic growth and all the countries in the world are trying to develop its own long-term innovation strategy in order to preserve its competitiveness. This trend is generated by a globalization of economy, the evolution of society, and the emergence of new ideas and actors, which have completely modified the traditional concept of innovation. At present it seems that the word “innovation” has become the most appropriated term to qualify the policy required to answer the challenges of the past time. In the 1950’s the linear model of innovation was one of the first frameworks developed for understanding science and technology and its relation to the economy. The model suggested that innovations start with basic researches and ends with production, following simple linear steps:

\begin{align*}
\text{Basic research} & \rightarrow \text{Applied research} \rightarrow \\
&\quad \text{Development} \rightarrow \text{(Production and) Diffusion}
\end{align*}

This model has prioritized scientific research as the basis of innovation and has been very
influential. Academic organizations and economists have spread widely this concept and have used it as a precious argument to get government supports to science, in financial areas or for policy-making decisions. The simplicity of the scheme for administrative and the large diffusion of the idea allowed this linear model to stay on the core of numerous science and technology policies and also for academic studies. However with the evolution of the society and the globalization of economy, the linear concept became “old-fashioned” to the detriment of new innovation models, more complex and more complete, adapted to the current evolution of the time. And in spite of the several derived models inspired by the linear concept, such as the Technology Push model, the Market Pull model or the traditional Stage-Gate model, the linear model of innovation has been criticized and considered as inappropriate for the reason that it has ignored the different feedbacks and failures that occur at various stages and neglected the reconsideration of earlier steps. Academic opinions approved this reality and try to build new efficient models of innovation: N.Rosenberg (1994) claimed that “everyone knows that the linear model of innovation is dead” and D.Edgerton (2004) concluded that “the linear model is very hard to find everywhere, except in some descriptions of what it is supposed to have been”.

Then, new forms of innovation theories emerged with a much complicated sequential scheme and above all, taking in account different parameters that was not included in the different phases because they were estimated as not important, or because their concept did not exist at that time. Emergence of the globalization and the increase of international competitiveness changed the innovation view all around the world. And due to the complex changing of the innovation process, it became not possible anymore to talk about “model” of innovation but of a “system” including new actors and new factors.

During the mid 1980’s networking and the interaction of different actors in the innovation process became important to establish competitive products and efficient policies. B-A Lundvall, in 1985, introduced the concept of “innovation system” that influenced national policy makers and innovation studies during the 90’s to create at last the concept of “National Innovation System” (Freeman, 1995). This new system approach stresses that the flow of technology and information among people, enterprises and institutions are key to the innovative process. It also defines the interaction between the actors who are needed in order to turn an idea into a process, product or service on the market. And for policy-makers, an understanding of the National Innovation System can help identify important points for enhancing innovation performance and competitiveness. OECD (1997) defined the National Innovation System as follow: “Analysis of technology performance and policies has traditionally focused on inputs (such as expenditures on research and development and the number of research personnel) and outputs (such as patents), the measurement of which is standardized across OECD countries (OECD, 1996). […] The innovative performance of a country depends to a large extent on how these actors relate to each other as elements of a collective system of knowledge creation and use as well as the technologies they use. These actors are primarily private enterprises, universities and public research institutes and the people within them. The linkages can take the form of joint research, personnel exchanges, cross-patenting, purchase of equipment and a variety of other channels. There is no single accepted definition of a National Innovation System”.

Several interpretation of the National
Innovation System rose during the 1990’s in order to create the perfect innovation policy. If the role of the actors is essential for the good working of the innovation process in a country, the codification or policy application are also important. Smith (1991, 2000) defined the policy implication of innovation as a systemic phenomenon and enhanced the importance of the State implication in the emergence of a National Innovation Process policy. One of the revolutions that will lead countries to reconsider the practical use of the innovation system was the creation of clusters based on M.Porter’s Diamond Model (elaborated in 1990 and modified in 1998). According to his approach, in the globalization era, the declining influence of the State on national companies is not the major issue: the most important is to analyze the causes of the productivity with which the companies compete, instead of traditional comparative advantage such as natural resources and pools of labor. For Porter the traditional factors for comparative advantage that are land, location, natural resources, labor and local population size cannot be applied for sustained industrial growth. Then he worked out 4 interlinked advances factors for competitive advantage for countries or regions, and represented on a diamond model: Firm strategy, demand conditions, related supporting industries, factor conditions.

However this process cannot work without an external regulating actor which is the government. It is defined as a “catalyst and a challenger to encourage –or even push- companies to raise their aspirations and move to higher levels of competitive performance”. They must encourage companies to raise their performance, stimulate early demand for advanced products, and focus on specialized factor creation and to stimulate local rivalry by limiting direct cooperation and enforcing anti-trust regulations.

Following the Diamond Model, Porter introduced the concept of clusters, a group of interconnected firms, suppliers, related industries and institutions that arise in particular locations. However it is important to notice that Porter has largely been influenced in the late 1990’s by the impact of economic globalization, the progress of IT revolution, the diffusion of the concept of good corporate governance and, the most important, the visible success of Silicon Valley in USA. The spontaneous emergence and development of the Silicon Valley has been defined as the referential model of clusters because it included all the elements and factors required to form this new type of “decentralized regional network-based industrial system”. It also seems that national government of different countries, have been influenced in the late 1990’s to early 2000’s by the success of Silicon Valley and clusters model leading to a clusters-policy trend to emerge all around the world. Of course this model has been the target of criticism from other academics such as Dunning (2000) or Raines (2002) who estimated that the model neglected important elements such as the international firm activities or the local social and cultural population conditions. The problem was that, regarding the different study report on clusters project elaborated by OECD (1999, 2001) or on different US states (Enright, 2000), the definition of clusters is covering a large field of industrial agglomeration, from the macro-level industry to the local micro-network between companies or even the intermediary mezzo assembly industry. Then it is important to distinguish two different concepts to fix the border between what a cluster is and what it is not:

- Cluster Strategy; a strategy to reinforce vertical and horizontal competitiveness and collaboration through the common effort of industry, intermediary administration, university and research laboratories, and government
institutions that share the same vision of developing a specific market field.

- Cluster policy: a policy using cluster strategy and aiming to adjust products or services production and to link innovation value-added to interdependence’s or coexistence’s essential point, instead of trying to find comprehensive and rational approach toward a region or a country.

Hence, clusters model have been perceived as a new form of science and technology that use interaction process between actors to increase the knowledge production and technology potential. Cluster has been regarded as the most efficient way to increase competitiveness by gathering the economic and scientific potential no more at national or regional level but at an independent cluster level. Then a boom of clusters policy occurred in developed or developing countries during the 2000’s and related innovation theories inspired by clusters appeared at the same period. The Triple Helix Model invented by Etzkowitz and Leydersdorf (2000, 2002) is one of this networking-based processes invented to increase research and innovation competitiveness. Innovation has probably entered in an open innovation era since the development of new IT tools and the globalization that changed the role of actors and interaction between them. Probably other new types of innovation will rise in the following decades.

II. Japanese innovation and clusters policies

In Japan the process of ‘clustering’ began in the early 2000s with the implementation of the Industrial Cluster Plan by the METI in 2001, in order to revitalize industrial districts that were left behind because of increased global competition and with the Knowledge Cluster Initiative set up in 2002 by the MEXT mainly to strengthen the development of new industries. Although those two initiatives cannot be considered as the first policy device to enhance competitiveness through increasing innovation, they constitute the major achievements of recent policies. Other laws initiated since the 90s are worth mentioning though as they have contributed to their creation or contribute to their support.

The most important one is probably the Science and Technology Basic Plan enacted in 1996 for 5 years until 2001, to promote the construction of a new R&D system by increasing funding for competitive research with a budget of 17.6 trillion yen. This law was introduced during a period of economic crisis, nevertheless the Japanese government tended to increase R&D expenditure to strengthen the potential. At the end of the program Japanese authorities decided to extend the plan for 5 more years but focused this time on promoting basic research and giving priority to R&D on national and social issues with a budget of 21.1 trillion yen. This second phase was associated with the knowledge cluster plan set up by the MEXT. Further, in 2006, the “Mega-competition of Knowledge” caused the government to give priority to the reinforcement of the knowledge clusters’ competitiveness. Using the policy framework built during the previous programs, it decided to launch the third phase of the Science and Technology Basic Plan with a budget of 25 trillion yen.

Japan’s originality, compared to the other cluster initiatives in the world, is that, as previously mentioned, the government has enacted two different policy measures leading to two kinds of cluster labels.

In 2001, the Industrial Cluster Plan started...
with the objective to create “networks where every face is visible” between industries, universities and public research institutions to allow them to join their respective resources, materials and knowledge. METI first labeled 19 clusters gathering around its Regional Bureaus (RBETIs) about 9800 regional SMEs, to create new businesses based on projects coming from a total of more than 290 universities. In April 2006 the Second phase of the Industrial Cluster Plan began with 17 industrials clusters having new objectives: to develop technologies leading to practical applications in the regions and to reinforce the function of incubation to establish 40 000 new businesses by 2011. To promote industrial clusters for this new period, the Japanese Government decided to provide a budget of 20.8 billion yen for 2007 divided as follows:
- 6.5 billion for the formation and management of University-Industry-Government networks
- 13.3 billion yen for the promotion of technology development incorporating the special characteristics of a region (including financial support for SMEs and Venture Business)
- 1 billion yen to strengthen the functioning of incubation centers.

On the other side, the Second Science and Technology Basic Plan, established by a Cabinet Decision in March 2001, called for the creation of Clusters in the different regions of Japan and since 2002 MEXT has been implementing two types of actions to promote regional R and D activities by supporting regional clusters:
- The Knowledge Cluster Initiative that aims at “developing into world-class innovative clusters attracting humans, goods, and money from around the world”;
- The City Area Program that aims at “developing small to medium-size clusters across Japan” with strengths that utilize unique regional resources to support the creation of new business and R and D business through industry-academia-government collaborations (Kakizawa Yuji, 2007).

A knowledge cluster is a system for technological innovation, organized by local initiative around universities and other public research institutions whose R&D focus is original and has potential. This system drives technological innovation and creates new industries by stimulating interaction between the technological seeds from research institutions and the practical needs of business world. In this process universities and public research institutions are considered as “concentrations of knowledge and talent” and intend to create world-class technological innovation. In order to stimulate the centers of knowledge creation the Japanese Government decided to put 500 million yen per year into each cluster, over five years, and also some grants for the core organizations (foundations or other organizations) designated by local governments. In 2002 the Knowledge Cluster Initiative started with 12 knowledge clusters but a year later 3 new ones were implemented and 3 more in 2004; but in 2007 the first term of this policy ended and the final evaluation showed that only 3 clusters out of 18 have the potential to survive in open innovation competition. The objective of the second term will be to focus on upgrading to world-class level clusters and to create competitive businesses by patenting research results and conducting R&D related to incubation. Thus for the second term, in 2008, some knowledge clusters have been combined in order to from 6 stronger knowledge clusters.

Both cluster initiatives represent together the core of industrial innovation and became a guideline for new businesses. Since their creation most of new policies implemented were adapted to them.

A majority of industrial clusters and knowledge
clusters are located in the same areas. They are independent from each other and differ according to the objectives of their ministries of affiliation (METI or MEXT) and also in their governance.

Taking into account the fact that regional characteristics are quite numerous, and that it would therefore be difficult to national government to support all of them, METI has devolved part of its competence to Regional Bureaus (RBETI). Those have the ability to adapt national objectives to local needs according to their appreciation of public policy measures. The governance structure, while regionalized to some extent thanks to a strong collaboration between national and local level, remains however rather centralized. MEXT for its part doesn’t have Regional Bureaus to delegate power as the METI has done. This difference finally gave a larger autonomy to local governments to create and manage clusters. Core Organizations are designated by the local government concerned to set up a Knowledge Cluster Headquarters, which acts in each region as a control body for project implementation.

III. Case studies: Kyushu and Tohoku Clusters

In this study two concrete examples are treated to analyze the impact of the clusters policies on the regional economy: The clusters of Kyushu, considered as a success and the Tohoku clusters that had more difficulties to develop innovations. Such contrasted results allow to compare the strong and the weak points of each model and to define some important elements that permit to increase competitiveness.

The island of Kyushu turns out to be an active model in terms of innovation and in the establishment of clusters. By way of proof, the second phase of the project has no less than 3 industrial clusters and an intellectual one resulting from the merger of 3 coexisting units on the island. The cluster models in Kyushu and especially the one of the semiconductor in Fukuoka have always been considered by the Japanese government as a role model and their evaluation results have always been positive. To such an extent, that it is viewed as a worldwide reference in terms of semiconductors because of a long industrial tradition in this area with strong local historical companies as Nippon Steel Corporation (Shin Nippon Seitetsu). The other force of the Kyushu cluster is the networking between actors, their coordination and their ability to open some collaboration with overseas clusters. The reason is probably the attendance of two charismatic leaders who are working actively for the development and the cooperation of all the actors of the Island. The main one is the Governor of the Fukuoka region: the charismatic Wataru Aso who has held the position for more than 15 years. He is also the head of the National Governor’s Association of Japan, which makes him strongly in favour of the initiatives and of the powers given to the local governors. The other main protagonist: Hiroto Yasuura from the University of Kyushu, is known worldwide for his works on semi conductors. He has also worked closely and in consultation with big companies and acts as a leader for the development of this technology within the cluster. The positive aspect of the Fukuoka cluster is a true coherence among the principal role-players of the network who manage to form a strategic alliance. The Fukuoka cluster managed to manufacture devices resulting from innovation which were also able to break away from the Monozukuri, a concept appreciated

THE CLUSTER POLICY IN JAPAN AND THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CENTRAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES
by the Japanese industrial area. In addition, the alliances formed by the cluster with the other foreign units allow avoiding the “Galapagos syndrom”\(^27\), in other words the development of an innovative product or service within the country and for a unique use in the country itself, even if it implies to get out of this worldwide logic and to isolate itself. The worldwide expansion of the LSI technology enables to keep the same global technological development perspective and to highlight the Kyushu trademark. There is no doubt that for the years to come the LSI technology will witness a new boom with a change in the technological needs of our society such as the 3D technology for televisions, the thinness of laptops or cell phones, or even tablet computers.

The Tohoku region is located in the North of Japan, just above the Kanto region and below the Hokkaido Island. During the setting up of clusters policies, this Japanese area obviously decided to create its own clusters in order to revitalize a region which up to now had no real competitive industries. For cluster policies needs, the prefectures of Miyagi, Iwate, Aomori, Yamagata, and Fukushima joined forces and created on the one hand the Tohoku manufacturing Corridor (an industrial cluster) and on the other hand the Greater Sendai area (an intellectual cluster). However the major difficulty was to find an industry that would be suitable and adjust to the Tohoku region as several problems were encountered when this region decided to apply for this Clusters programme. First of all, managing to gather these 5 prefectures was not easy, especially as every region has its own speciality, and more importantly, socio-economic characteristics. The other major difficulty in the formation of clusters in the region was to find an industry they could emphasize in this context. As the main weakness of the region and especially of Sendai lies in the fact it does not manage to attract big businesses, only small businesses with a more traditional approach based on the Monozukuri or the manufacturing. Of course the Monozukuri concept was assimilated to the innovation concept in Japan\(^28\) but with the internationalization, this concept more centered on the manufacturing of “things” seems to be passed by some high-tech priorities\(^29\). The Tohoku region however did try to play on this aspect by basing its industrial cluster in it, calling it the “Tohoku manufacturing Corridor” (or Tohoku Monozukuri Corridor), and by focusing its industry on 3 main fields: the automobile, the semiconductors and the medical instruments. The aim of this cluster was therefore to create some traditional manufactured products but usable for advanced technologies, such as the 3 mentioned above. However the level of technological development is not as important as one might think, as the manufacturing of medical instruments is limited to the making of tools such as scalpels or scissors, by a consortium of 170 companies.

The reason for the malfunction of the Tohoku cluster is without a doubt the creation and the use of the network, though it is viewed as a key element in the functioning of clusters. Unlike the Fukuoka region where the links between actors are strong, with a constant flow of information, the region of Tohoku is having trouble to impose the formation of competent networks to its actors. Indeed the Tohoku region includes all the key elements to the formation of clusters, in other words: the companies, universities research labs and a local administration; however each of these elements has its flaws which are an obstacle to the building of clusters.

Therefore the territorial organization and a solid network building based on actors’ mutual-trust seem to be the condition to strengthen the competitiveness of a cluster. However nowadays a huge gap of power still exists between the Central and peripheral government in Japan and does not
look forward to reduce. Territorial reorganization and especially power delegation through decentralization process is considered as a way to reinforce local innovation competitiveness, and in an era where regions became actors it is important to attribute some initiative powers to local entities.

IV. Territorial reorganization and political decentralization to strengthen innovation

A redefinition of the spatial area on a territory can influence every domain of a State. The administrative restructuration can change the power balance between actors and give a higher initiative field to the “weak” levels. In the 21st Century, during a globalized era, regions are becoming important economic actors and reinforcement of national industrial potential is deeply linked to the initiative that the decentralized bodies can take by their own. For instance European Union decided since 2006 to support the regional governance system in generating policy making to strengthen the Regional Innovation System. Members of the European Union also decided to enlarge and reinforce the initiative of the local autonomous body: in France an important decentralization reform occurred in 2004 and introduced the Region as a core of local economy and industry. This process cannot be seen in federal countries such as the United States where federal States have already their own autonomy and competence to manage the local industry.

Furthermore decentralized society is seen as more flexible to external competitiveness in contrast to centralized State, even democratic, controlled by the Top that would not take the risk of changing radically their policy for new technological project. A capacity of switching to new technological or industrial domain is much stronger in decentralized government and so decentralization could be considered as an essential frame for innovation perspectives. For social scientists this idea became a sort of “accepted wisdom”: decentralized governments are widely seen as agile, competitive and well structured to adapt to innovation’s gale of creative destruction (Taylor, 2007).

This process can be explain by the fact that now a days, all over the world, political power has been redistributed to regions in decentralized or traditionally centralized countries on the way to be decentralized. For instance European Union members are in a geographical alliance process in order to maximize its economical power. But in paradox, benefits increasing process cannot be efficient if EU’s huge new political and transnational structure is not decentralized. Also from a macroeconomic point of view, biases on decentralization have changed and the former social scientific idea that decentralization can protect the market and make a more efficient government has been criticized at the end of the 20th century. New arguments against decentralization, and especially federalism, developed its negative impact on fiscal and monetary decisions. Therefore decentralization can affect the technological innovation, strongly linked to a long-term macroeconomic management and performance.

However to define the influence of the decentralization over the innovation industry it is important to define the type of decentralization process. The effect can be different if the decentralization is vertical, with the transfer of few competences from Central government to local governments, or horizontal, with a share
of executive and judiciary power between both governments. Also the degree of decentralization is an important factor that can determine the strength of a local industry; if decentralization is pushed to the extreme level by creating a federalism process, the scope for making policy will be stronger and Central government will have a limited control on it. Nevertheless, actors of the vertical and horizontal decentralization form a “policy community” sharing common resources and aiming to produce a collective output. To reach the same objective, members of the “policy community” have to be selected and interdependent in a stable configuration. For instance Maurice Wright (1988) is using the “policy community” concept to study a policy network between government and industry, but also argues that the norms of policy and behavior at different levels have to be analyzed with more attention.

Analysis of the political decentralization points out that governmental structure has impact on the national innovation system. (1) Horizontal and vertical decentralization increase the implication of actors in the innovation process. This affects not only the financial aspect as funding but also the research and innovation efforts by the fact that more actors are involved and more technological needs and seeds will rise. (2) However the downside of the former aspect is the increase of the competition between decentralized bodies. According to federalism scholars the major risk of generating a competitive “race to the top innovation” between autonomous entities is to create a “Delaware effect” and to let them such a larger and uncontrolled legal autonomy (Subramanian, 2004). In order to avoid such a situation this concept has evolved into the “market-preserving federalism” in which local government actions are controlled to establish policies in favor of the market and public goods (Weingast, 1995). (3) Local policymakers have more efficient information to provide to innovators concerning local situations. They have a proximity advantage that allows them to establish policies adapted to local environment and their autonomy, delegated by the decentralization, allows them a few initiative liberties letting them out of the national administration’s control. From an economic and sociological point of view the local public goods production is better and much appreciated than centralized national goods (Tiebout, 1956). This reality does not mean that national legislators do not have to interfere with local business but that the “local brand” is an important condition to increase competitiveness of an innovation. (4) Political decentralization makes the autonomous body less exposed to lobbying group influence because the local policy is more complicated and various to control than the national one. A national initiative is more exposed to different institutions opinions but if the policy is nationwide, the interest group will have much more difficulty to express their opinion case by case because each local body has its own liberty of policy interpretation. Technological changes and needs are different from one State to another and local innovation is free to follow or not the national guideline. According to Mokyr (1990, 2002) the innovative advance of Europe compared to Asia during the 20th Century can be explained by this capacity for the countries to set up a decentralization process to let a larger option to local bodies for creating its own innovation policies and products. But Mokyr also argues that decentralization is necessary but not sufficient for innovation, a theory also supported by Drezner (2001) who thinks that other external factors are involved in the innovation process.

Political decentralization can be a vector of innovation increase but it is important for the
Central government to establish a shape balance of power with local governments to find the most efficient policy. In Japan the case is similar and the Government has made efforts during decades to decentralize their policy power step by step and the innovation rates seem to have been impacted.

Notes
1 See Porter (1998) and the “Diamond model” to understand the competitive position of a nation in global competition.
3 In this study the word “region” is used as its geographical definition and does not refer to a name of an administrative division as the French “Région”. Also for the Japanese case the words “Prefecture” (Tódófuken) and “municipalities” (Shichoson) will be used to mention the administrative divisions.
4 In the early 1980’s Michel Callon and Bruno Latour (with John Law) of the Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation (CSI) of the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris developed the Actor-Network Theory that explains how actor-networks get formed, hold themselves together or fall apart. This constructivist theory explains the way actors are rationally linked (but not “how”) and analyze the incommensurability of elements and interests (process called “translation”). This theory is practically used in firms to establish a new system of leadership and action for innovation issues.
5 This innovation system concept has been inspired by the “national system of political economy” theory established by Friedrich List in 1841. Lundvall himself admitted the inspiration source.
6 Freeman has used these words in 1988 in his study of the Japanese economy success, but at that time the definition was only used to describe the specific Japanese case. Few years later he applied this concept to a global economic theory. The “National Innovation System” of 1988 and the “National Innovation System” of 1995 are quite different in their essence though.
7 Nelson (1992) tried for instance to define a model of National Innovation System based on the studies of fourteen countries however the studies were before all descriptive and were not focused on the core of the systems approach. Even though Nelson manage to establish a double layer evolutionist theory on National Innovation System based on the fact that 1) innovation is an interactive process and 2) the industrialization of the innovation results on a force of the market.
8 Also see Patel and Pavitt (1994) and Metcalfe (1995).
9 This Diamond Model can sometimes be found with an additional external and independent factor which is the “Chance”. Porter himself defined “chance” events as the ones that have little to do with circumstances in a nation and are outside the control of firms. Chance could be significant shifts in exchange rates, wars or decision taken by foreign governments. It plays its role by altering the four main conditions in the diamond model.
10 See Saxenian, 1994
11 Raines compared Porter’s model to local models that integrate local factors such as “Local innovative milieu” or the “regional innovation system”.
13 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
14 Industrial districts have a long history in Japan, for more details see among others Whitaker, Hugh D. 1997, Yamawaki Hideki, 2001
15 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
16 For more details on the Basic Plans, see Hattori Akira 2006.
17 Four domains of activity were selected : life science, IT, environment and nanotechnology
18 The 19 initial clusters were reviewed after a first-term final evaluation of the METI (through RBETIs), five were eliminated, nine were modified, five others continued and three new ones were created.
19 In 2006 the national budget for industrial clusters was 30 billion yen for 19 projects, and only the fund for international development has increased between 2006 and 2007: 14.1 billion yen to 15.5 billion yen (Sakai 2007).
20 Although MEXT is supporting 48 City Area Programs, the paper will mostly focus on Knowledge clusters which are the most representative of MEXT cluster plan.
21 The government budget for 2004 was about 9 billion yen and 10 billion yen for 2005
22 Staffed by a President, a Project Director, a Chief Scientist and other members, and including S&T coordinators or advisers like patent attorneys.
23 Kyushu Recycle and Environmental Industry Plaza (K-RIP) and Kyushu Silicon Cluster Project have existed since the beginning of the cluster policies, and the Kyushu Bio Cluster Project was added during the second phase of the project in 2006
24 These evaluations were carried out by MEXT. The list of criteria and the results are available on: http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/kagaku/chiiki/cluster/index.htm
26 National Governor’s Association, founded in 1947 and whose aim is to develop cooperation between different prefectures, but these last years their main claim has been to get higher power compared to the central government. Governor Aso is still at the head of this association after 3 years: http://www.nga.gr.jp/index.php
27 The “Galapagos syndrome” or “Galapagosisation” term refers to the Island with the same name whose living beings followed a different evolution from other living beings found elsewhere. In Japan, this term alludes to the cellphone market, which is more advanced than in any other country, but whose use is typical of Japan and incompatible with the other cellphones in the world. See Nomura Sôgô Kenkûjo. 2008, Feb.13. Garapagosuka suru Nihon (ガラパゴス化する日本, The Galapagos Syndrom in Japan), in NRI Mirai Navi. See Tabuchi, Hiroko. Why Japan’s cellphones haven’t gone global?, in The New York Times, 2009, July 19.
28 Fujimoto, Takahiro. 2007. Monozukuri Keieigaku – Seizôgyô wo Koeru Seisan Shikô (ものづくり経営科
Though, the Japanese government passed in 2000 a specific law to promote the production, the export, and the training to these traditional techniques: Monozukuri Kiban Gijutsu Shinkō Kihon Hō (ものづくり基盤技術振興基本法, A law on the development of manufacture techniques).

Some States based their decentralization process on local autonomy and ethno-cultural divisions meanwhile they knew that long-term competitiveness of a region is not possible without decentralization. Promotion of technological progress, sustain of innovation-driven economic growth and a long-run competitive advantage over centralized States are in fact the real motivations to continue establishing a decentralization process in the European Union (Commission on European Communities, 1988; European Commission, 2003).

According to Charles Mills Tiebout (1956) and his “Tiebout Model”, in local governance there is in fact a non political-solution to the “free rider problem”. Mancur Olson established the theory of the free rider a few years later (1965) and modeled the link between local population and their rational collective action for the economic evolution of the local entity.

Jonathan Rodden (2002) discovered a vicious circle in which financial transfer from Central government to local governments and the capacity of the regions to take on external debt on their own can actually generate a threat to force the Central government to attribute more grants and subsidies. State has to control and to limit the local government loan in order to avoid a regional bankruptcy and to minimize the impact on national funding.

The concept of the “Delaware effect” refers to the situation where different States of a country are in competition one with another to attract business investment and one of them, to be more attractive than the others, improves special laws, tax rules and also environment regulations. Then a concentration of attracted firms will be created in this advantageous State, and the rest of the country will be industry-neglected (Oates, 1972). This situation existed during the 1970’s in the USA when the Delaware State enacted some industry advantage laws and attracted a lot of big firms to become an important industrial area. Then the legal competition between States has been criticized and national control and regulation of competition have been reinforced to avoid this situation (Cary, 1974).
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Guidelines for Submission to the GEMC journal

“GEMC journal” is a scholarly journal published as part of the activities of Tohoku University’s Global COE Program, “Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization” (for further details please visit our homepage at http://www.law.tohoku.ac.jp/gcoe/). The journal consists of two parts, “invitational papers” and “submitted papers”. Invitational papers are requested by Editorial Committee for publication and subject to a review process and are either based on presentations given at occasions either sponsored or co-hosted by the GCOE which the Editorial Committee considers as appropriate for publishing in the GEMC journal, or articles which correspond with the aims of the Journal designated by the Editorial Committee in accordance with the purpose of the GCOE program. The contents of submitted papers should be related to the GCOE’s theme and purpose. Papers are welcomed from scholars of all disciplines. All submitted papers will be subject to an anonymous review procedure and will be evaluated based on their academic quality and value. The following are the instructions to authors who wish to submit their manuscripts to our journal:

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1. The journal welcomes individual submissions of unsolicited manuscripts. All submissions should be accompanied by a letter of recommendation from at least one professor or one associate professor of the institution which the author belongs and at least one professor or one associate professor of an outside institution(s). As an exception, the journal accepts submissions accompanied by a letter of recommendation provided by a GCOE program member.

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1. The journal accepts only articles written in either Japanese or English. Submission of articles written in languages other than Japanese or English requires a special decision by the Editorial Board.

2. Articles prepared for submission should either be written in MS Word format or Ichitaro Word Soft Data format. The maximum length of articles including references, footnotes, illustrations, tables and headings should be 15,000 words. Please note that the number of characters per page for the main text body is 2,256 (24 letters x 47 lines x double column layout) and for headings 768.

3. Authors are requested to use English one byte characters instead of Chinese numerals to indicate more than double figures given the journal’s double column layout. This rule applies to manuscripts written in English and Japanese.

4. We request authors to attach tables included in the manuscript in the form of a MS Excel file or to provide links showing the original data.
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6. Authors should compile the main body of the manuscript beginning with an “I. Introduction” followed by a “subheading level 1.” and eventually an additional “subheading level (I)”.

7. For including footnotes authors should employ the relevant functions of the word-processing software and these should be included at the right shoulder of the relevant words before punctuation. Footnotes should be collected at the end of the manuscript in numerical order in form of endnotes.

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9. Authors are requested to pay particular attention to the accuracy and correct presentation of references cited in the articles. References cited in the text should provide the author’s name and year of publication (Bull, 1977), as well as specific page numbers after a direct quotation. In-text references should be in chronological order with a reference list included at the end of the text. Examples:


※In accordance with the conclusion of Global COE Program “Gender Equality and Multicultural Conviviality in the Age of Globalization” as the publisher of the GEMC journal, the last issue was published at the end of the 2012 academic year. Thus, we will not accept any more paper submissions. The above state editorial guidelines are for reference only.
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